THE Public Interest

NUMBER 7, SPRING 1967, PRICE: $1.50

Economics and Criminal Enterprise
Thomas C. Schelling

Nathan Glazer . Housing Problems and Housing Policies
Donald J. Bogue . The End of the Population Explosion
Carl Kaysen . . . . . Data Banks and Dossiers
Daniel Bell . . Notes on the Post-Industrial Society (II)
Daniel P. Moynihan . . . . A Crisis of Confidence?
Clifton Daniel • *Irving Kristol on* The Times

The Catholics and Their Colleges (I)
Christopher Jencks & David Riesman

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE Public Interest

CONTENTS

A Crisis of Confidence? ..... *Daniel P. Moynihan* 3

The End of the Population Explosion
Donald J. Bogue 11

Housing Problems and Housing Policies
Nathan Glazer 21

Data Banks and Dossiers ..... *Carl Kaysen* 52

Economics and Criminal Enterprise
Thomas C. Schelling 61

The Catholics and Their Colleges (I)
Christopher Jencks & David Riesman 79

Notes on the Post-Industrial Society (II) *Daniel Bell* 102

The Times: An Exchange
Clifton Daniel • Irving Kristol 119

Current Reading 124

Contributors to This Issue 20

THE PUBLIC INTEREST is published quarterly by National Affairs, Inc., and appears in Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Winter issues. Its office of publication is located at Freedom House, 20 West 40 Street, New York, N. Y. 10018. Subscription price: $5.00 per year. Second class postage is paid at New York, N. Y.

© 1967 by National Affairs, Inc.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Editors
Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol

Publisher:
Warren Demian Manshel

Publication Committee:
Murray L. Silberstein (chairman)
Leo Cherne
Daniel P. Moynihan
Arthur J. Rosenthal
Leo Rosten
Martin E. Segal
Stanley Simon
Arthur L. Singer, Jr.
Robert M. Solow
James Q. Wilson

Editorial Office:
c/o Basic Books,
404 Park Avenue South, N. Y. 16

Subscription Office:
c/o Freedom House,
20 West 40 St., N. Y. 18

THE PUBLIC INTEREST *is sponsored by Freedom House as part of its educational program and as a contribution to — the public interest. But the views expressed in the magazine are to be attributed only to the authors and, where appropriate, the editors. Freedom House believes that it is out of such a confrontation of thoughtful views that a more enlightened and more responsible public opinion will emerge.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COMMENT

A Crisis of Confidence?

DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN

THE similarities between the War in Viet Nam and the War on Cities are instructive. We are now in the thirteenth or whatever year of the foreign involvement, and the third or perhaps thirtieth of the domestic crisis. Each entanglement somehow crept into being without any great attention being paid it by the general public. Each, of a sudden, has become acute in the eyes of government. After great exertions, ever greater ones are asked. The principal difference at this moment is one of phasing: among the public few would deny the reality of the Viet Nam situation, but as yet the idea that there is an identifiable urban crisis remains pretty much confined to specialists, or to spokesman for those groups, principally ethnic minorities, who might expect to gain most from a serious national commitment to the proposition.

It is never easy to pronounce about what the public does or does not think, but it is reasonably clear that the greater portion of the American electorate simply does not share the currently voiced concern about "our sick cities."

The sources of this unconcern are varied but convergent. The principal one is that for a solid quarter of a century the great mass of Americans have experienced a steadily rising standard of living, to a degree without parallel in history. This rise has been accompanied by, and in large measure has consisted of, improvements in housing, transportation, education, health, recreation, and other "urban" amenities which are now said to be in a state of crisis, but which most persons know to be in a vastly better condition today than in times past. I believe it fair to say that this popular impression corresponds to whatever reality is reflected in our standard national statistics, and that a great many students of cities, however urgent they may feel is the need for further improvement, will nonetheless agree that things are far better now than they have ever been.

WHAT, then, is the case for "crisis"? It rests largely, I believe, on three congeries of facts which are only somewhat related to each other, but which tend to be perceived with equal concern by urbanists.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The first set of "facts" consists of assertions that American cities are ugly, incoherent, sprawling wastelands. Los Angeles is the preferred example. The second set of facts is addressed to the severe financial strains which most central cities are experiencing. The third set concerns the growth of a large Negro lower class in those cities, a group that many seem to feel is less assimilable than lower class immigrant groups which have preceded it.

I happen to share, in varying degrees, the concern felt by others on each of these scores. However, I am aware that there are quite persuasive arguments to the contrary. The most compelling of these concerns the first point. I believe Professor Daniel J. Elazar, in the Summer, 1966, issue of this magazine, is entirely sound in his assertion that the "American people persist in maintaining an implicit distinction between urbanization and citification, willingly accepting the former while seeking to avoid the latter." The American urban place is an "anti-city" because, with our strong agrarian ideals, we like it that way. The medieval or baroque notion of the European city, with its animated center and sacred precincts and teeming parishes, is one which most Americans simply do not share: a pity perhaps, but a fact. As Elazar has written: "There is a great deal of evidence to indicate that most models of improvement proposed for the American city are nothing more than projections of the desires of certain articulate minorities. . . ."

The financial troubles of cities are well enough documented, but even here it is not so much a matter of the cities' earning less as of spending more. The essential fact is that, owing to sustained general prosperity, public revenues have been rising quite handsomely. There is indeed an imbalance between the elasticity of revenues at the local as against the national level, but it hardly requires great imagination to devise transfer systems that will restore a measure of balance.

Similarly, the appearance, all of a sudden, of large numbers of lower class Negroes in Northern cities has led many persons to assert that we are in the grip of a unique problem. It seems to me that it is not yet clear whether this is so, but it may turn out that it is, and in the meantime I would certainly agree with James Q. Wilson that "for the present, the urban Negro is, in a fundamental sense, *the* 'urban problem.'" But even here one is impressed with how easy it is for the majority of Americans to remain quite unaware of any such problem. The physical isolation of Negro housing is so near to complete in the United States that it is possible to live in the same city with a million Negro Americans and have only the faintest awareness that they live in distinct neighborhoods and communities that have vastly greater "urban" problems than those faced by the community-at-large. And such is the hold of race on the American mind that it becomes entirely too easy simply to assume that Negroes will live and act differently from whites, an assertion one hears increasingly from Negroes as well. I have often wondered, for example, what would be the reaction of the business community if it were reported that the "proletariat" were rioting in Los Angeles, or Cleveland, or Rochester, or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wherever, instead of Negroes. Would there not be a deeper tremor of concern? It is a vicious but persisting fact of American life that white Americans blandly accept as almost natural the fact that Negro Americans are mistreated and that in response they misbehave. And somehow whites contrive to dislike Negroes on both grounds.

The upshot of all this is that only a limited number of Americans see contemporary social problems as a result of the malfunctioning of that system of economic and social relationships which are defined as "urban."

But there is yet another source of reluctance to accept the reality and urgency of our urban problems. I would call it a crisis of confidence with regard to the efforts that have already been made to deal with them.

By "crisis of confidence" I mean this. For more than a generation now, the Federal government has been concerned about and has been involved with urban problems. However, the results of this involvement – of the programs enacted in the '30's and '40's – have been anything but spectacular, while the official rhetoric about them has remained altogether too glowing.

To be specific. The first efforts of the Federal government were directed towards the physical plant of the city. It was judged that private enterprise was not producing enough housing for the poor, nor did it seem able to prevent the decay of commercial and other properties in the center city. The Federal government thereupon undertook to subsidize remedial building efforts through the public housing program, begun under President Roosevelt, and the urban renewal program begun under President Truman. I speak as an advocate of both these programs, and as one who has worked hard for them in political campaigns that go back half my lifetime. But I think that none of us could say that either of these programs has been a smashing success. And if we are honest with ourselves we will allow that many persons of competence would judge them just the opposite. Thus, Professor Scott Greer, a distinguished and liberal urban analyst, has concluded that "at a cost of more than three billion dollars, the Urban Renewal Agency has succeeded in materially reducing the supply of low cost housing in American cities."

Again, I would not myself necessarily subscribe to such a judgment; but it and similar judgments have been reached by responsible men, and they are reacting to realities which members of the public are able to perceive for themselves. If it were the practice of public authorities to acknowledge the import of such criticisms, I suspect there would be today a larger willingness to try out new and different programs. I would challenge, in other words, the assumption that, if the public should learn that a program has not succeeded as well as was hoped, it will abandon not only the program but the problem to which it was addressed. I think we trifle with the intelligence of the American democracy when we assume that it will never accept bad news, must indeed be fed a constant diet of good news about

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

past programs, accompanied by forecasts of violent catastrophe unless new and even greater ones are enacted.

I ASSUME that the problem of objectively evaluating urban programs must become even greater now that the Federal government is moving beyond its original concern to improve the physical equipment of cities towards an effort to improve the human beings who live in them. No one need be told that people are harder to rehabilitate than buildings, although we have begun to learn that the process is expensive and frustrating in buildings as well. More to the point, most of the "high yield" social programs aimed at improving the lives of our urban populations have already been enacted. (Birth control programs for the poor are perhaps the one great exception.) The kinds of programs that are now being proposed are almost by definition marginal. One comparison will suffice. The introduction of universal, compulsory education in the 19th century gradually transformed American society. This was *the* great change. Present efforts to add a few years of schooling at one end or another, to extend the curriculum and improve facilities, while useful and important, cannot possibly have the impact of that first innovation. And to the extent that new programs are directed to the youngster who has trouble coping with the education system as it is, they will be even more costly and marginal in their effects.

Now, it is always the case that marginal effects are much harder to measure than gross and fundamental ones. But over the past generation, there has been significant progress in the capacity of the social sciences to measure social changes induced by public policy. These derive in great measure from the introduction of the high-speed computer, but also from solid advances in our understanding of social processes themselves. "We live in a society," Otis Dudley Duncan has written, "that is understandable but not understood." I am sure Professor Duncan would wish to leave plenty of room for the eventual mysteries of life, but it is fair to state that the "first-order" effects of many social programs may now be subjected to rudimentary, but nonetheless useful, measurement.

If this is so, then the obvious course of responsible government is to make use of these techniques, recognizing both their limitations and their utility. Perhaps the best recent example of this was the decision by President Johnson to introduce the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System developed in the Defense Department to the other activities of the Federal government. But my main object is to suggest that this approach is essential, not only to the rational initiation of new policies, but also to the maintenance of public confidence in the programs that ensue, and to argue that this second function is not now being performed.

LET me be specific. Of all the major social initiatives of recent times, none, I think, arose more directly from academic research and evaluation than did the War on Poverty. Much of the basis for the program, for example, was laid by the careful economic analyses

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

carried out in the 1950's by the Subcommittee on Low Income Families of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report. This attachment to research and evaluation was carried over into the operations of the Office of Economic Opportunity itself. Surely one of the most attractive products of this process was Project Head Start. It was begun on the basis of good research information, and proceeded to research itself as it went along. However, by the end of its second year of operation, at least some of this research was concluding that, while the program has strong initial effects on children during the summer, these effects are quite quickly attenuated as the children return to their regular schools in the fall. This has led to suggestions that the program be year-round, which is reasonable and obviously worthy of careful consideration. But then, last month, the OEO announced yet a new program, Operation Keep Moving. The first point in this program is an across-the-board reduction of pupil-teacher ratios in all elementary grades to that of Head Start, i.e., 15 to 1.

This is clearly an expensive proposal. The current pupil-teacher ratio in our public schools is 24.6, the current expenditure per pupil in average daily attendance is $532. To reduce the ratio to 15 to 1, in rough but representative terms, would require another $340 per pupil. This would represent an increase in public expenditure of $1020 per year for a family with three children – which sum, in turn, represents 28.3% of the median income of nonwhite families in the nation as of 1965.

It also happens that this is a subject about which there is a body of research findings, going back to the beginnings of empirical research in educational psychology and sociology almost half a century ago. In a paper presented to the American Statistical Association last summer, Professor Peter Rossi of the University of Chicago summarized these findings as follows: "By and large, class size has no effect on the learning of students, with the possible exception of classes in the language arts." At about the same time, the Office of Education released its massive study, "Equality of Educational Opportunity," by Professor James Coleman, which came to the identical conclusion stated flatly as follows: "The pupil/teacher ratio . . . showed a consistent lack of relation to achievement among all groups under all conditions."

Now I am aware that much of the Head Start research has been challenged, and assume this is also the case with class size effects. I know that in the experience of individual teachers class size is often seen as crucial. I would further suppose that it is possible that a really sharp reduction in numbers might make a significant difference. But it is also possible that a really sharp increase in teachers' salaries might have an even greater effect. I don't know. The point is that, in making proposals of this kind, which call for a massive allocation of public funds, we ought to get into the habit of reviewing the research findings at the outset – and then candidly stating our case for moving contrariwise, if that is our wish. How else is public confidence to be maintained?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The usual whispered argument, of course, is that to be candid about public policies which don't produce much progress is to give a weapon to those who dislike seeing the Federal government involved in any such programs at all. This is an unworthy argument; but it is also an absurd argument. The American public is supporting a fantastic array of social services, and continues to do so in ever larger amounts. The issue, then, is not *whether*, but *which*. Thus, with regard to persons living in or near to poverty, a fundamental issue is to choose between a strategy of services as against a strategy of income. The amounts of money a Project Keep Moving would require are in the range of those that would be needed to establish a national family allowance. I can imagine a good argument being made to the effect that, if there is an extra thousand dollars a year to go round on every poor family in the nation, the best thing would be to give them the cash and let them spend it on things they think they need most – which might well be formal education for many, but is sure to be more varied than any formula laid down in Washington would permit. In any event, to propose spending on services which such research as we have suggests will produce little or no effect, is to risk being thought ridiculous or worse by members of the public; and we would delude ourselves if we did not see that this judgment has already been reached by large numbers.

EVEN more to be deplored than our tendency to ignore the results of research and evaluation in our shaping of public policy, is our tendency to undertake great and promising enterprises only to forget about them, and to allow them to wither on the vine as other more interesting subjects come along. Let me cite, for example, the research and evaluation programs that accompanied the pilot projects funded by the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, established in 1961. As few programs in the history of American government, this one set out consciously and openly to test a set of hypotheses about the nature of deviant behavior in slum neighborhoods. It was a social scientist's dream, and at the time attracted great attention in the press and in university circles. But five years later, what has come of it all? With one or two exceptions, the projects seem to have disappeared into the War on Poverty, or to have been quite transformed on their own. The research directors are scattered, policy objectives have been redefined, and after the expenditure of many millions of dollars, we don't seem to know any more about delinquency than when we undertook to find out about it five years ago.

I believe our difficulty here has two quite different components. The first is that our commitment to evaluation research is fundamentally ambivalent. This is so, not only because research of this kind can blow up in an administrator's face when it turns out his programs show little or none of the effects they are supposed to achieve, but more importantly because, in areas of social policy, facts are simply not neutral – they are inescapably political. Most social arrange-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ments rest on assumptions about the "facts" of a given situation, and to challenge such facts could also mean to challenge those social arrangements.

The second source of difficulty, however, is of quite a different nature. It is that, up until now, the executive branch of the Federal government, and the executive branch in American government in general, has had a virtual monopoly on evaluation research. Congress, the State legislatures, the City Councils, are simply told what have been the supposed results of such research. They do not have to agree; but they are hard put to disagree.

There is nothing sinister about this state of affairs. Serious evaluation research is only just approaching the state of a developed, as against an experimental, technique. Inevitably it has been sponsored in the first instance by executive departments. However, precisely because the findings of such research are not neutral, it would be dangerous to permit this imbalance to persist. Too often, the executive is exposed to the temptation to release only those findings that suit its purposes; there is no one to keep them honest. Similarly, universities and other private groups which often undertake such research on contract are in some measure subject to constant, if subtle, pressure to produce "positive" findings. The simple fact is that a new source of knowledge is coming into being; while it is as yet an imperfect technique, it is likely to improve; and if it comes to be accepted as a standard element in public discourse it is likely to raise considerably the level of that discourse. This source of knowledge should not remain an executive monopoly.

WHAT is to be done? I would offer a simple analogy. In the time this nation was founded, the principal form in which knowledge was recorded and preserved was in printed books, and accordingly in 1800 Congress established the Library of Congress as a source of information. Over the next century, techniques of accounting and budgeting developed very rapidly, and in 1921 Congress established the General Accounting Office to keep track of federal expenditures. I would like to suggest that Congress should now establish an Office of Legislative Evaluation in the GAO which would have the task of systematically reviewing the program evaluations and "PPBS" judgments made by executive departments. This office would be staffed by professional social scientists. On occasion they would undertake on their own to assess a Federal program, just as on occasion the GAO does an audit of its own; but in general their task would be to "evaluate the evaluators" and in this way both maintain and improve the quality of the regular ongoing work of the executive departments in this field, and also routinely make these findings available to the Congress. It should not be expected that their findings will be dramatic or that they will put an end to argument – just the contrary is likely to occur. But the long-run effect could be immensely useful, if only because Congress would have some clearer idea than it now has as to what it is doing.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Some will feel that the very existence and distribution of knowledge of this kind is a threat to continued experiment and innovation. I disagree. I would argue, for example, that the General Accounting Office has in its 45 years of activity raised the level of financial honesty in the programs of the Federal government to the point that it is no longer even a remote obstacle to federal legislation. Federal money may get wasted, but it rarely gets stolen. The American people know this, and I am persuaded that it profoundly affects their willingness to pay taxes for the support of federal programs. I believe further that if we began to be as careful and as open about assessing the results of social programs as we are in ensuring the personal honesty of those involved with running them, we might begin to see a more enduring willingness to keep trying – as well, perhaps, as a welcome reluctance by cabinet officers to "oversell" their programs to begin with.

We have set ourselves goals that are, in some ways, unique in history: not only to abolish poverty and ignorance, but also to become the first genuinely multi-racial and, we hope, in the end non-racial democracy the world has seen. I believe that in moving toward these goals, and in seeking to change the present reality, an unflinching insistence on fact will be a major asset.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The end of the population explosion

DONALD J. BOGUE

Recent developments in the worldwide movement to bring runaway birth rates under control are such that it now is possible to assert with considerable confidence that the prospects for success are excellent. In fact, it is quite reasonable to assume that *the world population crisis is a phenomenon of the 20th century, and will be largely if not entirely a matter of history when humanity moves into the 21st century.* No doubt there will still be problematic areas in the year 2000, but they will be confined to a few nations that were too prejudiced, too bureaucratic, or too disorganized to take action sooner, or will be confined to small regions within some nations where particular ethnic, economic, or religious groups will not yet have received adequate fertility control services and information. With the exception of such isolated remnants (which may be neutralized by other areas of growth-at-less-than-replacement), it is probable that by the year 2000 each of the major world regions will have a population growth rate that either is zero or is easily within the capacity of its expanding economy to support.

The implications of these assertions for the feeding of the human race are obvious. Given the present capacity of the earth for food production, and the potential for additional food production if modern technology were more fully employed, mankind clearly has within its grasp the capacity to abolish hunger – within a matter of a decade or two. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether a total net food shortage

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for the entire earth will ever develop. If such a deficit does develop, it will be mild and only of short duration. The really critical problem will continue to be one of maldistribution of food among the world's regions.

These optimistic assertions are not intended to detract from the seriousness of the present population situation. Some years of acute crisis lie immediately ahead for India, China, the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, Mexico, Brazil, Egypt, and other nations. Severe famines quite probably will develop within local areas of some of these nations unless emergency international measures are taken. My purpose here is to emphasize that the engineers and the agricultural technicians striving to increase the output of material goods in these nations are not working alone. Paralleling their activity is a very ambitious international fertility control program which is just starting to "pay off."

These remarks are certainly not intended to cause the participants in this international fertility control program to relax their efforts and be lulled into complacency. The successful outcome anticipated above is not one that will come automatically, but only as a result of a continued all-out "crash program" to make the widest and most intensive use of the medical, sociological and psychological knowledge now available, and of the practical experience that has recently emerged from experimental family planning programs. It also anticipates a continued flow of new research findings and enriched practical experience that is promptly fed back into programs of fertility reduction.

This view is at variance with the established view of many population experts. For more than a century, demographers have terrorized themselves, each other, and the public at large with the essential hopelessness and inevitability of the "population explosion." Their prophecies have all been dependent upon one premise: "If recent trends continue. . . ." It is an ancient statistical fallacy to perform extrapolations upon this premise when in fact the premise is invalid. It is my major point that *recent trends have not continued, nor will they be likely to do so.* Instead, there have been some new and recent developments that make it plausible to expect a much more rapid pace in fertility control. These developments are so new and so novel that *population trends before 1960 are largely irrelevant in predicting what will happen in the future.*

In times of social revolution, it often is fruitless to forecast the future on the basis of past experience. Instead, it is better to abandon time series analysis and study the phenomenon of change itself, seeking to understand it and to learn in which direction and how rapidly it is moving. If enough can be learned about the social movement that is bringing about the change, there is a hope that its eventual out-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

come can be roughly predicted. This procedure is followed here. The result is subjective and crude, but I believe it to be nearer the future course of demographic history than the official population projections now on record.

II

Limitations of space permit only a listing of major social developments which, in my view, justify the relatively optimistic prospect I have set forth.

1. Grass roots approval. All over the world, wherever surveys of the attitudes of the public with respect to fertility have been taken, it has uniformly been found that a majority of couples with three living children wish to have no more. Of these, a very large proportion approve of family planning in principle and declare they would like to have more information about it. They also approve of nationwide health service that includes family planning. In other words, active objections among the masses on cultural, moral, or religious grounds are minor rather than major obstacles. This is true both in Asia and Latin America, and seems to be developing rapidly in Africa. Thus, at the "grass roots" level, the attitudinal and cultural conditions are highly favorable. Previously, it had been feared that traditionalism and religious attitudes would prove to be almost insuperable blocks to rapid fertility control. But the more sociologists study the situation, the more they accept as correct the generalization that, in most places where there is a population problem, the attitude toward family planning among the mass of the people is strongly positive.

2. Aroused political leadership. Whereas fertility control was regarded as a subversive, immoral, and sinful program during the 150 years of fertility decline in Europe and the United States, in the nations with a population problem today the national political leadership openly accepts family planning as a moral and rational solution. Heads of state in India, Pakistan, Korea, China, Egypt, Chile, Turkey, and Colombia, for example, have made fertility control an integral part of the national plan for economic development. In this, they have followed the lead of Japan. The national ministers of health and welfare not only are permitted but are expected to provide family planning services. National health services are adding family planning to their clinic services, financed by public tax funds. The mass media are increasingly carrying official endorsements, public encouragements, and specific information.

3. Accelerated professional and research activity. Professional groups in the developing countries (as well as in the rest of the world) are rapidly losing whatever antipathy or prejudice against family planning they may have had. Everywhere, the medical profession is rapidly giving it a solid endorsement – even in nations where there

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have been problems of religious objection. Within religious groups where there formerly was a hard inflexible prohibition against the use of chemical or mechanical contraceptive appliances, there is now a great deal of difference of opinion. Gradually, the laity is reaching the belief that the control of natality is a matter for the individual conscience, or a medical matter to be discussed with a physician – but not with the priest. Physicians and priests alike tend to accept this interpretation without forthright challenge.

Universities, both in the United States and abroad, have undertaken large-scale and sustained research activities in the fields of family planning. Their activities cover the entire range of topics – medical, sociological, and psychological. Most of the nations with a national family planning program are sponsoring research into the problem. This includes not only projects to discover new and improved ways of promoting fertility control, but also the evaluation of present programs. These activities are not amorphous, but within a remarkably short time have been coordinated. The process of integration was greatly facilitated by the holding in Geneva in 1965 of an International Conference on Family Planning Programs.

Much of the credit for the development described above is due to the activities of not-for-profit organizations that have taken population control as a focus of their activities: the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, Population Council, and International Planned Parenthood are the leaders. The Swedish Government, the Milbank Memorial Fund, the Planned Parenthood Association of America, and the Pathfinder Fund have also been highly important sponsors of these activities. These organizations have provided unprecedented financial and technical support.

4. The slackening of progress in death control. Immediately after World War II, the industrialized nations of the world realized that there was a series of public health and medical programs that could be accomplished quickly and cheaply to bring about a reduction in mortality. These have now been largely carried out – there have been campaigns against malaria, smallpox, cholera, yellow fever, and other diseases that can be brought under control with an injection, a semiannual house spraying, etc. The results have been dramatic, and death rates have tumbled. However, further progress in death control will be slower, because the remaining problems are those for which a solution is more difficult or is as yet unknown. For example, the death rate in Latin America stands at about 14 per thousand now. Modern medicine could bring it, at best, only to about 8 per thousand – a fall of 6 points. But a very much greater investment must be made, and over a considerably longer span of time, to achieve these 6 points than was required to obtain the preceding six points. In Asia the death rate still stands at about 20, even after the advent of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"miracle drugs" and the mass-inoculation and mass-treatment programs. It may be expected to drift lower, but at a slower pace than before.

This slackening of death control has a most important implication – a decline in the birth rate would be more directly reflected in a decline in the rate of population growth. During the past two decades, even if birth rates were declining, death rates were declining still faster, so that the population growth rate increased. That trend now appears to be reaching the end of a cycle: the cycle appears to be on the verge of reversing itself.

5. A variety of sociological and psychological phenomena, previously unknown or underappreciated, are promoting the rapid adoption of family planning by the mass of the people. Here we can only list them, without explanation:

a. Privation is itself a powerful motivating force for fertility control.

b. Private communication about family planning is far greater than had been thought, and can easily be stimulated to attain flood proportions.

c. "Opinion leaders" – indigenous men and women who are knowledgable about birth control and freely undertake to influence others to adopt it – can be mass-produced cheaply and very rapidly by means of mass media and other action programs. Thus, in this area just as in economic development, there is a "multiplier effect" which, if capitalized upon, can greatly hasten "takeoff" into rapidly declining fertility.

d. It is becoming evident that fathers are very nearly equally as interested and responsible in controlling fertility as are wives. Programs aimed at couples, instead of at females, are highly effective.

e. We are discovering that illiterate rural populations will make use of the traditional methods of family planning – condom, suppositories, etc. – very nearly as readily as urban populations, after a brief period of information and trial. They will also adopt the newer methods as – or even more – readily.

6. Improved technology in contraception promotes massive adoption by uneducated people at a rapid pace. Oral contraceptives and the intra-uterine devices have both proved to be highly acceptable after only short periods of instruction and familiarity. Even illiterate rural villagers make sustained use of these methods where they have been given unprejudiced trial. These developments are only half-a-decade old, but they already have had a profound impact upon fertility control programs and plans. As yet there is still a great deal of prejudice against the oral compounds in Asia, so that the advantages of a two-method assault have not been fully realized there.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In Latin American experiments, where the "pills" and intra-uterine devices are used side-by-side as alternative methods, the results are highly impressive.

We are repeatedly being told by the physiologists, however, that our so-called "modern" methods of contraception are crude and barbarous – each with unpleasant side-effects and unsuitable for as much as one quarter of the population. They insist that much superior methods are on the horizon – that soon there will be dramatic improvements, that costs will be cheaper, and that the need for "sustained motivation" to practice contraception will be greatly reduced. Millions of dollars are being poured into experimental research on this front each year. This activity is taking place both in the public and the private sector. The giants of the drug industry know that huge markets can be gained by improving upon present contraceptive technology – and that huge markets will be lost if a competitor discovers and markets a superior product. As a result, all of the leading motives that bring about frenzied activity for progress among scientists have been harnessed and are at work in behalf of improving contraceptive technology – prestige, economic gain, anxiety, compassion.

III

In order to illustrate the above points, let us take as an example the recent experience of Korea. In 1962, the Republic of Korea formally adopted family planning as one of its national policies. In 1965, a National Survey of Family Planning was conducted. Following are some points from that survey.

1. Eighty-nine percent of the wives and 79 percent of the husbands approved of family planning.
2. The rate of approval was only slightly lower in the rural than in the urban areas (88 percent for rural women and 77 percent for rural men).
3. Of the minority who disapproved, only 8 percent mentioned religion or morals. Traditional resistance was as low in rural as in urban areas.
4. Inability to read was no barrier; 81 percent of those unable to read nevertheless approved of family planning.
5. On the verbal level, the population declared itself willing to practice family planning if given services. Seventy-seven percent of the urban women and 71 percent of the rural women made such a declaration. Among husbands, 71 percent of the urban and 65 percent of the rural made such a declaration.
6. Unwillingness to practice family planning was concentrated primarily among young couples who had not yet had the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

number of children they desired and older couples (past 40 years of age) who were approaching the end of their childbearing. Couples in the years of prime importance for birth control, 25-40, were most positive in their attitudes. Moreover, the greater the number of living children, the greater the willingness to practice.

7. As a result of the national information program, 85 percent of the urban and 83 percent of the rural population had heard of family planning. Moreover, 67 percent of the urban and 64 percent of the rural population had knowledge of at least one contraceptive method. Even among the illiterate, 51 percent knew of one method or more. Knowledge of the more reliable methods — oral pill, IUCD, condom — was only very slightly less widespread in rural than in urban areas.
8. At the time of the interview, 21 percent of the urban and 14 percent of the rural couples were practicing family planning. Even among the illiterate population, 10 percent were currently practicing family planning. Although small, these percentages very obviously have sprung from a condition of near-zero within a span of three years. If only 2 percent are added each year, within 35 years population growth would be near zero.
9. The methods used by rural families were equal to or superior to those of the urban population in terms of reliability:

	Percent of those using a method	
Method	*Rural*	*Urban*
Condom	51.1	61.1
I.U.C.D.	18.4	27.0
Oral Pill	8.5	3.5
Foam tablet	34.5	42.2

Note: Figures add to more than 100 because some couples employed more than one contraceptive.

10. In April of 1965 there were 2207 field workers in the national family planning service, stationed in the health centers or in local offices. This is only the first wave of a rapid build-up to a point where there will be one field worker for each 10,000 population. The medical and social science departments of Seoul National University are actively engaged in research, evaluation, and participation in the national program. A private organization, Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea, has a branch in each province and is providing service and information through its office. Yonsel Medical College is conducting special experiments in rural areas, with assistance from the Population Council.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

11. The progress of the national program in giving family planning services is most impressive. The progress that results when a well-designed family planning program is carried out in a population of low education is illustrated by the Sungdong Gu Action-Research Project on Family Planning, Conducted by Seoul National University School of Public Health under the sponsorship of the Population Council. This program started in July, 1964. It included the use of mass media (T.V., radio, newspaper, posters, pamphlets, leaflets), group meetings, and home visiting. During the first 15 months of the program, of a total of 44,900 eligible (married women in the ages 20-44), 9,809 visited the family planning station for family planning information. About 85 percent of these visitors (19 percent of all the eligible women) accepted a method of family planning. Acceptance was divided roughly equally between condoms and other traditional methods and the IUCD's. Within the period, a total of 5,722 insertions (13 percent of the eligible women) were made. Even when allowance is made for the fact that the first year's experience would "skim off" the accumulated group of already-motivated people, the fact that one-fifth of the fertile population could be induced to adopt family planning within such short time is most impressive. It suggests the potential progress that can be made when a well-balanced program of information and service is provided, making use both of the mass media and personal contact.

The above brief notes on the progress of fertility control in Korea are not isolated instances. A recent report from the Pakistan Family Planning Programme suggests that more than one million families in that nation of 100 million (about 5 percent of the eligible population) now are currently contracepted through this program alone. In India, more than a million insertions of IUCD's are being made annually — in addition, the use of other methods of contraception is rising. In Colombia in Latin America, the oral pills and the IUCD both are being accepted at phenomenal rates; it is estimated that more than 120,000 couples in this nation of 18 million persons are using the oral pills alone; this is roughly 3 percent of the eligible population. In addition, large quantities of other methods are known to be used. In Santiago, Chile, the IUCD is so well known and widely used that it is a part of the medical service throughout the metropolitan area.

To summarize: wherever one looks in the underdeveloped segments of the world, one finds evidence of firmly established and flourishing family planning activity. By whatever crude estimates it is possible to make, it is quite clear that a sufficiently large share of the population already is making use of modern contraceptives to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have a depressing effect upon the birth rate. Even conservative evaluation of the prospects suggests that *instead of a "population explosion" the world is on the threshold of a "contraception adoption explosion."* Because of lack of adequate vital statistics, the effects of this new "explosion" will not be readily measurable for a few years, but they will start to manifest themselves in the censuses of 1970 and will be most unmistakable in 1980.

IV

Given the situation that has just been described, what can be said concerning the future population of the world? If we insist on extrapolating past trends, we are making the unrealistic assertion that conditions have remained and will continue to remain unchanged. If we predict a slow change of the type that was typical of Europe and Northern America before 1960, we are implicitly asserting that the current programs are having zero effect: this assertion is contrary to fact. The course taken here has been to try to comprehend the nature of the change that is taking place, and to predict its probable course and speed, so that its impact may be guessed. As crude and subjective as this procedure is, it appears to offer more valid predictions than conventional population projections.

Looking at the developments listed above, realizing that they are only 5 years old or less, knowing that accomplishments in this area are cumulative and grow by exponential curves, and appreciating that new discoveries and improvements will accrue promptly along all fronts – medical, social, and psychological – both from basic research and from accumulating experience and evaluation – the following generalizations appear to be justified:

The trend of the worldwide movement toward fertility control has already reached a state where declines in death rates are being surpassed by declines in birthrates. Because progress in death control is slackening and progress in birth control is accelerating, the world has already entered a situation where the pace of population growth has begun to slacken. The exact time at which this "switch-over" took place cannot be known exactly, but we estimate it to have occurred about 1965. From 1965 onward, therefore, the rate of world population growth may be expected to decline with each passing year. The rate of growth will slacken at such a pace that it will be zero or near zero at about the year 2000, so that population growth will not be regarded as a major social problem except in isolated and small "retarded" areas.

In evaluating these conclusions, it must be kept in mind that the topic is a deadly serious one, and the penalties for misjudgment may be very great. There is one set of penalties that results from overoptimism. But there is another set of penalties that results from over-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pessimism. It is quite possible that nothing has sapped the morale of family planning workers in the developing countries more than the Malthusian pessimism that has been radiated by many demographic reports. It is like assuring soldiers going into battle that they are almost certain to be defeated. If the comments made here should be so fortunate as to fall into the hands of these same family planning workers, it is hoped that those who read them will appreciate just how close they actually are to success. They have it within their grasp to improve dramatically their countries' fortunes. Coupled with the companion programs of industrialization and modernization, the effects could appear almost miraculous as they unfold in the 1970's and 1980's.

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN is Director of the Joint Center of Urban Studies of M.I.T. and Harvard. His article is adapted from testimony presented before the Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization of the U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operations (the Ribicoff Committee).... DONALD J. BOGUE is Professor of Sociology and Director of the Community and Family Study Center of the University of Chicago. He is a former president of the Population Association of America and is directing a large program, under a grant from the Ford Foundation, of research and experimentation for accelerating the decline in birth rates.... NATHAN GLAZER is Professor of Sociology at the University of California at Berkeley.... CARL KAYSEN is Director of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton.... THOMAS C. SCHELLING, author of many important works on military strategic thinking, is at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.... DAVID RIESMAN is Professor of Social Relations at Harvard University.... CHRISTOPHER JENCKS is Resident Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C.... Some of the "notes" in DANIEL BELL's essay are drawn from a paper, "Beyond the Great Society: the Inadequacy of the Concepts," which was given as the Bentley lecture at Syracuse University in February, 1966, and from a Memorandum submitted by the author to the National Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Housing problems and housing policies

NATHAN GLAZER

The question of what is "good housing" is never as simple as it appears. Primitive dwellings on Greek isles delight architects and city planners who are horrified by the housing and planning of Levitt and Sons. In Japan, the sixth most powerful industrial nation in the world, and in its wealthiest city, Tokyo, we find that at least three-quarters of the dwellings *must* be substandard by American census standards, simply because they do not have flush toilets. Or if we consider a country that has, in common opinion, a most enlightened governmental housing policy and a very high living standard, Sweden, we find that the number of persons per room is one-third higher than in the United States.

So what is well housed? American housing experts apply three principal measures to the voluminous information provided by the housing census in order to determine adequacy of housing: (a) whether a housing unit is dilapidated or not, (b) whether it has hot running water and private toilet and bath, and (c) whether it is overcrowded (that is, more than one person per room). Using these measures – and we have indicated by reference to plumbing in Japan and crowding in Sweden how specifically they are the measures of this country, of this culture, and at this time – we find that 21 percent of the non-farm American families are ill-housed; and among specific groups, much larger numbers: 37 percent of those earning under $4,000, 53 percent of those with non-white heads of families, 65 percent of those with non-white heads and incomes under $4,000.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thus, American housing, which from one perspective can be seen as the most spacious and best-equipped in the world, is, from another perspective, grossly inadequate. Since this last perspective happens to be our own, any discussion of American housing policy had better operate from within it.

On the effects of poor housing

What is the effect of substandard and crowded housing on the families that live in it? Here we reach into the murkiest of sociological depths. I have indicated how culture-bound are our definitions of "the standard" and "the crowded." We can find examples of entire societies living in housing that by our measures are substandard and crowded, and yet these conditions seem not to create a serious problem for family living. That is understandable and obvious: we are all aware of how the prism of culture transforms the same physical reality into symbolically different settings. Less understandable and less obvious is the fact that defective conditions in housing within a single society, as defined by that society, seem to have such an irregular relationship to other social phenomena. Thus, we may observe that in preserves of technically excellent and uncrowded housing which are limited to low-income groups – that is, in public housing projects – there is no clear and specific relationship between the improvement in housing that the families have experienced and other social indicators. Families in low-rent-housing projects are neither stronger nor weaker, better nor worse off – except for having better housing.

Consider, for example, the most careful study – that of Daniel M. Wilner and his associates – of the effects of good housing, of the public housing project variety, on family relations. This study concludes: "It is not clear . . . that the change from bad to good housing has brought with it distinguishable alterations in relations among persons within the family." Equally inconclusive results are found in changes in attitudes and behavior toward neighborhood and community, and in a variety of recreational activities. On the other hand, in relations with neighbors and on various rather elusive (to this reader) psychological measures, housing seems to have made some small difference. And there is a clear, if also surprisingly small, improvement in health.

If we were dependent on Wilner's study alone to argue for the generally beneficial effects of better housing, our argument would not have much force. But we must also point out that Wilner studies the impact of housing *per se* in isolation from all other factors. And he is also studying the impact of what is, in one perspective (in the light of housing possibilities available to most American families), only a small improvement. Alvin Schorr, in a scholarly and insightful summary of the literature on this problem, has come to a balanced

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conclusion that indicates a somewhat more pessimistic view of the effect of inadequate housing, thus a more optimistic view of what better housing can do. But even if one accepts Schorr's estimate, there are still three points to be made:

First, the clearest bad effects come from "desperately inadequate" housing, as against mere "substandard" housing.

Second, many of these ill effects come from *overcrowding* rather than any of the structural characteristics of housing that we often think of when we speak of poor housing.

Third, it is arguable that some of the effects of poor housing ("pleasure in company but not in solitude," "relationships that spread out in the neighborhood rather than deeply in the family") are not entirely negative.

Negro housing

On the whole, desperately inadequate housing is infrequent in this country outside the rural areas. In 1950, 96.4 percent had a bath; 96.6 percent had electricity. Among specific groups, and in particular for the Negro, it is true the situation is much worse, and the inadequate is more common. Thus, of housing units occupied by urban non-whites in 1960, 80 percent had inside hot and cold running water, but 15 percent had only cold water; 85 percent had private use of a flush toilet, but 8 percent shared a flush toilet and 7 percent had none; 78 percent had exclusive use of a bathtub or shower, but 7 percent shared it and 15 percent had none.

It is clear that the urban Negro — even more so, of course, the rural Negro — suffers from some of the worst housing conditions in the country. Unquestionably, for this group there is an important relationship between housing quality and the quality of family life. And yet, one must go on to point out that other factors are easily capable of overwhelming any positive efforts of an improvement in housing.

Some striking improvements have taken place in Negro housing with no impact on significant aspects of Negro family life (e.g., family break-up, illegitimacy, dependency, etc.). The proportion of non-white couples without their own household (that is, doubled up) dropped from 14 to 5 percent between 1950 and 1960 (white, from 6 percent to 2); the percentage of non-whites in substandard units dropped from 72 percent to 44 percent (white, from 32 percent to 13); and the percentage of non whites in overcrowded housing (non-farm only) was reduced more moderately from 32 percent to 27 (white, from 12 percent to 8). Meanwhile, various measures of Negro family disorganization actually increased.

Or we may note that there is no obvious correlation between the quality of housing in low-income Negro areas and the degree of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

social disorganization. Thus, the housing of Negroes in more newly-built Western cities is clearly superior to that in older Eastern and Northwestern cities (Watts versus Harlem, or Oakland versus Chicago's south side, to give the picture; in 1950, only 19 percent of dwelling units occupied by non-whites in the Los Angeles metropolitan area was substandard.) And in addition to newer, less substandard, less crowded housing, there is also in the West, in many respects, a better neighborhood ambiance (more recreational facilities, newer schools, etc.). But other conditions seem to destroy any positive relationship that might otherwise be expected to exist between housing conditions and family life.

The effects of crowded rooms

Past the threshold of the most inadequate housing, it would appear that it is crowding that has the most serious effects. Thus, the excessive sexual stimulation, the attitudes toward privacy and self, the irritation of intra-family relations, the intrusive presence of non-family members — all these are consequences of crowding, of the simple shortage of space. Oscar Lewis's *Children of Sanchez* describes the incredible crowding of present-day lower-class urban living in Mexico City, where a dozen or more people, in three or four families, must use the same room for sleeping. Crowding conditions similar to these are described in the literature on the immigrant quarters of New York at the turn of the century. One would think the terrible effects of such crowding can scarcely be overestimated.

But even under such conditions of room crowding, cultural factors may come into play to mitigate the evil effects. Robert C. Schmitt has studied the effect of room crowding in Hong Hong, which reaches levels as high as any we know. In 1957, three-quarters of Hong Kong's households had less than a full room — and the average size of the household was 4.7! ("The Hong Kong average of 32 square feet is probably less than one-tenth of the metropolitan U. S. norm.") Despite this, health conditions do not seem to suffer much in comparison with the United States, and indices of social disorganization are lower.

But presumably even Chinese families, whose capacity, at least in the past, to cope with frightfully crowded urban conditions has been legendary, would do better with more space. And *certainly* families without long urban experience, and in a society in which the norms of space are much more lavish than in Hong Kong, may be expected to suffer from room crowding. Yet in contemporary America, the threshold we now consider "crowded" is so low that it is questionable whether transgressing it has significant effects on the family. This threshold, as we have pointed out, is now one person per room. Two persons per room is considered excessive crowding, and is so

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

uncommon that census summary statistics do not even give figures for this degree of crowding. Can we say that densities of more than one person per room are factors in creating social problems and family disorganization? Perhaps they contribute (everything contributes); it is hard to see them as major factors. Consider for example the statistics in Table I – which show the proportion of households crowded (more than one person per room) by family income in 1960:

TABLE I.

Income $	% of households crowded	
	Owners	Renters
under 2,000	6	16
2,000-2,999	9	20.5
3,000-3,999	11	19
4,000-4,999	11.5	17.5
5,000-5,999	11	16
6,000-6,999	10	14.5
7,000-7,999	9	13
8,000-9,999	8	11.5
10,000-15,000	7	11
above 15,000	4.5	8.5

(Source: *U.S. Census of Housing:* 1960, *Metropolitan Housing,* Final Report HC(2)-1, Table A-3.)

Crowding does decline with increase in income (the low crowding of the lowest income levels is accounted for by the high proportion of the elderly in this group). But what is striking is how *slowly* it decreases, and how substantial a proportion of the highest income groups still live under "crowded" conditions. They do this, one must assume, by choice, for they have the ability to allocate their income so as to eliminate crowding.

Under these circumstances, one wonders whether it should be a major aim of public policy to eliminate all crowding of more than one person per room. Still, it would seem to be an entirely proper aim of public policy to eliminate certain *extremes* of excessive crowding when these result, not from choice, in which privacy is a lesser value than some alternative good that may be purchased, but from economic incapacity to purchase space. In 1960, 1,690,000 families of five persons or more had incomes under $3,000. Most of these large, poor families must live under conditions that are truly crowded, and not merely statistically "crowded." This group forms a not insubstantial fraction of the American people.

Crowded neighborhoods

We have spoken up to now of room crowding alone. Conceivably, room crowding, when measured by the current lavish American

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

standard of one person per room, may have a less serious effect on the family than area crowding, that is, the concentration of too many households in an area, with the consequent crowding of streets with children and adolescents and young adults. Once again, Schmitt has carried through an interesting analysis, correlating various measures of crowding with various measures of ill-health and of family and social disorganization, for the census tracts of Honolulu. "Population per net residential acre" — a measure of area crowding — does correlate best with nine measures of ill-health and social disorganization, much better than does "dwelling units with more than one person per room." And yet I hesitate to conclude that crowding, whether area or room, in contemporary American cities, leads to family disorganization. What, after all, is the range of area crowding we are discussing? When we think of the conditions of the urban poor, we too often think of Harlem, which is far less typical of the country as a whole than Watts. Schmitt points out:

"Statistical subdivisions of American cities seldom exceed 150 inhabitants per gross acre. Analysis of recent census tract statistics indicates the highest densities to be about 450 persons per acre in both Boston and New York, 163 in Chicago, 150 in Philadelphia, 132 in Honolulu, and 62 in Seattle. Several blocks in Manhattan had as many as 1,300 persons per acre of ground space." In contrast, the highest densities in Hong Konk census divisions (equivalent to our census tracts) reach 2,800 per gross acre.

At 150 persons to the acre, assuming four to a household, and reserving one-third of the space for streets and open and public use, it would theoretically be possible to give each household a plot of 20 by 40, which does not seem excessively crowded for the most crowded urban housing — and these are the most densely settled tracts in American cities, leaving aside the exceptional cases of New York and Boston.

Rising expectations and standards

Indeed, the issue may not be whether housing, in terms of any world or absolute standard, is adequate or crowded. It may be: where does one's housing stand in terms of the standards of the system, and what does falling behind that standard mean? In a society in which quarter-acre lots become the norm, anything less will be correlated with a whole range of measures of poor health, family instability, and social disorganization. We may then say that housing has had such and such an influence upon the family, and in some sense it has. But it is not housing as such that has an effect, but housing as mediated through a complex culture and the expectations it variously distributes among its people. Thus, it is common to read — even in the writing of sociologists — that the housing of the urban

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Negro is now worse than it was, when it is by all measures better. But it may be – by some measures – further *behind* the housing of the urban white than it was; even more seriously, the expectations of the urban Negro are no longer – nor should they be expected to be – the expectation of the European immigrant of 1910, or the Negro migrant of 1930. But if this is so, we must expect to find paradoxes and ambiguities if we seek clear and determinate effects of poor housing and crowded housing, by our current standards, on family life; it will only have such effects if the housing reality is symbolically interpreted to mean degradation.

And we can be sure that even the measure of one person per room, lavish as it is by world standards, will soon be inadequate, too. If our society begins to define it as the right of every unmarried 21-year-old to have a separate household – and at least in the upper middle classes, this definition is spreading – and if our society defines it as the right of every older couple or older single individual to live alone, and not with his children, then the proportion of American households "overcrowded" is much, much more than the 12 percent listed as such by the one-person-per-room measure in the housing census of 1960.

It is to meet the demands of those with grossly inadequate housing, and of those with housing that compares too unfavorably with the American average, that we have evolved a national housing policy. The evolution is, of course, still incomplete. But there are already a flock of cautionary lessons to be learned from our experience.

The constraints on American housing policy

Housing policy in any society, including ours, operates within a larger economic policy which limits, directly or indirectly, the resources that can be placed into housing. In societies in which central planning plays a larger role, a housing goal, in terms of amount of living space or numbers of houses or apartments to be built, is directly set, in the light of competing demands on economic resources. In this country, we do not set a grand goal for housing; but central economic policies affect directly or indirectly the flow of credit for housing, and the cost of labor and materials, and thus various government measures can control the number of housing units built almost as effectively as a central plan. At present, there is a crisis in the housing industry: credit is not easily available at interest rates that permit houses to be profitably built and sold. The maneuvers of the Treasury are dictated primarily by the need to avoid inflation and a heavier outflow of gold. The effect on the building industry is only one of the factors that are taken into account when making such central economic decisions. From the point of view of grand economic policy, the impact of decisions on the scale of *building* and *construc-*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion operations may be important; but the impact on amount and types of *housing* available plays no role at all.

Aside from these general economic considerations, there are some special problems in establishing a governmental housing policy in a free society. When a public housing project operates with 20 percent vacancy rates, or when 20 percent of the buyers in a government-insured development default on their mortgages, the policy makers and administrators are subjected to great embarrassment. Yet in a free and relatively affluent society, such consequences may well occur. For where people have more choices before them, and more freedom to make such choices, it is certain that some of their choices will not correspond with the range that government policy has made available. Twenty percent of the American population moves every year — the opportunities for policy disasters in that simple figure are tremendous. Since World War II, we have consistently in this country built more housing than we have formed new households. There was of course, during the early postwar period, an enormous backlog of need, built up in the preceding fifteen years of war and depression. During the decade of the 1950's, 10,000,000 new households were formed and 13,400,000 additional housing units were added to housing inventory. In the first quarter of 1966, 7.5 percent of all rental units, and 1.4 percent of homeowner units, were vacant. The available for-rent vacancy rates (that is, units not deteriorated, available for year-round occupancy) was lower, but still substantial — 2.7 percent and .8 percent. From the point of view of providing a desirable level of choice in the search for housing, these rates are still too low for many groups and in many areas. But from the point of view of builders and housers, the vacancy levels are too high; they are certainly higher than in any other major industrial nation.

Under these circumstances, just as the private builder of rental units or the developer of units for sale knows he may be courting disaster when he builds, and is therefore cautious, so too are the shapers and administrators of government policy cautious. In effect, choices are already so wide that a new choice, a new approach, must compete with many existing alternative possibilities. This is perhaps one of the chief constraints on American housing policy. In contrast, where shortages are or have been severe, and where more of the elements of investment policy are in the hands of the government (as is true of Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Japan, the developing world), one can operate with some assurance that almost any policy one decides upon will produce houses that are occupied, even if they come in a shape and style and are in a location that is less attractive than some conceivable alternative.

Thus, paradoxically, scarcity may permit greater freedom and experimentalism in policy, affluence — the presence of surplus — may impose greater caution.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A home is a house

There is also another constraint, perhaps the most distinctive constraint on American housing policies. This is the consistent bias in this country in favor of the owner-occupied, single-family, free-standing house, with a bit of land around it. When we speak of housing problems in this country, we tend to think of the city tenement, crowded with the poor, and of how to rehabilitate it or replace it with a more spacious and better planned multiple-family dwelling. But in the range of American housing problems, and of American housing policies, this situation is not central. Both the crowded slum and the type of multi-family housing that can replace it have received the chief attention of reformers, writers, analysts. On the other hand, it is the single-family, owner-occupied home – getting it built, getting it financed, saving it from the banks, reducing its cost, increasing its amenities – that has received the chief attention of elected officials, administrators, and the majority of the American people, perhaps even the poor among them.

The overwhelming preference of the American family in housing is the single-family home, preferably owned, preferably detached. Our housing policy, at local and federal levels, has been designed to facilitate the building of such a home, to protect its environment, to make it accessible to more and more people at lower economic levels. We have to keep this fundamental orientation in mind. If public housing fails – as it does in so many ways and so many cases – then we must realize this is a program to which our best attention as a nation has never been addressed. If our slums are uglier than those of any of the major industrial nations of Northwestern Europe – and they are – then we must realize this is in part because our interest in, and organization for, maintaining and policing the quality of rented dwellings for low-income people has never been fully developed – the low-income family is expected to get into a home of its own, somehow.

Thus, if we look at American housing policy, we will see that it consists of two large segments, and both are overwhelmingly directed toward facilitating the building, financing, and protection of the single-family home. On the local level, we find zoning regulations, building codes, and health codes. All of these, in their origins in the early 20th century, were designed to protect the low-income population, immigrant and working class, from frightful housing conditions. And to protect, too, the middle and upper-income population from the evil consequences, in health and amenities, that flowed from these conditions. Paradoxically, all these mechanisms of housing policy soon outgrew their origins, and they became adapted to the housing conditions and housing desires of the greater part of the population

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

– that is they become policies for protecting the single-family home.

On the Federal level, we may trace a similar emphasis in policy. The first Federal action in the field of housing was a survey of slums in 1892. During World War I, the Federal government, directly and through loans to private builders, put up war housing. These initial forays into policy had no lasting consequences. But beginning in the early thirties, with the "President's Conference on Homebuilding and Home Ownership," Federal policy was set on the path of the encouragement of home-ownership, through the development of the amortized long-range mortgage, Federal insurance of home mortgages, encouragement of large-scale development of single-family homes, guidance of the supply of long-term housing credit. The Federal Home Loan Bank system in 1932, the Home Owner's Loan Corporation and Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation of 1933, and the National Housing Act of 1934, setting up the Federal Housing Administration, were all steps to the creation of a Federal policy which facilitated home ownership.

As against these two major forms of government policy – zoning, building and health codes at the local level, the encouragement of home-building and home ownership at the federal level – other major thrusts of policy have been relatively minor. Federally financed public housing (the United States Housing Act of 1937), was, in its origins, designed to combat the depression by encouraging building, as well as to clear slums and provide housing for the poor. It has always been operated on such a small scale that its achievement in all these areas has been minor. Today, a little more than one percent of the population is in public housing. (For certain parts of the population, of course, public housing is more important. In New York City, where public housing is most prominent, about 7 percent of the population, and a quarter of the Negro population, live in public housing.) Urban renewal, which began in 1949, even with the large areas that have been cleared in some American cities, is small potatoes compared to the central policy of encouraging single-family home building and ownership. In contrast to some 600,000 units of public that have been built during the history of the public housing program, and 80,000 that have been built under urban renewal, over 5,000,000 units have been built under FHA home mortgage programs.

What the people want

This overwhelming central tendency in American housing policy undoubtedly reflects certain characteristics of the actual American family, and of the models, conscious or unconscious, that are held as to the ideal family life. Thus, the emphasis on a room for every individual and on space between the houses reflects an emphasis on familial privacy, and individual privacy within the family. There is no

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

question this is what the American family – for the most part – wants. William Slayton and Richard Dewey, summarizing eleven opinion studies in 1953, assert simply that, "whenever given the opportunity, most American families express their desire to own their own homes." National surveys in 1935, 1940, and 1945 showed remarkably similar proportions – 70 percent preferred to own (almost all the homeowners, and half or more of the renters, too). Since 1945, the jaundiced depression view of home ownership has receded in the face of FHA and VA-insured housing, and the percentages of those preferring to own, if we had recent surveys, might well be higher.

If this has been the taste of the American family, it can hardly be argued with, since the choice has a certain amount of face validity – it means more space for children, inside and out; it means the opportunity to invest one's resources, if they are available, in newer equipment and better upkeep; it means a generally rising investment; it means freedom to alter one's living accomodations at will and to keep pets and animals; and one may proceed from there to various more subtle gains, all of which quite overwhelmed the demonstrations of housing experts twenty years ago that ownership was often financially unwise. Together with the housing policies we have outlined, it has resulted in a home ownership rate of 62 percent of all housing units in 1962.

Even this understates the prevalence of the single-family house, for many are rented. In 1960, no less than 70 percent of all housing units in this country were one-family houses, detached; another 6 percent were one-family, attached; 13 percent were in structures with two to four units; a mere 11 percent were in structures with more than five units. Even in metropolitan areas, the apartment house was – statistically – a relatively rare phenomenon. Sixty percent of all *metropolitan* housing units were single-family, detached; another 8 percent were single-family, attached. New York is the unique city which, for reasons of culture, or crowding, or land value, breaks with this pattern. It contains the bulk of the apartment houses of the country – in 1950, 51 percent of all apartment units in structures of more than 20 units were in New York City!

Presumably, home-ownership and the single family detached dwelling have now reached most of the family units that might find it desirable. Of our fifty-three million households, 41 percent hold two persons or less, and many of these, we must assume, would not be interested in homeownership. Of our forty-five million families, only 52 percent contain children under eighteen, and many of the remainder, too, might find homeownership less attractive than renting. And indeed, after dominating the housing markets of the 1960's overwhelmingly (92 percent of all private housing units started in 1956 were single-family homes), the proportion of single family

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

homes has been dropping, steadily, and in 1964 only 62 percent of all new units begun were single-family homes.

The criticisms of American housing policy

The policy of the encouragement of homeownership has been subjected to three major criticisms. The first is that it has favored the better-off. (We cannot say simply the wealthier, for the homes of the wealthy do not need, and do not generally get, FHA insurance and VA guarantees – though even the wealthy have benefitted from the stabilization of the mortgage market and the availability of long-term amortized mortgages). Policies for the poor, this criticism asserts, have been non-existent or paltry and demeaning (e.g., public housing). Thus, the slums endure and spread, in the face of a housing policy that serves only the top half or less of the income distribution.

The second major criticism of this policy is that it has destroyed urbanism. By urbanism, critics mean many things. They mean some appropriate level of *density,* so people can meet on a face-to-face basis, engage in casual encounter, be stimulated by new experience. They further mean heterogeneity of income group and of race and ethnic group, which may be expected to have the same "urbanizing," "urbane-izing," "civ-ilizing" effect. They also mean *mixing of uses* – of different kinds of residential uses (apartment and single-family houses), and of residential, commercial, amusement, and even some industrial uses.

This criticism comes in a variety of forms. We can trace a spectrum from those who emphasize most strongly the aesthetic (Lewis Mumford), to those who emphasize the aesthetic and the social with almost equal weight (Jane Jacobs), to those who emphasize the social (Charles Abrams) – and when we get to the latter end of the spectrum, one of the chief indictments made by this criticism is that Federal and local housing policy have created, indeed enforced, the growing division between the white suburbs and the increasingly Negro central cities.

Just as public housing is an unsatisfying answer to those who make the first criticism (i.e., that our housing policy has aided the better-off), so is urban renewal an unsatisfying answer to those who make our second criticism, that federal housing policy destroys urbanism. And once again, the criticism of urban renewal ranges from the aesthetic to the social, but here social criticism has been most intense – urban renewal is said to favor an even wealthier class than does FHA, with subsidies for the building of expensive apartments and houses, and to do nothing for the poor who are ejected from the central city.

The third major criticism of Federal housing policy is that it does not create a valid form of community expansion and community

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

building. Here critics point to the experience of England, Sweden, Finland, Holland, where new communities are planned, where open space, "countryside," is maintained within easy access of new urban areas, where planned public transportation relates the residential to the work areas, where a non-wasteful and aesthetically and socially satisfying form of community building provides not only a house but an environment for families.

Obviously all three major criticisms, if true, would amount to a devastating indictment of Federal housing policy. But are they true, in whole or in part?

Criticism I: does policy neglect the poor?

The first criticism is to my mind the most serious. How have the poor fared under Federal housing policy?

In 1950, Charles Abrams argued that only 30 percent of American nonfarm families could afford private builders' houses – and this was at a time when FHA and VA together permitted no cash down payments for many home purchasers. At the same time, and on the other hand, another leading housing expert (Sherman Maisel) argued: "The generalization that houses can be and are being built only for the upper income groups is incorrect. It is more accurate to state that if existing veteran terms of no or low down payments, 4 percent interest rates, and thirty-year-amortization were made available to all, nearly every family receiving a minimum full-time income could afford to purchase a house if so desired."

Paul Wendt, who reports these contrasting judgments of the early 1950's, tries to bring them into harmony, and points out that Abrams was referring to *all* families, and that Maisel was describing generous terms that did not hold for all purchasers and in any case did not hold for long. Twenty percent of all families, too, he points out, were in 1957 "not in the labor force, unemployed, or in the Armed forces"– thus did not have "minimum full-time incomes." On the other hand many of the poor families who could not qualify for the FHA or VA housing were farm or rural families, with special housing problems which have, in any case, always been difficult for major government programs to overcome, while many others were older couples who might not be interested in purchasing new homes. So the question remains open: how far down in the income distribution has the government-insured and guaranteed new home reached – only the top 30 percent, as according to Abrams, or 80 percent, as according to Maisel?

Someone who is not an expert on the economics of housing might well strike a median. And indeed, it seems that the median income of families purchasing FHA houses hovers only about $1,000 above the median income of all urban families. Thus, in 1958, the median income

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of buyers of new FHA houses was $7,733, the median income of buyers of existing homes on FHA mortgages was $7,447. In 1959, urban husband-wife families had a median income of $6,454. (In the early postwar period, the median income of FHA purchasers was about the same as the median income of all families, for in those years it was possible to get mortgages at lower interest rates, and the FHA or VA house was cheaper, owing to smaller size, less equipment, and smaller lots.) This suggests that the FHA house is indeed pretty much within the means of the median American family, if we have in mind the urban, husband-wife family at which this policy aims. What it leaves out are the substantial numbers of families that fall below the median – for example, the non-white family, whose median income (again, urban and husband-wife families) was in 1959 only $4,329. It certainly leaves out the family headed by a woman, the elderly couple without resources, and other poor families. And yet we should avoid a position which often becomes polemical and exaggerated. For in 1963, 13 percent of new single-family homes were priced under $12,500, and in 1964, 11 percent; and this substantial part of the new home market *was* within the means of families earning well below the median that year.

Of course, for the bottom half of the distribution there were other programs. There was, in the post-war period, a great deal of rental housing (under an FHA program which created a scandal, and which was abandoned). After the revival of multi-family housing in the late fifties, however, new rental housing was too expensive for poor families. In New York City, where the apartment is still the norm, state and city funds made possible various kinds of subsidized apartment houses for middle-income and lower middle-income populations, and these have included enormous developments of cooperative apartments, sponsored by trade unions and other non-profit organizations. But these were not popular elsewhere. The federal government moved into this field of subsidizing lower middle income (or upper lower income) apartment units with its 221 (d)3 program, offering federally-insured mortgages to non-profit or limited profit builders at lower than market interest rates; but this program, which has a good deal of promise for the future, numbered only 15,000 units at the end of 1964.

The "failure" of public housing

The major Federal program for the poor has been public housing. We have indicated above its relatively small scale. It has been starved by Congress; and low cost units have been built in recent years at a rate of only 20,000 annually, less than 2 percent of all housing starts. But if Congress has been unsympathetic, so too has a substantial part of the group for which it was ostensibly designed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

– the poor family. Thus, while poor families on urban renewal sites have priority in entering public housing projects, only a minority do so. Public housing has been much discussed, but as yet is little studied. Some of the best studies have been of public housing in Puerto Rico – where the program operates under the same federal laws as on the mainland, but where the prevailing conditions of poverty and the prevailing influence of rural patterns of living make the whole business something quite different. The best studies of public housing on the mainland are yet to come – and yet it seems clear they will come after the country as a whole, both Congress and a large percentage of those for whom it was designed, have indicated their sharp rejection of the program. Admittedly, the middle class liberal and the radical ally of the poor (along, of course, with older critics on the right) seem to be more sharply opposed to public housing than those who live in it and for whom it is designed. As we can see from the long waiting lists in most cities, many families are delighted to get into public housing. But this acceptance of public housing is based on the fact that it is a bargain (about $500 a year subsidy for an apartment) and that for many people it is the best buy available. Even though we do not have the evidence that could give us complete assurance in making our assessment, it seems clear than many who live in public housing also have sharp criticisms, and find it easy to think of something better.

Public housing has survived to the extent that it has only because it is beginning to serve a number of special elements in the population who either find it unobjectionable or who have no alternatives available. Thus, after 1956 – and owing to its unpopularity with Congress and local communities – public housing began to accept single elderly persons, and began to build for the elderly. After World War II, the proportion of non-whites in public housing began to increase, and in some cities public housing is now largely Negro – which makes it more difficult to attract white families. And public housing has increasingly provided dwelling places for families without fathers. Thus, in 1964, 53 percent of families in public housing were nonwhite; 28 percent were elderly. In individual projects, such as that under study by Lee Rainwater in St. Louis, as much as 50 percent of the families may consist of women and children without husbands or fathers. There are, of course, complete families with children in public housing, and perhaps half or more of the units are occupied by them; but white families are a declining proportion, and in most cities they are concentrated in a few projects that are known as "good" projects.

If public housing has "failed"– and we mean that it is unpopular among those who pay for it, and those who are supposed to benefit by it – what explains its failure? The following seem to be the most important:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(1) It has been limited to the poorest. Thus, in 1964, the median income of public housing families was under $2,500. Inevitably, these families must include large proportions of families on relief, large proportions of broken families, large proportions of families without wage-earners, large proportions of families with problems that prevent earning. This is not true of all projects – but when the concentration of the unfortunate and the miserable becomes too large, other families shun the project, and then, despite the attractivness of good housing (physically speaking) at low rents, a too-high vacancy level may develop. And the income limits checked annually have also meant that the more productive and ambitious are required to leave.

(2) Administration has been rather more restrictive and intrusive than in alternative housing, and this has both limited the number of those who would enter, and perhaps created a restrictive and unpleasant atmosphere among those who have remained. Studies as to the reasons why people don't like public housing often refer to these restrictions – the inability to keep animals in the apartment and conduct businesses in them (in Puerto Rico), the restrictions on painting and alterations and even on pounding nails into walls (sometimes these restrictions do not actually exist – but the fact that tenants believe they do is itself evidence of the restrictive atmosphere), the prohibition on overnight guests (again, this may be an illusion), the fact that rents rise with income (which again makes administration – by law, and necessarily – intrusive). Under these circumstances, it is the helpless, fatherless families on welfare who flock to the projects.

(3) Public housing architecture and siting, as well as its regulations and its clientele, have often marked it off from other housing, stamping it as separate, institutional, deviant. One can find little evidence that the architecture as such has had unpleasant consequences – the same buildings, more or less, that house low-income families in New York seem to provide what is considered reasonable family housing for that city when inhabited by middle-income families. Unquestionably, those public housing projects that approximate in their design most closely single-family housing are most attractive to the public housing resident.

And yet "the jungle" is not created by the twenty-story apartment house. It is created by the social circumstances of the families who live in them. The physical setting only contributes to some undetermined extent – and largely as it becomes symbolic of a life set apart, of placement in a ghetto. Thus, it would be difficult to argue that curtains instead of doors over clothing closets, or toilet seats without covers, or elevators that stop on every other floor, by themselves lead to an unhappy life – but they become symbols of an unhappy life, and develop an exaggerated importance. Ironically, any form of physical deviance can be used to symbolize the social deviance. Thus, Marin City, north

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of San Francisco, which represents the efforts of the Public Housing Administration to break away from institutional architecture, and which is a daring creative solution to the problem of building apartment houses on a hill, has had more problems than more architecturally conventional public housing projects. Deviant architecture, even when it is deviant in a progressive direction, is taken to symbolize the deviant social condition of the population, and becomes a target of their aggression.

(4) Critics have also pointed to the fact that public housing projects are set in old and dilapidated neighborhoods (originally, it was hoped the new building might help *improve* the neighborhoods), and are cut off from contact with middle-class areas, which might serve to encourage social mobility among the project population.

Much of this criticism is unfortunately undocumented with research, and the last point is perhaps least well supported. In New York, in Washington, and elsewhere, there *have* been efforts to place public housing adjacent to middle-income housing developments. It is not clear what effect, if any, this has had on the low-income population, as compared with projects that are placed squarely in low-income neighborhoods. One may feel confident that the poor prefer to live in a less poor neighborhood – there are more facilities, better stores, less crime. One must be less confident when one asserts that proximity to middle-class residential areas will have some specific social and psychological effects on the projects' dwellers.

A graveyard of good intentions

Are there solutions to these problems of public housing? Many earnest efforts have failed and others have been only partially successful. Thus, consider the efforts to create balanced communities within the projects. The New York City Housing authority has tried to limit the number of families on welfare – and this leads to the ironic necessity of the Welfare department paying inflated rents for slum dwellings for its clients, because it cannot place them in public housing. The objective of balanced communities means, too, that the Housing Authority may favor a family that financially is in lesser need over one that is in greater need because the first family will make a larger contribution to creating a balanced community. The Housing Authority has tried to create racially and ethnically mixed projects – and this, too, has led to the ironic conclusion that it will favor an elderly white couple (because whites are in short supply in public housing), over a Negro family with children (because Negroes are all too plentiful in public housing). It has tried to protect its families from potential and actual criminals and drug addicts, and has therefore set up a check-list for applicants – and this has meant that it has had to exclude those whose need is greatest. It has rehabili-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tated brownstones and older apartment houses so that its dwellings would blend into the New York scene – but the costs of rehabilitating to government standards have been frighteningly high in administrative time and money. It has tried to break up its projects and spread them in middle-class communities – and has roused the protests of these middle-class communities, who are convinced that public housing will make their neighborhoods less attractive, less safe, less desirable.

Public housing is a graveyard of good intentions. Some projects succeed, partially. Some projects are maintained as good communities, some are racially balanced, some rehabilitated dwellings are added to the public housing supply, some small projects are sited in middle-class areas. But to turn public housing into sound, low-cost family housing seems enormously difficult. And indeed, the government has put its hopes for low-income family housing into rent supplements – perhaps this will overcome the major problems I have outlined. But while Congress has accepted the principle, it has resisted the appropriation of the funds required to put a large rent-supplement program into effect. And rent supplements themselves raise a host of intriguing problems for the sociologist of the future. For if the homeowner and the middle-income renter have resisted the low-income housing project coming into their neighborhoods, how will they feel about the subsidized low-income family? What stigma will it bear? How will its relations with unsubsidized (or less subsidized) neighbors be affected?

My own conclusion is that while both traditional public housing and the new rent subsidy program have a place in providing housing for the poor, they are not the final or the best answers to the problem. In an egalitarian society, where the single family home, under home-ownership, is the *norm*, it must also become (as Charles Abrams has argued) the *objective* of public policy for the poor family – and less than that will generally become a sign of discrimination and degradation. This will not be true in situations where a substantial number of middle-income families live in apartments (as in New York), but it will be true in most of the country. And indeed, certain experiments now being conducted under the aegis of the Low Income Housing Demonstration Program of the Department of Housing and Urban Development are testing whether home ownership – with special government aids and subsidies – can be extended to very low-income families.

The dangers of being different

I would argue that one must avoid the danger of building for the poor under regulations or in a style very different from that to which the middle class is accustomed. The housing for the poor

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the nations of Northwestern Europe, whether the council housing of England or the apartments of Scandinavia, are, in effect, the housing that most people in those countries have – and it is not marked by any stigma of deviance. In New York City, public housing is not all that different from the housing of other New Yorkers – and there public housing is politically acceptable, and various types of public housing are built with city and state funds, as well as with Federal funds.

Sam B. Warner, describing the history of two philanthropic projects to provide workingmen's homes in late 19th-century Boston, provides a cautionary tale for us in considering what kind of housing to provide for the poor. The first project, put up through the efforts of Robert Treat Paine, provided two-story brick row houses. Warner writes:

"Though Paine's houses and narrow streets may have been suitable in Philadelphia, where there was a long and continuous tradition of row housing, in Boston these buildings had a strong philanthropic air. They were brick and fireproof and had a full set of plumbing facilities, but for all their safety and sanitation they remained mean, cramped row houses built a full decade after the main body of the middle class had ceased building row houses for itself. Like the wooden barracks and tenements of the neighborhood, these houses were suited to the momentary needs and capabilities of their inhabitants – all too suited to them, and not at all suited to their aspirations. . . . Because Paine had built minimal structures, and built without regard to some of the important middle class aspirations of the day, his houses suffered the fate of all the other homes in the area. For the last forty years they have served as slum dwellings, and, despite Paine's careful construction, they are falling to the ground."

Paine's second undertaking was a "cheap project . . . but the streets do follow the contours of the land and are designed to make a traffic cul de sac. . . . such site planning was just then coming into vogue for expensive subdivisions in Brookline and other parts of greater Boston. . . .

"The houses themselves came in several styles of detached frame single and two-family structures. A variety of contemporary ornament was also offered. . . . The houses were more than twice as big as the little row houses of the 1880's and sold for twice as much. . . . The whole suburban 'cottagey' effect of this hundred-house subdivision was underlined with street names of 'Round Hill' and 'Sunnyside'. . . .

"Paine's houses are still kept up because for sixty years they have been the best choice of the neighborhood. They have been the best choice because they were more in keeping with the housing aspirations of Bostonians than any of the other cheap alternatives of the 1890's.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"The success of Paine's experiment suggests that slum housing is one of the prices that a society pays for allowing any major amount of its building to proceed at a level below its common understanding among the middle class as to what constitutes a satisfactory home environment."*

An intriguing conclusion: but is this not what we have allowed to happen with public housing? And is this not part of the reason why we are faced with the contradiction of social slums in what are some of the best built structures in our housing stock?

Criticism II: does it destroy urbanism?

The second major criticism of American housing policy – that it is destructive of urbanism – has, as I have outlined it, a number of parts. Part of the criticism is of the design of the communities that have been built with federal subsidy and support, both new suburban communities and new developments within the city. This design criticism links up with social criticism of insufficient density and variety. And finally, we have placed under this criticism the charge that federal policy has encouraged the separation of the races.

Certainly there have been few creative achievements in the field of urban design, except for the shopping center – and that has been built without federal aid. But it is equally true that the demand for the kinds of design that urban designers have most favored has not been very great. Thus, urban designers have been attracted to the row house. The row house combines an economy in the use of space with a relatively high degree of privacy for the family. It offers the possibility of a common use of some of the saved space. It gives a larger opportunity to the architect to create a space than does the single-family detached house, and links up current building with the great tradition of urban architecture.

And yet there tends to be a conflict between the interest of the designer and the interest of the family. Regardless of its great historical associations for the architect, for the family seeking space and good living it generally means more cramped conditions than the detached house. Where land is expensive – e.g., the land of urban renewal developments in central cities, of near-in older areas of New York – the row house will be widely used; but it is clearly a second best. And for most of this country, land costs are still so reasonable as to permit most families to realize their first choice in the amount of space they consider desirable.

The variety that is so attractive to the architectural critic or urban designer is also less attractive to the homeowner. If the variety means only varied ornamentation on houses of the same basic style

*Sam B. Warner, *Streetcar Suburbs* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or price, that is fine with the homeowner. If it means the introduction of apartment houses, homeowners will object; if it means non-residential uses, they will object again. They do not want the convenience of corner shopping. They often do not even want the presence of a too-nearby church, regardless of the mildness of its activities. The use of the automobile is so widespread that the family prefers to put all these things at a distance, and approach shopping, work, worshipping, and most other activities by automobile. Only for the elementary school is an exception made, because children don't drive.

The variety arising from the heterogeneity of mixed income groups is fought even more vigorously. An as yet unpublished study of new communities in California by Werthman, Mandel, and Dienstfrey demonstrates the strength of the resistance to the nearby presence of cheaper residential developments. The homeowner is also an investor, and cheaper housing nearby (and any mixing of economic levels means that some of the housing will be cheaper) will be resisted. Thus, even the homeowner at the $21,000 level will resist the intrusion of development, if he can, at the $17,000 level. Ironically, one of the meanings – and indeed the chief meaning – of planning to the homeowner, according to this study, is that the homeowner will be protected from the intrusion of cheaper housing and from nearby non-residential uses. To the planner and new community developer, on the other hand, what planning means is just the opposite – that instead of the enormous tract in one style for one income group, he will be able to introduce a variety of groups, and a variety of uses.

What about integration?

The charge that Federal housing policy has contributed to the separation of the races is certainly the most serious part of this criticism. That residential segregation of Negro and white in the American city is extensive and spreading is undeniable. On the other hand, it is difficult to trace this segregation to Federal policy. Charles Abrams has sharply criticized the FHA for encouraging segregation. (From 1935 to 1950 its official handbooks warned against the stability of areas that held both Negroes and whites, and discouraged guaranteeing mortgages in such areas.) Certainly Abrams has demonstrated that the Federal government did nothing for many years to encourage integration. But could it have used its powers to do so? Technically, yes. But politically this was most unpopular. And practical measures to overcome segregation are difficult to implement. Since President Kennedy's executive order of 1962, all Federal aid to housing and community development has been on the condition that discrimination will not be practiced. In 1964, the Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination and segregation in any program that uses Federal

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

funds. Many states and cities have had laws against discrimination in rental and sales of housing for some years. And yet the total effect of these measures in creating integrated neighborhoods has been hardly visible.

To produce integration in residential areas requires the most persistent and sophisticated measures of administration and enforcement before any major effect is produced, and even in New York City, where such laws have been in existence for the longest period, and with the widest support, one cannot be optimistic about the results. Neither Federal, state, nor local action can create integration by fiat. Segregation is an outcome that is shaped by complex forces on many levels: ignorance and prejudice; the differing economic levels of whites and Negroes; economic fears as to the loss of property values by homeowners and other property holders; social fears as to the decline of the neighborhood – which seem to refer to such elements as the quality of schools, level of public safety, degree of littering, and social patterns in the use of open space; the institutionalization of discriminatory practices and procedures in all the agents of the housing market – renters and buyers, builders and lenders, banks and appraisers, local government officials and employees; and personal choice by Negroes and white. On the whole, in this area, Federal policy has followed local practice, and on the whole, local practice has been discriminatory.

The executive order of 1962, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and many local and state laws, now call on government to do more. But in this area – as in so many areas of social policy – it is not easy to find the Gordian knot to be cut at one stroke. One can find principles, policies, approaches. Perhaps the single most important principle that emerges from the literature on this question is that it is perhaps too much at this time to try to integrate *both* different economic levels and Negro and white in the same areas. When one keeps these two forms of integration separate, and tries to integrate middle-income Negro and white groups, and lower-income Negro and white groups, the problems may be manageable, even if difficult and delicate.

It is clear that the builder who is willing to accept a few losses and a somewhat lower rate of sale can successfully sell to both groups. But as we know from experience in other areas – such as higher education and the higher civil service – in which there has been no discrimination for some time, it requires active measures of recruitment to proceed from non-discrimination to integration. And as against the cases of the civil service and some universities and corporations, builders and developers who have gone out of their way in an attempt to create an integrated community are rare indeed. A few experiments have been conducted on a small scale. With a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rising Negro middle-income housing market, it should be possible to extend the scale of these undertakings.

The period when active discrimination and segregation could occur in projects and developments that used Federal funds or services is coming to an end; but we have not as yet, except in a few areas and a few cases, moved to the next stage, of an active encouragement of integration. Until the summer of 1966, one would have said, on the basis of the experience of a few non-discriminatory builders and of a scattering of integrated neighborhoods, that a policy of active encouragement of integration – if it took into account the powerful feeling against mixing groups of different economic levels, regardless of race – could be implemented in many areas without massive resistance. This was the experience of many voluntary groups of suburban white home-owners who tried to encourage integration by getting neighbors to list their houses as available for rental or purchase to Negroes. One could not speak with any such assurance now. The marches led by Martin Luther King into white lower-middle class and middle-class areas of Chicago in the summer of 1966, and the furious resistance they encountered, helped to make the subject of residential integration one of the most inflammatory of civil rights issues, and led to the defeat of the Civil Rights Bill of 1966. And yet, the violent attacks on the Negro marchers in Chicago were not only or even primarily in defense of the right to segregation: they were also reactions to the symbolism of marching and demanding Negroes in white areas, and reactions in defense of ethnic communities which it was believed were threatened by Negro demands. This belief was certainly encouraged by the inept form that was chosen by the King campaign. Had the integration campaign of Martin Luther King chosen to operate by encouraging Negroes to move into white areas and encouraging white areas to accept Negro homeowners and renters, it is hard to believe such massive resistance would have been encountered. Violence against the occasional Negro renter and homeowner is less and less frequent in the North and West – though it occurs, as in Philadelphia in the autumn of 1966.

It will take political "muscle" on the federal level to make residential integration a reality, more now than before the summer of 1966. And for some time, it would appear, that muscle, if it is available, will be directed to the objectives of reducing unemployment, raising welfare and social insurance levels, desegregating and improving urban education, and increasing Negro political representation. And, indeed, one may question the overall importance of the residential integration aim. Unquestionably, housing must be available; discrimination should be illegal (though when the discrimination is that of the individual home-owner, we have a serious clash of principles). But the task of creating a fully integrated residential

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pattern raises such overwhelming difficulties, and the gains to be achieved by it are so questionable – in light of the persistent tendencies of ethnic and racial groups in the past to prefer some degree of concentration, though nowhere the degree that is imposed by discrimination on Negroes – that I would question how far governmental power in this area should try to extend itself.

"Balanced" communities

If we were to move ahead to a major policy of home-building for the poor, then we would have a different kind of problem. We would be faced with the same difficulty of achieving residential racial integration for low income Negroes that we now find in public housing. The concentration of Negro families in the low-income population in the worst housing is so great that any program designed to accommodate poor families in new housing would be a program largely for Negro families. The difficulties of distributing such housing in higher-priced neighborhoods would be immense. The tendency of any program that wanted to make an impact on this problem rapidly would be to by-pass the subtle and time-consuming political and administrative procedures required to distribute such housing among an upper-income white population, and build large tracts designed specifically for those whose housing needs were greatest, that is, poor Negro families. Thus, once again we would have the specter of racially segregated areas built with Federal funds.

Any proposal to eliminate the worst family housing along the lines I earlier suggested – single-family housing – would come into conflict with the aim of integration. One American New Town project, interested in achieving a balanced community of middle-income and low-income, white and black, has attempted to analyze with the help of social scientists how heterogeneity of this type could be introduced, and has concluded that some minimal degree of separation of income levels and races would, in effect, take place. Those who bought the more expensive housing would want the neighborhood benefits that came from more prosperous neighbors; and the poor neighborhoods would inevitably be largely Negro.

I would conclude that, while it is possible to integrate the races of the same economic level, to carry through such an integration when the whites are (mostly) prosperous and the Negroes are (mostly) poor would be enormously difficult, and no measures that we can project give hope that such integration on a major scale can take place in the near future. Under these circumstances, we must expect for some time to come that poor areas will be largely Negro, that more prosperous areas will be largely white, with some small degree of integration. This further raises the prospect that cities will become inhabited by majorities of Negroes, suburbs will

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

remain overwhelmingly white, with slowly rising proportions of Negroes. At one time this prospect appeared disastrous; now that we know that we must undergo it, further analysis and reflection and experience suggest that it need not be. Growing Negro economic capacity will destroy this pattern — and if this develops rapidly enough, conceivably this pattern of Negro-central-city and white-suburbs will be limited to only a few metropolitan areas.

In considering this question of racial integration, as in our consideration earlier of the complex problems of creating a "balanced community" in a housing project, the question must come up: who wants balanced and integrated communities, and what are their virtues? Obviously this question would not arise if such a community developed as a result of the unguided play of economic and technological forces. Thus, the Middletown of the 1920's had workers and businessmen, community leaders and casual laborers, Negroes and whites. It had grown as a service and industrial city; and, in contrast to a Levittown of the same size thirty years later, seemed to have clear and obvious virtues. The classes could learn from each other by direct observation and contact something of the whole complex structure of society. Children growing up could see men at work, the aged, the houses of the rich and the poor.

On the other hand, Levittown and the housing project also came into existence for clear and sufficient reasons: one, to house rapidly great numbers of relatively low-income young families; the other, to house great numbers of truly poor people. And we have seen why it has been difficult to introduce a great range of social variation in such communities. The homeowners of Levittown would not want cheaper houses, and buyers of more expensive houses would not want to live there. The poor in the housing projects would be deprived of their right to subsidized housing if some substantial portion of this housing went to those who economically did not need it, whatever their presumed social virtues for the community.

The question remains, what efforts of social policy are justified in introducing a greater social variety into these communities? If this social variety is maintained by the exclusion of racial groups, it is in large measure illegal and it is certainly immoral. Beyond this, however, should we introduce a greater social variety through insisting on a wide range of economic levels and through a positive effort to recruit families of minority groups? One is cognizant of the fact that even where such variety exists (in the crowded central city), the mere fact of geographical proximity may lead to very little social contact. *Dead End,* in which the slum kids interact with the swells, is still fiction; most such interaction occurs through the intermediary of the police. Puerto Ricans and Negroes in the shadows of expensive apartment houses of New York scarcely have any inter-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

action with the wealthy – they generally use different stores, schools, churches, and open spaces.

Geographical proximity may lead to little of that social interaction we want, and which we try to achieve when we press for communities with representatives of different economic levels and racial groups. On the other hand, the new monumental scale of our metropolitan areas and sub-areas does not necessarily isolate economic and racial groups more. Interaction between our larger ghettoes and larger suburban communities may be in some ways more intense than when low-income and middle-income groups share the same small community. This interaction today occurs through politics, the press and the mass media, through riots and demonstrations. It may be an interaction appropriate to our new urban scale.

Nor have we truly examined the gains of the one-class or one-race community. Herbert Gans has unemotionally and unideologically pointed out that middle-class families like to have people like them as their neighbors, and has questioned what gains would follow from imposing on them a random selection of un-likeminded neighbors. Certain ethnic groups, even forty years after the end of mass immigration, still seem to want to cluster together – consider the Italians of Boston's late West End, or the East European communities of Chicago that are resisting Martin Luther King's integration campaign.

I think we have good social grounds for imposing a certain amount of discomfort on people who would prefer to live in communities of like and like-minded people. We can impose this discomfort when this common desire restricts other's rights to housing; we may impose this discomfort when some larger social end dictates a new and different use for the land of the community in which they live. But I would stop at imposing this discomfort out of a theory that "progress" is the result of being uprooted from the familial and tribal wombs.

Segregation by age

Aside from racial and economic segregation, our new communities show another form of segregation – by family life-cycle. Young families with children live in new suburban single-family home areas; older families will live in the older sections of the city. When children are grown and gone, elderly couples or single survivors will occupy a variety of specialized buildings or communities for the aged. Young couples without children occupy the new suburban apartment houses and – with more money, and a different style of life – the new inner-city apartment houses. Certainly we find a degree of segregation by family life-cycle that is more extreme than in the past, and that must have certain consequences for children and family life. It encourages

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the peer-group society, reduces the role of the generation of grandparents in the rearing of children, encourages a more rapid geographical mobility — for some neighborhoods are appropriate to one section of the family cycle, others to another part.

Has housing policy encouraged this segregation? In some degree it has. It has encouraged it simply because programs are defined in terms of certain specific needs — we have the standard FHA and VA programs, which are designed for the family with children, special programs for senior citizens, special programs for apartment building. Theoretically, a developer could mix together all these and other building types in the same development. Practically, he does not have the overhead resources for planning and negotiating with various federal agencies that this requires. It is hard to think of any good reason why the segregation should be as pronounced as it is. Perhaps senior citizens are annoyed by children's noise and prefer the company of others like them. Does this mean we should build communities of thousands of units for senior citizens alone? We cannot refer to any definitive studies — indeed, there are hardly any studies at all. But it does seem that, just as we have decided it was inhuman and murderous to segregate the mentally ill in vast institutions of many thousands, we may in time decide that the scale of some of our communities and developments for the aged is far too large. And we may find there are drawbacks in communities that recruit all their residents from the young family stage in the life cycle. One can only speculate as to the social and psychological effects, but we can point to inefficiencies in such communities — enormous pressures on schools followed by underutilization, for example. On the other hand, the drawbacks are not yet so obvious as to lead to any clear or strong demand that our policies be reviewed.

Urban renewal under attack

Urban renewal is one means by which urbanity is returned to the city — stronger commercial centers, cultural centers, new open space, new styles of center city living, a new mix in central city, in which upper-income groups are favored through government action. Its supporters have been central city mayors, trying to maintain the tax bases of their cities; central city economic interests — department store owners, banks; planners and architects, seeing the possibility of new urban forms. It has been resisted by the low-income people who inhabit the older buildings that have been cleared away; by sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists defending the ways of life of the low-income population, or defending their rights, and concerned with the impact upon them of forced relocation; and by advocates of the free market, who see no reason for the government to subsidize certain types of development, and distort what may be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a natural and sound adaptation of people to the new technology of the metropolitan area. Herbert Gans's *The Urban Villagers* has been the most powerful criticism of urban renewal from the point of view of the low-income population; Martin Anderson's *The Federal Bulldozer* has been the most powerful from the point of view of the advocates of the free market. The defenders of urban renewal have not yet emerged with equally powerful defenses; one may say, cynically, that in view of the interests arrayed in its favor, literary and scholarly defense has been unnecessary.

Nevertheless, under the impact of political unpopularity and intellectual critique and resistance, the urban renewal program has changed. More – if not enough – is now done for the population to be relocated, the stores and businesses that will be uprooted; the role of rehabilitation is now greater in urban renewal, and with new government aids one does not have to be well-to-do to afford the rehabilitation of one's own home; and some projects – in part through the impact of the poverty program – now show a larger participation of the population on the site. Under the Demonstration Cities Program, urban renewal will be transformed into the direction urged by its opponents and critics – all the branches of government, all the forms of aid, for physical and social and psychological ends, will be brought together to improve the central city. The practical difficulties of actually bringing into effect, under American political conditions, an integrated program to improve the living conditions of the people of a neighborhood and prevent loss of property values, change in occupancy to poorer groups, and physical deterioration, are enormous. It remains a question whether this type of city-building and city-renewal can develop the powerful dynamic drive that only one American housing policy has developed – that is, support of new, single-family, home building.

Meanwhile, the score on Mark I urban renewal is still being totted up. Urban renewal has unquestionably reduced the quantity of low-cost housing and raised rents for the poor. On the other hand, in our cities the overall housing stock has been rising faster than the number of households; the average quality of the housing stock has been rising; the number of vacancies is slowly increasing. Thus, this increase in housing costs is matched, overall, by an increase in housing quality. Is this increase in housing quality essential, when there were so many poor who would have preferred their poorer housing at lower rents? One may take this side of the argument – but those who take it do not always realize that one necessary implication is that, in doing so, one accepts the legitimacy of a range of freedom of choice in housing by people that a wealthy and socially conscious society tends to restrict at the lower end. Thus, we do not allow people in cities to live in shacks without plumbing. But if we want to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

give them the freedom to spend only a small proportion of their income on housing, then we must give them this freedom. One cannot have both sides of the argument — insist that we should not undertake housing policies that improve housing and increase housing costs, and insist at the same time that we should not tolerate slums.

The increase in housing costs for the poorest as a result of urban renewal's destruction of cheap housing (which plays only a small role actually in eliminating cheap housing — other public and private investment policies have a much larger effect) has been to some extent matched by a general increase in income; but urban renewal raises sharply the need either to establish minimum incomes so that people can afford the minimum housing that society insists they occupy, or to subsidize the housing costs directly.

Criticism III: are we building good communities?

We come now to the last major criticism of American housing policies — that they have not created good communities. We have in part already considered this criticism in our discussion of the problems of balanced communities. Once again, this criticism has both an aesthetic and social side, and ranges from the attack on urban sprawl to the critique of a dreary suburbia. Once again, Herbert Gans has had some of the wisest things to say about this. In his huge study, *The Levittowners*, he argues that those who accepted the relatively unplanned community of the developer, built on the basis of Federal policies that stabilized a flow of cheap mortgage credit for minimum single-family homes, on the whole got what they wanted. They did not suffer when they moved out of the central city. They gained space, a new house well-equipped with modern machinery, new schools for the children, bright new shopping facilities. The sufferers were the young housewives, who could not get out and away easily, and the adolescents, for whom there were too few facilities. (Gans indicates how better planning might have accommodated the needs of these deprived groups; some good public transportation, a few corner drug-and-candy stores, some recreational facilities.) The community was certainly not attractive to intellectuals, incipient intellectuals, and the culturally avant-garde. But few of them actually lived there.

Was this a "community"? The community was being made by those who came to live there, and those who had lived there previously. The developer had supplied only the housing, the inner roads, and the shopping. Perhaps, Gans argues, some of the necessary communal organizations could have been prepared in advance. But the strain of creating them was also fun, and there were national organizations to help.

Socially, the gains of the more fully planned community are as yet still tenuous. Lord Taylor and Sidney Chave show a clear improve-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment in mental health and health for the planned New Town as against the less planned London County Council Estate. The latter, however, has older people, and more people with medical problems to begin with; the former has attractive clinics as centers for group practice – the evidence is less for planning overall than for planning good health facilities.

Aesthetically, the gains of the planned community are clear. Reston and Columbia will have better looking neigborhoods, admirable town centers, more open land usable for recreation. They will be in competition with less planned developers' communities. If their advantages seem clear to the buyers, then one suspects the developer's community will become as uncommon as the new corner grocery in competition with the super market – another area of enterprise for the small businessman will fall by the way, to the benefit of the consumer, or at least the majority of the consumers.

One of the chief benefits of the planned community is to be found in the saving of open land and recreational land. We can easily contrast the English preservation of "greenbelts" with the despoiling of the American countryside. The advantage for the planned community is clear – and yet once again, the analysis is not generally carried far enough. The English commitment to countryside is based on the power of generally accepted values, in particular the belief that park-like countryside is one of the glories of England and must be maintained. Our countryside is less park-like, more subject to commercial exploitation by farmers which reduces park-likeness. Our population is more motorized and seems to demand more recreational facilities at a distance, and less at home. Our normal home has more space about it, so that some of the virtues of the preserved countryside are enjoyed at home.

The commitment to the maintenance of open land also means that land values rise, because much of it cannot be built on. H. E. Bracey, who has written an interesting book comparing new suburban development in the United States and England, points out that while Bristol, England, and Columbus, Ohio, have about the same population, land for building on the outskirts of Bristol costs $11,200 an acre, while similar building land near Columbus, and closer to the city, costs $1,000 an acre. Part of the difference is caused by the planned withdrawal, in Britain, of land for maintenance as countryside.

The benefits of planning have to be balanced against the costs of planning. To calculate all the costs and all the benefits is difficult. But our approaches to this problem are still too crude to be politically effective. We are quick to calculate the benefits of open land to the exurbanite driving through it to work in the city; we do not calculate the cost to the working men or low-income white collar workers who

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

might, if it were available for building, be able to put up cheap houses on it.

Conclusion

I would conclude that housing policy in this country has permitted the majority of American families to improve their living conditions, and to gain family settings for themselves that were superior to those they left. It has done little for a substantial minority of poor families who have not had the resources to achieve what the society considers (and they do, too) minimally desirable housing; for them, we must devise income maintenance policies that permit them to achieve such housing, or housing subsidies that work to the same effect. Nor has this policy been attractive to urban designers, architects, and all those sensitive to the value of maintaining or achieving subtle unities in the relationships between home, community facilities, work-places, transportation, and natural setting. Just as we are rich enough to provide decent minimal family settings for the economically deprived in our population, so I believe we are rich enough to provide some resources to the aesthetically deprived so as to maintain our more successful urban settings, and to devise new ones. But both new directions of policy must be fed, of course, through the complex procedures of a democratic society; and their proponents must convince the majority that they, too, will benefit from these extensions of our major policy commitments.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Data banks and dossiers

CARL KAYSEN

Both the intellectual development of economics and its practical success have depended greatly on the large body of statistical information, covering the whole range of economic activity, that is publicly available in modern, democratic states. Much of this material is the by-product of regulatory, administrative, and revenue-raising activities of government, and its public availability reflects the democratic ethos. In the United States there is also a central core of demographic, economic, and social information that is collected, organized, and published by the Census Bureau in response to both governmental and public demands for information, rather than simply as the reflex of other governmental activities. Over time, and especially in the last three or four decades, there has been a continuing improvement in the coverage, consistency, and

---

Last year, a government committee headed by Carl Kaysen proposed the creation of a "national data center." The intention is to improve the usefulness of available statistics for policy planning purposes by funneling such statistics into a central "information bank." But the proposal evoked considerable criticism as representing a possible threat to privacy and an undue concentration of power, in the form of knowledge, in governmental agencies. In this article, Mr. Kaysen, who is Director of the Institute for Advanced Study, in Princeton, presents the case for a "data bank." We expect to continue the discussion of this matter in future issues. – Ed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quality of these data. Such improvements have in great part resulted from the continuing efforts of social scientists and statisticians both within and outside the government. Without these improvements in the stock of basic quantitative information, our recent success in the application of sophisticated economic analyses to problems of public policy would have been impossible. Thus, the formation last year of a consulting committee composed largely of economists to report* to the Director of the Budget – himself an economist of distinction – on "Storage of and Access to Federal Statistical Data" was simply another natural step in a continuing process. The participants were moved by professional concern for the quality and usability of the enormous body of government data to take on what they though to be a necessary, important, and totally unglamorous task. They certainly did not expect it to be controversial.

The central problem to which the group addressed itself was the consequences of the trend toward increasing decentralization in the Federal statistical system at a time when the demand for more and more detailed quantitative information was growing rapidly. Currently, twenty-one agencies of government have significant statistical programs. The largest four of these – the Census, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Statistical Reporting Service, and the Economic Research Service of the Department of Agriculture – account for about 60 percent of a total Federal statistical budget of nearly $125 millions. A decade ago, the largest four agencies accounted for 71 percent of a much smaller budget. By 1970, the total statistical budget of the Federal Government will probably exceed $200 millions and, in the absence of deliberate countervailing effort, decentralization will have further increased. Yet, it has already been clear for some time that the Federal statistical system was too decentralized to function effectively and efficiently.

The drama begins

Such is the background of the report which recommended the creation of a National Data Center. Here, Congressman Cornelius Gallagher (D., 13th District, N.J.) entered the scene, with a different set of concerns and objectives. He was Chairman of a Special Subcommittee on Invasion of Privacy, of the Government Operations Committee of the House, which held hearings on the proposed data center and related topics in the summer of 1966. To some extent the

*The full title of the Report, dated October, 1966, is: *Report of the Task Force on the Storage of and Access to Government Statistics,* and it is available from the Bureau of the Budget. The Committee which produced it were: Carl Kaysen, Chairman, Institute for Advanced Study; Charles C. Holt, University of Wisconsin; Richard Holton, University of California, Berkeley; George Kozmetsky, University of Texas; H. Russell Morrison, Standard Statistics Co.; Richard Ruggles, Yale University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hearings themselves, and to a much greater extent their refraction in the press, pictured the proposed Data Center as at least a grave threat to personal privacy and at worst a precursor to a computer-managed totalitarian state. Congressman Gallagher himself saw the proposal as one more dreary instance of a group of technocrats ignoring human values in their pursuit of efficiency.

It now appears as if the public outcry which the Committee hearings stimulated and amplified has raised great difficulties in the way of the proposed National Data Center. To what extent are they genuine? To what extent are they unavoidable? Are they of such a magnitude as to outweigh the probable benefits of the Center?

In answering these questions, it appears simplest to begin with a further examination of the proposal itself. The inadequacies arising from our over-decentralized statistical system were recognized two decades ago; since then they have increased. The present system corresponds to an obsolete technology, under which publication was the only practical means of making information available for use. Publication, in turn, involved summarization, and what was published was almost always a summary of the more basic information available to the fact-gathering agency. In part, this reflected necessary and appropriate legal and customary restrictions on the Federal Government's publication of data on individuals or on single business enterprises. In part, it reflected the more fundamental fact that it was difficult or impossible to make use of a vast body of information unless it was presented in some summary form.

Any summarization or tabulation, however, loses some of the detail of the underlying data, and once a summary is published, retabulation of the original data becomes difficult and expensive. Because of the high degree of decentralization of the statistical system, it is frequently the case that information on related aspects of the same unit is collected by different agencies, tabulated and summarized on bases that are different and inconsistent, with a resultant loss of information originally available, and a serious degradation of the quality of analyses using the information. The split, on the one hand, between information on balance sheets and income statements, as collected by the Internal Revenue Service, and, on the other hand, the information on value of economic inputs and outputs as collected by the Census, is one example of this situation.

The result of all this is the substitution of worse for better information, less for more refined analysis, and the expenditure of much ingenuity and labor on the construction of rough estimates of magnitudes that could be precisely determined if all the information underlying summary tabulations were available for use. This, in turn, limits the precision of both the policy process, and our ability to understand, criticize and modify it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These effects of the inability of the present system to use fully the micro-information fed into it are growing more and more important. The differentiation of the Federal policy process is increasing, and almost certainly will continue to do so. Simple policy measures whose effectiveness could be judged in terms of some overall aggregate or average response for the nation are increasingly giving way to more subtle ones, in which the effects on particular geographic areas, income groups, or social groups become of major interest. The present decentralized system is simply incapable of meeting these needs.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to make informed and intelligent policy decisions on such questions in the area of poverty as welfare payments, family allowances, and the like, simply because we lack sufficient "dis-aggregated" information – breakdowns by the many relevant social and economic variables – that is both wide in coverage and readily usable. The information the Government does have is scattered among a dozen agencies, collected on a variety of not necessarily consistent bases, and not really accessible to any single group of policy-makers or research analysts. A test of the proposition, for example, that poor performance in school and poor prospects of social mobility are directly related to family size would require data combining information on at least family size and composition, family income, regional location, city size, school performance, and post-school occupational history over a period of years in a way that is simply not now possible, even though the separate items of information were all fed into some part of the Federal statistical system at some time.

A secondary, but not unimportant gain from the creation of the data center, is in simple efficiency. At present, some of the individual data-collecting agencies operate at too small a scale to make full use of the resources of modern information-handling techniques. The use of a central storage and processing agency – while maintaining decentralized collection, analysis, and publication to whatever extent was desirable – would permit significant economies. As the Federal statistical budget climbs toward $200 million annually, this is not a trivial point. Even more important than prospective savings in money are prospective savings in the effort of information collection and the corresponding burdens on individuals, business, and other organizations in filling out forms and responding to questionnaires. As the demand for information grows, the need to minimize the costs in respondents' time and effort becomes more important. The present statistical system is only moderately well-adapted to this objective; a data center would make possible a much better performance on this score.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What it is and isn't

So much for the purpose of a data center; how would it function? First, it is important to point out that a data center is *not* the equivalent of single centralized statistical agency which takes over responsibility for the entire information-gathering, record-keeping, and analytical activity of the Federal government. Rather, it deals with only one of the three basic functions of the statistical system – integration and storage of information in accessible form – and leaves the other two – collection of information, and tabulation, analysis, and publication – in their present decentralized state. To be sure, if the Data Center is as effective and efficient as some of its proponents expect, some redistribution of the last set of tasks between the agencies presently doing them and the Center would probably occur. This, however, would be the result of choice on the part of the using agencies, if they saw an opportunity to do a better and less costly job through the Center than they could do for themselves.

The crucial questions, of course, are (a) what information would be put into the data center, and (b) how would access to it be controlled? In the words of the Task Force Report, the "Center would assemble in a single facility all large-scale systematic bodies of demographic, economic and social data generated by the present data-collection or administrative processes of the Federal Government, . . . integrate the data to the maximum feasible extent, and in such a way as to preserve as much as possible of the original information content of the whole body of records, and provide ready access to the information, within the laws governing disclosure, to all users in the Government, and where appropriate to qualified users outside the Government on suitably compensatory terms."

The phrase "large scale systematic bodies of demographic economic and social data" translates, in more concrete terms, into the existing bodies of data collected by Census, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Department of Agriculture, the National Center for Health Statistics, the Office of Education, and so on. It also includes the large bodies of data generated as a by-product of the administration of the Federal income tax and the Social Security system. It does *not* include police dossiers from the FBI, personnel records of the Civil Service Commission or the individual government agencies, or personnel records of the armed services, and other dossier information, none of which fits what is meant by the phrase "large scale, systematic bodies of social, economic, and demographic data."

For the data center to achieve its intended purposes, the material in it must identify individual respondents in some way, by Social Security number for individuals, or an analogous code number now used within the Census for business enterprises called the Alpha

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

number. Without such identification, the Center cannot meet its prime purpose of integrating the data collected by various agencies into a single consistent body. Whether these Social Security or Alpha numbers need in turn to be keyed to a list of respondents which identifies them by name and address within the data center itself, or whether that need be done only within the actual data collecting agencies, is a technical detail. That it must be done someplace is perfectly clear, as it now is done within the several agencies that collect the information.

On the other hand, it is not in general necessary that the central files in the data center contain a complete replica of every file on every respondent who has provided information to the original collectors. In many cases – e.g., the Social Security files – a properly designed sample would serve the same purposes more economically. To this extent, then, the data center will not contain a file on *every* individual, *every* household, *every* business, etc., but a mixture of a collection of samples – some of them relatively large – and complete files of some groups of reporting units which are particularly interesting and important from an analytical point of view. But here again, the significance of the difference between reproducing for the data center a complete file which already exists in some other agency, and reproducing only a sample therefrom, can easily be over-emphasized.

Anxieties

It is neither intemperate nor inappropriate to observe that the merits of the proposed data center have hardly been discussed in the tones that ordinarily mark consideration of a small change in government organization in behalf of greater effectiveness and efficiency. The anxieties stimulated by or crystallizing around the proposal can be divided into six groups: (1) the center will contain information that should not be in it; (2) the information can be improperly used by those within the government who have access to it; (3) the "bank" will be subject to cracking, so to speak, and data on individuals will be used to their detriment in any way from blackmail to gossip; (4) an enterprise of this sort is inherently expanding in nature, and no matter how modestly it begins, it will grow to include more and more, and eventually too much; (5) it both represents and encourages meddling and paternalistic government, trying to do too much in controlling the lives of its citizens; and (6) at a deeper level, it stands for a notion of an omniscient government, which is in some fundamental way inconsistent with our individualistic and democratic values. These categories are overlapping in part and hardly all on the same logical level of discourse, but they seem to contain broadly all the criticisms that have been made.

To what extent are these problems real and new; to what extent

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are they simply translations into a new technical mode of familiar and persistent problems in the relation of citizens and government? And, if the latter, how well can variants of familiar mechanisms be adapted to deal with them? In what follows, I argue that while the fears raised by critics have real content, the problems are neither entirely novel, nor beyond the range of control by adaptations of present governmental mechanisms.

The first two questions go to the fundamental problem of government: *quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* The content of information now in the inventory of government agencies is controlled ultimately by the Congress, operating through the appropriations process; and more immediately by the separate bureaucratic hierarchies of each data collecting agency, subject to the overall review of the Director of the Budget. He has a specific statutory responsibility for reviewing all governmental questionnaires directed to the public, with a view to eliminating duplication and keeping the total burden on respondents at a reasonable level. If this process seems to be working ineffectively, in the sense of ignoring persistent complaints, then the Appropriations Subcommittees that deal with the budget requests of each data-collecting agency are readily able to exercise a further control. In practice, the existence of this restraint operates to reinforce powerfully the caution of the collecting agencies in expanding their requests.

A new data center would operate within the same framework of controls. Indeed, the Congress, in authorizing its creation, should define the kind of information which it would assemble, and could follow the line of demarcation of large-scale systematic demographic, economic, and social statistics suggested above. The inclusion of dossier information could be specifically prohibited. A clear distinction between "a dossier" and "statistical data file" on an individual can be made in principle; namely, for a dossier, the specific identity of the individual is central to its purpose; while for a file of data it is merely a technical convenience for assembling in the same file the connected set of characteristics which are the object of information. The purpose of the one is the assembly of information about specific people; the purpose of the other, the assembly of statistical frequency distributions of the many characteristics which groups of individuals (or households, business enterprises, or other reporting units) share. In practice, of course, this distinction is not self-applying, and administrators and bureaucrats, checked and overseen by politicians, have to apply it. But so is it ever.

A similar set of observations is relevant to the question of the control over the use of data in the center. The present law and practice governing the Census Bureau offer a model for this purpose. The law provides that information contained in an individual Census return may not be disclosed either to the general public or to other

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agencies of the government, nor may such information be used for law-enforcement, regulatory, or tax-collection activity in respect to any individual respondent. This statutory restriction has been effectively enforced, and the Census Bureau has maintained for years the confidence of respondents in its will and ability to protect the information they give to it. The same statutory restraint could and should be extended to the data center, and the same results could be expected of it. The data center would supply to all users, inside and outside the government, frequency distributions, summaries, analyses, but never data on individuals or other single reporting units. The technology of machine storage and processing would make it possible for these outputs to be tailored closely to the needs of individual users without great expense and without disclosure of individual data. This is just what is *not* possible under our present system.

Temptations

However, it may be argued that the greater richness of the data file on any single reporting unit in a new data center as compared with those presently existing in the Census, the Social Security Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, and elsewhere would greatly increase the temptation for those with legitimate access to the data to use it improperly. The same argument goes to the third point listed above – the "cracking" of the center by outsiders ranging from corrupt politicians to greedy businessmen and organized criminals. It is clearly the case that centralized storage in machine-readable form of large bodies of information makes the rewards of successful abuse or "penetration" relatively large – compared to what they would be in a more decentralized, less mechanized system. It is not at all clear, however, that the cost of successful misapplication or penetration cannot be increased even more sharply than the rewards. In detail this is a technical problem of great complexity, but it seems clear from experience with a variety of secrecy-preserving techniques that a well-designed system of record storage and use could make "penetration" highly costly and to a large extent self-announcing. It is not difficult, for example, so to organize and code the basic records that programs for retrieving information routinely record the user and the purpose for which it was used. Any continued improper use would thus leave a trail that would invite discovery. Or, to mention another aspect, identifying numbers could be specially coded, and the key to that code made available on a much more restricted basis than were other codes. While no security system can be made perfect, it is feasible to make the costs of breaking it sufficiently high so as to keep the problem within tolerable bounds. The same kinds of safeguards would prevent misuse of the data by those with legitimate access to it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The last three kinds of objections are similar in that they reflect a certain stance toward the government, and toward the evolution of its role in the larger society, and are not tied to any specific concrete problems. Indeed, the concrete problems underlying these broader concerns are those already examined. How will the contents of the data bank be controlled? Who will determine to what uses it may be put? How can we prevent the stock of information from being abused, misused, or simply misappropriated? But there appears beyond these specifics an attitude hard to discuss because of its intangible nature.

On the broadest level, one can simply reject the notion that there is an ineluctable ever-expanding process of governmental "intrusion" which must be resisted at every turn, yet inevitably overcomes whatever resistance the public offers. After all, this is the stuff of right-wing ideology. Opposed to this is the pragmatic liberal view that the public calls in the government, with more or less deliberation, when there are social problems to be solved which require governmentally-organized efforts and legally-enforceable obligations for their solution. Indeed, many proponents of this view see the restraints on government action built into our political system as too high, rather than too low, and action as typically too little and too late. On this view we have suffered more, at least in matters of domestic policy, from the feebleness of our government than from its overweening strength.

Without decisively choosing one over the other of these ideological stances, and with full recognition that a government too feeble for the welfare of its citizens in some matters may be too strong for their comfort or even their liberty in others, it is possible to believe, as I do, that the present balance of forces in our political machinery tends to the side of healthy restraint in matters such as these. After all, the very course of discussion on these problems, since the Center was first considered, supports this view. Accordingly, I conclude that the risky potentials which might be inherent in a data center are sufficiently unlikely to materialize so that they are outweighed, on balance, by the real improvement in understanding of our economic and social processes this enterprise would make possible, with all the concomitant gains in intelligent and effective public policy that such understanding could lead to.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Economics and criminal enterprise

THOMAS C. SCHELLING

At the level of national policy, if not always of local practice, the dominant approach to organized crime is through indictment and conviction. This is in striking contrast to the enforcement of anti-trust or food-and-drug laws, or the policing of public utilities, which work through regulation, accommodation, and the restructuring of markets. For some decades, anti-trust problems have received the sustained professional attention of economists concerned with the structure of markets, the organization of business enterprise, and the incentives toward collusion or price-cutting. Racketeering and the provision of illegal goods (like gambling) have been conspicuously neglected by economists. (There exists no analysis of the liquor industry under prohibition that begins to compare with the best available studies of the aluminum or steel industries, air transport, milk distribution, or public-utility pricing.) Yet a good many economic and business principles that operate in the "upperworld" must, with suitable modification for change in environment, operate in the underworld as well – just as a good many economic principles that operate in an advanced competitive economy operate as well in a socialist or a primitive economy.

In addition to the sheer satisfaction of curiosity, there are good policy reasons for encouraging a "strategic" analysis of the criminal underworld. Such an analysis, in contrast to "tactical" intelligence aimed at the apprehension of individual criminals, could help in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

identifying the incentives and disincentives to organize crime, in evaluating the costs and losses due to criminal enterprises, and in restructuring laws and programs to minimize the costs, wastes, and injustices that crime entails.

What market characteristics determine whether a criminal activity becomes "organized"? Gambling, by all accounts, invites organization; abortion, by all accounts, does not. In the upperworld, automobile manufacture is characterized by large firms, but not machine-tool production; collusive price-fixing occurs in the electrical-machinery industry, but not in the distribution of fruits and vegetables. The reasons for these differences are not entirely understood, but they are amenable to study. The same should not be impossible for gambling, extortion, and contraband cigarettes.

How much does organized crime depend on at least one major market in which the advantages of large scale are great enough to support a dominant monopoly firm or cartel? Not all businesses lend themselves to centralized organization; some do, and these may provide the nucleus of capital and entrepreneurial talent for extension into other businesses that would not, alone, support or give rise to an organized monopoly or cartel. Do a few "core" criminal markets provide the organizational stimulus for organized crime? If the answer turns out to be yes, then a critical question is whether the particular market so essential for the "economic development" of the underworld is a "black market," whose existence is dependent on the prohibition of legal competition, or instead is an inherently criminal activity. Black markets always offer to the policy maker, in principle, the option of restructuring the market – of increasing legal competition, of compromising the original prohibition, of selectively relaxing either the law itself or the way it is enforced. If, alternatively, that central criminal enterprise is one that rests on violence, relaxation of the law is likely to be both ineffectual and unappealing.

Since one of the interesting questions is why some underworld business becomes organized and some not, and another, what *kinds* of organization should be expected, a classification of these enterprises has to cover more than just "organized crime" and to distinguish types of organization. A tentative typology of underworld business might be as follows.

Black markets

A large part of organized crime is the selling of commodities and services contrary to law. In what we usually consider the underworld this includes dope, prostitution, gambling, liquor (under prohibition), abortions, pornography, and contraband or stolen goods. Most of these are consumer goods.

In what is not usually considered the underworld, black markets

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

include gold, contraceptives in some states, rationed commodities and coupons in wartime, loans and rentals above controlled prices, theater tickets in New York, and a good many similar commodities that, though not illegal per se, are handled outside legitimate markets or diverted from subsidized uses.

In some cases (gambling) the law bans the commodity from all consumers; in others (cigarettes), some consumers are legitimate and some (minors) not. In some cases what is illegal is that the tax or duty has not been paid; in some, it is the price of the transaction that makes it illegal. In some (child labor, illegal immigrant labor), it is buying the commodity, not selling it, that is proscribed.

Racketeering

Racketeering includes two kinds of business, both based on intimidation. One is *criminal monopoly*, the other *extortion*.

"Criminal monopoly" means the use of criminal means to destroy competition. Whether a competitor is actually destroyed or merely threatened with violence to make him go out of business, the object is to get protection from competition when the law will not provide it (by franchise or tariff protection) and when it cannot be legally achieved (through price wars, control of patents, or preclusive contracts).

We can distinguish altogether three kinds of "monopoly": those achieved through legal means, those achieved through means that are illegal only because of anti-trust and other laws intended to make monopoly difficult, and monopolies achieved through means that are criminal by any standards – means that would be criminal whether or not they were aimed at monopolizing a business. It is also useful to distinguish between firms that, in an excess of zeal or deficiency of scruple, engage when necessary in ruthless and illegal competition, and the more strictly "racketeering" firms whose profitable monopoly rests entirely on criminal violence. The object of law enforcement in the former case is not to destroy the firm but to curtail its illegal practices. If the whole basis of success in business, though, is strong-arm methods that keep competition destroyed or scare it away, it is a pure "racket".

"Extortion" means living off somebody else's business by the threat of violence or of criminal competition. A protection racket lives off its victims, letting them operate and pay tribute. If one establishes a chain of restaurants and destroys competitors or scares them out of business, that is "monopoly"; if he merely threatens to destroy people's restaurant business, taking part of their profits as the price for leaving them alone, he is an extortionist and likes to see them prosper so that his share will be greater.

For several reasons it is difficult to distinguish "extortion" that,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

like a parasite, wants a healthy host, from "criminal monopoly" that is dedicated to the elimination of competitors. First, one means of extortion is to threaten to cut off the supply of a monopolized commodity – labor on a construction site, trucking, or some illegal commodity provided through the black market. That is to say, one can use a monopoly at one stage for extortionate leverage at the next. Second, extortion itself can be used to secure a monopoly privilege: instead of taking tribute in cash, for example, a victim signs a contract for the high-priced delivery of beer or linen supplies. The result looks like monopoly, but arose out of extortion.

It is evident that extortion can be organized or not, but in important cases it has to be. Vulnerable victims, after all, have to be protected from other extortionists. A monopolistic laundry service, deriving from a threat to harm the business that does not subscribe, has to destroy or to intimidate not only competing legitimate laundry services but other racketeers who would muscle in on the same victim. Thus, while criminal monopoly may not depend on extortion, organized extortion always needs an element of monopoly.

Black-market monopoly

Any successful black marketeer enjoys a "protected" market in the way a domestic industry is protected by a tariff, or butter is protected by a law against margarine. The black marketeer gets protection from the law against all competitors unwilling to pursue a criminal career. But there is a difference between a "protected industry" and a "monopolized industry." Abortion is a black market commodity but not a monopoly; a labor racket is a local monopoly but not a black-market one; a monopoly in dope has both elements – it is a "black-market monopoly".

Cartel

A "conspiracy in restraint of trade" that does not lead to single-firm monopoly but to collusive price-fixing, and that maintains itself by criminal action, gives rise to a cartel that is not in, but depends on, the underworld. If the garment trade eliminates competition by an agreement on prices and wages, hiring thugs to enforce the agreement, it is different from the monopoly racket discussed above. If the government would make such agreements legally enforceable (as it does with retail-price-maintenance laws in some states), the business would be in no need of criminally enforcing discipline on itself. Similarly, a labor union can use criminal means to discipline its members, even to the presumed benefit of its members, who may be better off working as a bloc rather than as competing individuals. If the law permits enforceable closed-shop agreements, the criminal means become unnecessary.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Organized criminal services

A characteristic of the businesses listed above is that they usually involve relations between the underworld and the upperworld. But as businesses in the upperworld need legal services, financial advice, credit, enforcement of contract, places to conduct their business, and communication facilities, so in the underworld there has to be a variety of business services that are "domestic" to the underworld itself. These can be organized or unorganized. They are *in* the underworld, but not because they exploit the underworld as the underworld exploits the legitimate world.

The incentives to criminal organization

The simplest explanation of a large-scale firm, in the underworld or anywhere else, is high overhead costs or some other element of technology that makes small-scale operation more costly than large-scale. The need to keep equipment or specialized personnel fully utilized often explains at least the lower limit to the size of the firm.

A second explanation is the prospect of monopolistic prices. If most of the business can be cornered by a single firm, it can raise the price at which it sells its illegal services. Like any business, it does this at some sacrifice in size of the market; but if the demand is inelastic, the increase in profit margin will more than compensate for the reduction in output. Of course, decentralized individual firms would have as much to gain by pushing up the price, but without discipline it will not work; each will undercut its competitors. Where entry can be denied to newcomers, centralized price-setting will yield monopoly rewards to whoever can organize the market. With discipline, a cartel can do it; in the absence of discipline a merger may do it; but intimidation, too, can lead to the elimination of competition and the conquest of a monopoly position by a single firm.

Third, the larger the firm, and especially the larger its share of the whole market, the more will formerly "external" costs become costs internal to the firm. "External costs" are those that fall on competitors, customers, bystanders, and others outside the firm itself. Collection of all the business within a single firm causes the costs that individual firms used to inflict on each other to show up as costs (or losses) to the larger centralized firm now doing the business. This is an advantage. The costs were originally there but disregarded; now there is an incentive to take them into account.

Violence is one such external cost. Racketeers have a collective interest in restricting violence, so as to avoid trouble with the public and the police – but the individual racketeer has little or no incentive to reduce the violence connected with his own crime. There is an analogy here with the whaling industry, which has a collective inter-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

est in not killing off the whales although an individual whaler has no incentive to consider what he is doing to the future of the industry when he maximizes his own catch. A large organization can afford to impose discipline, holding down violence if the business is crime, holding down the slaughter of females if the business is whaling.

There are also "external economies" that can become internalized, to the advantage of the centralized firm. Lobbying has this character, as does cultivating relations with the police. No small bookie can afford to spend money to influence gambling legislation, but an organized trade association or monopoly among those who live off illegal gambling can. Similarly with labor discipline; the small firm cannot afford to teach a lesson to the labor force of the industry, since most of the lesson is lost on other people's employees, but a single large firm can expect the full benefit of its labor policy. Similarly with cultivating the market; if one cultivates the market for dope, by hooking some customers, or cultivates a market for gambling in a territory where the demand is still latent, he cannot expect much of a return on his investment if opportunistic competitors will take advantage of the market he creates. Anything that requires a long investment in cultivating a consumer interest, a labor market, ancillary institutions, or relations with the police, can be undertaken only by a fairly large firm that has reason to expect that it can enjoy most of the market and get a satisfactory return on the investment.

Finally, there is the attraction of not only monopolizing a market but achieving a dominant position in the underworld itself, and participating in its governing. To the extent that large criminal business firms provide a governmental structure to the underworld, helping to maintain peace, setting rules, arbitrating disputes, and enforcing discipline, they are in a position to set up their own businesses and exclude competition. Constituting a "corporate state," they can give themselves the franchise for various "state-sponsored monopolies." They can do this either by denying the benefits of underworld government to their competitors or by using the equivalent of their "police power" to prevent competition.

Market structure

In evaluating crime, an accounting approach gives at best a benchmark as to magnitudes, and not even that for the distribution of economic and social gains and losses. The problem is like that of estimating the comparative incidence of profits taxes and excise taxes, or the impact of a minimum-wage law on wage differentials. Especially if we want to know who bears the cost, or to compare the costs to society with the gains to the criminals, an analysis of *market adjustments* is required. Even the pricing practices of organized crime need to be studied.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Consider the illegal wire-service syndicate in Miami that received attention from Senator Kefauver's committee. The magnitude that received explicit attention was the loss of state revenues due to the diversion of gambling from legal race tracks, which were taxable, to illegal bookmakers, whose turnover was not taxable. No accounting approach would yield this magnitude; it depended (as was pointed out in testimony) on what economists call the "elasticity of substitution" betwen the two services – on the fraction of potential race track business that patronized bookmakers.

Similar analysis is required to determine *at whose expense* the syndicate operated, or what the economic consequences of the syndicate's removal would have been. The provision of wire-service was of small economic significance. It accounted, on a cost basis, for less than 5% of the net income of bookmakers (of which the syndicate took approximately 50%). And cheaper wire service to the bookies might have been available in the absence of the syndicate, whose function was not to provide wire service but to eliminate wire-service competitors.

The essential business of the syndicate was to practice *extortion against bookmakers.* It demanded half their earnings, against the threat of reprisals. The syndicate operated like a taxing authority (as well as providing some reinsurance on large bets); it apparently did not limit the number of bookmakers so long as they paid their "taxes".

How much of this tax was passed along to the customer (on the analogy of a gasoline or a sales tax) and how much was borne by the bookie (on the analogy of an income or profits tax) is hard to determine. If we assume (a) that bookmakers' earnings are approximately proportionate to the volume of turnover, (b) that their customers, though sensitive to the comparative odds of different bookmakers, are not sensitive to the profit margin, (c) that they tend, consciously or implicitly, to budget their total bets and not their rate of loss, we can conclude that the tax is substantially passed along to the customer. In that case the bookmaker, though nominally the victim of extortion, is victimized only into raising the price to his customers, somewhat like a filling station that must pay a tax on every gallon sold. The bookmaker is thus an intermediary between an extortionate syndicate and a customer who pays his tribute voluntarily on the price he is willing to pay for his bets.

The syndicate in Miami relied on the police as their favorite instrument of intimidation. It could have been the other way around, with the police using the syndicate as their agency to negotiate and collect from the bookmakers, and if the police had been organized and disciplined as a monopoly, it would have been the police, not the syndicate, that we should put at the top of our organizational pyramid. From the testimony, though, it is evident that the initiative and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

entrepreneurship came from the syndicate, which had the talent and organization for this kind of business, and that the police lacked the centralized authority for exploiting to their own benefit the power they had over the bookmakers. Presumably – though there were few hints of this in the hearings – the syndicate could have mobilized other techniques for intimidating the bookmakers; the police were the chosen instrument only so long as the police's share in the proceeds was competitive with alternative executors of the intimidating threats.

Any attempt to estimate the long-term effect on police salaries would have to take into account how widespread and non-discriminatory the police participation was, especially by rank and seniority in service. Recruiting would be unaffected if police recruits were unaware of the illegal earnings that might accrue to them; senior members of the force who might otherwise have quit the service, or lobbied harder for pay increases, would agitate less vigorously for high wages if their salaries were augmented by the racket. One cannot easily infer that part of the "tax" paid by the bookmaker's customer subsidized the police force to the benefit of non-betting taxpayers; mainly they supported a more discriminatory and irregular earnings pattern among the police – besides contributing, unwittingly, to a demoralization of the police that would have made it a bad bargain for the taxpayer anyway.

This is just a sketch, based on the skimpy evidence available, of the rather complex structure of "organized gambling" in one city. (It is not, of course, the gambling that is organized; the organization is an extortionate monopoly that nominally provides a wire-service but actually imposes a tribute on middlemen who pass most of the cost along to their voluntary customers.) Similar analysis would be required to identify the incidence of costs and losses (and gains, of course) of protection rackets everywhere (e.g., monopoly-priced beer deliveries to bars or restaurants, vending machines installed in bars and restaurants under pain of damage or nuisance, etc.).

Institutional practices

Institutional practices in the underworld need to be better understood. What, for example, is the effect of the tax laws on extortion? Why does an extortionist put cigarette machines in a restaurant or provide linen service? Do the tax laws make it difficult to disguise the payment of tribute in cash but easy to disguise it (and make it tax deductible) if the tribute takes the form of a concession or the purchase of high-priced services? Why does a gambling syndicate bother to provide "wire service" when evidently its primary economic function is to shake down bookies by the threat of hurting their businesses or their persons, possibly with the collusion of the police?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Kefauver hearings indicate that the wire-service syndicate in Miami took a standard 50% from the bookies. The symmetry of the 50% figure is itself remarkable. Equally remarkable is that the figure was uniform. But most remarkable of all is that the syndicate went through the motions of providing a wire service when it perfectly well could have taken cash tribute instead. There is an analogy here with the car salesman who refuses to negotiate the price of a new car, but is willing to negotiate quite freely the "allowance" on the used car that one turns in. The underworld seems to need institutions, conventions, traditions, and recognizable standard practices much like the upperworld of business. A better understanding of these practices might lead not only to a better evaluation of crime itself but also to a better understanding of the role of tax laws and regulatory laws on the operation of criminal business.

The role of vending machines, for example, appears to be that they provide a tax-deductible, non-discriminatory, and "respectable" way of paying tribute. Pinball and slot machines installed by a gang in somebody's small store may be only half characterized when identified as "illegal gambling"; they are equally a conventionalized medium for the exaction of tribute from the store owner. Effective enforcement of a ban on the machines will take care of the "gambling" part of the enterprise; what happens to the extortion racket depends then on how readily some other lucrative concession, some exclusive delivery contract, or some direct cash tribute can be imposed on the store owner.

Even the resistance to crime would be affected by measures designed to change the cost structure. Economists make an important distinction between a lump-sum tax, a profits tax, and a specific or ad valorum tax on the commodity an enterprise sells. The manner in which a criminal monopolist or extortionist prices his service, or demands his tribute, should have a good deal to do with whether the cost is borne by the victim or passed along by the customer. The "tax" levied by the racketeer uniformly on all his customers – monopoly-priced beer or linen supplies – may merely be passed along in turn to their customers, with little loss to the immediate victims, if the demand in their own market is inelastic. A bar that has to pay an extortionate price for its beer can seek relief in either of two ways. It can try to avoid paying the extortionate or monopolized price; alternatively, it can insist that its supplier achieve similar concessions from all competing bars, to avoid a competitive disadvantage. An individual bar suffers little if the price of wholesale beer goes up; it suffers when competitors' prices do not go up.

Similarly, legal arrangements that make it difficult to disguise illegal transactions, and that make it a punishable offense to pay tribute, might help to change the incentives. In a few cases, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deliberate stimulation of competing enterprises could be in the public interest: loan-sharking, for example, might be somewhat mitigated by the deliberate creation of new and specialized lending enterprises. Loan-sharking appears to involve several elements, only one of which is the somewhat outmoded notion – outmoded by a few centuries – that people so much in need of cash that they'd pay high interest rates should be protected from "usury" even if it means merely that they are protected by being denied any access to credit at all. A second element is that, now that debtors' prison has been liberally abolished, people who cannot post collateral have no ready way to assure their own motivation to repay – attachment of wages has also been liberally made illegal – so that those without assets who need cash must pledge life and limb in the underworld. Thus when the law has no way of enforcing contract, the underworld provides it: a man submits to the prospect of personal violence as the last resort in contract enforcement. Finally, the borrower whose prospects of repayment are so poor that even the threat of violence cannot hold him to repayment is enticed into an arrangement that makes him a victim of perpetual extortion, one who cannot go to the law because he is already party to a criminal transaction. Evidently there is some part of this racket that thrives on a void in our legal and financial institutions.

Evaluating costs and losses

Crime is bad, as cancer is bad; but even for cancer, one can distinguish among death, pain, anxiety, the cost of treatment, the loss of earnings, the effects on the victim and the effects on his family. Similarly with crime. It is offensive to society that the law be violated. But crime can involve a transfer of wealth from the victim to the criminal, a net social loss due to the inefficient mode of transfer, the creation of fear and anxiety, violence from which nobody profits, the corruption of the police and other public officials, costs of law enforcement and private protection, high prices to customers, unfairness of competition, loss of revenue to the state, and even loss of earnings to the criminals themselves who in some cases may be ill-suited to their trade.

There are important "trade-offs" among these different costs and losses due to crime, and in the different ways that government can approach the problem of crime. There will be choices between reducing the incidence of crime and reducing the consequences of crime, and other choices that require a more explicit indentification and evaluation of the magnitude and distribution of the gains and losses.

If there were but one way to wage war against crime, and the only question how vigorously to do it, there would be no need to identify the different objectives (costs and consequences) in devising the campaign. But if this is a continual campaign to cope with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some pretty definite evils, without any real expectation of "total victory" or "unconditional surrender," resources have to be allocated and deployed in a way that maximizes the value of a compromise.

In the black-markets it is especially hard to identify just what the evils are. In the first place, a law-abiding citizen is not obliged to consider the procurement and consumption of illegal commodities inherently sinful. We have constitutional procedures for legislating prohibitions; the out-voted minority is bound to abide by the law but not necessarily to agree with it, and can even campaign to become a majority and legalize liquor after a decade of prohibition, or legalize contraceptives in states where they have been prohibited. Even those who vote to ban gambling or saloons or dope can do so, not because they consider the consumption sinful, but because *some* of the consequences are bad; and if it is infeasible to prohibit the sale of alcohol only to alcoholics, or gambling only to minors, we have to forbid all of it to forbid the part we want to forbid.

The only reason for rehearsing these arguments is to remind ourselves that the evil of gambling, drinking, or dope, is not necessarily proportionate to how much of it goes on. The evil can be greater or less than suggested by any such figure. One might, for example, conclude that the consumption of narcotics that actually occurs is precisely the consumption that one wanted to prevent, and that it is the more harmless consumption that has been eliminated; or one might conclude that the gambling laws eliminate the worst of gambling, that what filters through the laws is fairly innocuous (or would be, if its being illegal per se were not harmful to society), and that gambling laws thus serve the purpose of selective discrimination in their enforcement if not in their enactment.

The evils of abortion are particularly difficult to evaluate, especially because it is everybody's privilege to attach his own moral value to the commodity. Are the disgust, anxiety, humiliation, and physical danger incurred by the abortionists' customers part of the "net cost" to society, or are they positively valued as punishment for the wicked? If a women gets an abortion, do we prefer she pay a high price or a low one? Is the black-market price a cost to society, a proper penalty inflicted on the woman, or merely an economic waste? If a woman gets a safe cheap abortion abroad, is this a legitimate bit of "international trade," raising the national income like any gainful trade, or is it even worse than her getting an expensive, more disagreeable, more dangerous abortion at home, because she evaded the punishment and the sense of guilt?

These are not academic questions. There are issues of policy in identifying what it is we dislike about criminal activity, especially in deciding where and how to compromise. The case of prostitution is a familiar example. Granting the illegality of prostitution, and ef-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

forts to enforce the law against it, one may still discover that one particular evil of prostitution is a hazard to health – the spread of venereal disease, a spread that is not confined to the customers but transmitted even to those who had no connection with the illicit commodity. Yet there is some incompatibility between a campaign to eradicate venereal disease and a campaign to eradicate prostitution, and one may prefer to legislate a public health service for prostitutes and their customers even at the expense of "diplomatic recognition" of the enemy. The point is that a hard choice can arise and ideology gives no answer. If two of the primary evils connected with a criminal activity are negatively correlated, one has to distinguish them, separately evaluate them, and then make up one's mind.

Similarly with abortion. At the very least, one can propose clinical help to women seeking abortion for the limited purpose of eliminating from the market those who are actually *not* pregnant, providing them the diagnosis that an abortionist might have neglected or preferred to withold. Going a step further, one may want to provide reliable advice about post-abortion symptoms to women who may become infected or who may hemorrhage or otherwise suffer from ignorance. Still a step further, one may like to provide even abortionists with a degree of immunity so that if a woman needs emergency treatment he can call for it without danger of self-incrimination. None of these suggestions compromises the principle of illegality; they merely apply to abortion some of the principles that would ordinarily be applied to hit-and-run driving or to an armed robber who inadvertently hurt his victim and preferred to call an ambulance.

One has to go a step further, though, on the analogy with contraception, and ask about the positive or negative value of scientific discovery, or research and development, in the field of abortion itself. Cheap, safe and reliable contraceptives are now considered a stupendous boon to mankind. What is the worth of a cheap, safe and reliable technique of abortion, one that involves no surgery, no harmful or addicting drugs, no infection, and preferably not even reliance on a professional abortionist? Suppose some of the new techniques developed in Eastern Europe and elsewhere for performing safer and more convenient abortions become technically available to abortionists in this country, with the consequence that fewer patients suffer – but also with the consequence that more abortions are procured? How do we weigh these consequences against each other? Each of us may have his own answer, and a political or judicial decision is required if we want an official answer. But the questions cannot be ignored.

The same questions arise in the field of firearm technology. Do we hope that non-lethal weapons become available to criminals, so that they kill and damage fewer victims, or would we deplore it on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

grounds that any technological improvement available to criminal enterprise is against the public interest? Do we hope to see less damaging narcotics become available, perhaps cheaply available through production and marketing techniques that do not lend themselves to criminal monopoly, to compete with the criminally monopolized and more deleterious narcotics? Or is this a "compromise" with crime itself?

Should crime be organized or disorganized?

It is usually implied, if not asserted, that organized crime is a menace and has to be fought. But if the alternative is "disorganized crime" – if the criminals and their opportunities will remain, with merely a lesser degree of organization than before – the choice is not an easy one.

There is one argument for favoring the "organization" of crime. It is that organization would "internalize" some of the costs that fall on the underworld itself but go unnoticed, or ignored, if criminal activity is decentralized. The individual hijacker may be tempted to kill a truck driver to destroy a potential witness – to the dismay of the underworld, which suffers from public outrage and the heightened activity of the police. A monopoly or a trade association could impose discipline. This is not a decisive argument, nor does it apply to all criminal industries if it applies to a few; but it is important.

If abortion, for example, will not be legalized and cannot be eliminated, one can wish it were better organized. A large organization could not afford to mutilate so many women. It could impose higher standards. It would have an interest in quality control and the protection of its "goodwill" that the petty abortionist is unlikely to have. As it is, the costs external to the enterprise – the costs that fall not on the abortionist but on the customer or on the reputation of other abortionists – are of little concern to him and he has no incentive to minimize them. By all accounts, criminal abortion is conducted more incompetently and more irresponsibly than illegal gambling.

Compromising with organized crime

It is customary to deplore the "accommodation" that the underworld reaches, sometimes, with the forces of law and order, with the police, with the prosecutors, with the courts. Undoubtedly there is corruption of public officials, bad not only because it frustrates justice but also because it lowers standards of morality. On the other hand, officials concerned with law enforcement are inevitably in the front line of diplomacy between the legitimate world and the underworld. Aside from the approved negotiations by which criminals are induced to testify, to plead guilty, to surrender themselves, or to tip off the police, there is always a degree of accommodation between

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the police and the criminals – tacit or explicit understandings analogous to what in military affairs would be called the limitation of war, the control of armament, and the delineation of spheres of influence.

In criminal activity by legitimate firms – such as conspiracy in restraint of trade, tax evasion, illegal labor practices, or the marketing of dangerous drugs – regulatory agencies can deal specifically with the harmful practices. One does not have to declare war on the industry itself, only on the illegal practices. Regulation, even negotiation, are recognized techniques for coping with those practices. But when the business itself is criminal, it is harder to have an acknowledged policy of regulation and negotiation. For this involves a kind of "diplomatic recognition."

In the international field, one can cold-bloodedly limit warfare and come to an understanding about the kinds of violence that will be resisted or punished, the activities that will be considered nonaggressive, and the areas within the other side's sphere of influence. Maybe the same approach is necessary in dealing with crime itself. And if we cannot acknowledge it at the legislative level, it may have to be accomplished in an unauthorized or unacknowledged way by the people whose business – law enforcement – requires it of them.

The relation of organized crime to enforcement

We have to distinguish the "black market monopolies," dealing in forbidden goods – gambling, dope, smuggling, prostitution – from the racketeering enterprises. It is the black market monopolies that depend on the law itself. Without the law and some degree of enforcement, there is no presumption that the organization can survive competition – or, if it could survive competition once it is established, that the organization could have arisen in the first place in the face of competition.

There must be an "optimum degree of enforcement" from the point of view of the criminal monopoly. With no enforcement – either because enforcement is not attempted or because enforcement is not feasible – the black market could not be profitable enough to invite criminal monopoly (at least not any more than any other market, legitimate or criminal). With wholly effective enforcement, and no collusion with the police, the business would be destroyed. Between these extremes, there may be an attractive black market profitable enough to invite monopoly.

Organized crime could not, for example, possibly corner the market on cigarette sales to minors. Every 21-year-old is a potential source of supply. No organization, legal or illegal, could keep a multitude of 21-year-olds from buying cigarettes and passing them along to persons under 21. No black-market price differential, great enough

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to make organized sale to minors profitable, could survive the competition. And no organization, legal or illegal, could so intimidate every adult that he would not be a source of supply to the youngsters. Without there being any way to enforce the law, organized crime would get no more out of selling cigarettes to children than out of selling them soft drinks.

The same is true of contraceptives in those states where their sale is nominally illegal. If the law is not enforced, there is no scarcity out of which to make profits. And if one is going to try to intimidate every drugstore that sells contraceptives, in the hope of monopolizing the business, he may as well monopolize toothpaste, which would be more profitable. The intervention of the law is needed to intimidate the druggists with respect to the one commodity that organized crime is trying to monopolize.

What about abortions? Why is it not "organized"? The answer is not easy, and there may be too many special characteristics of this market to permit a selection of the critical one. The consumer and the product have unusual characteristics. Nobody is a "regular" consumer the way a person may regularly gamble, drink, or take dope. (A woman may repeatedly need the services of an abortionist, but each occasion is once-for-all.) The consumers are more secret about dealing with this black market, secret among intimate friends and relations, than are the consumers of most banned commodities. It is a dirty business, and too many of the customers die; and while organized crime might drastically reduce fatalities, it may be afraid of getting involved with anything that kills and maims so many customers in a way that could be blamed on the criminal himself rather than just on the commodity that is sold.

Black markets and competition

I have emphasized that a difference between black-market crimes and most others, like racketeering and robbery, is that they are "crimes" only because we have legislated against the commodity they provide. We single out certain goods and services as harmful or sinful; for reasons of history and tradition, and for other reasons, we forbid dope but not tobacco, gambling in casinos but not on the stock-market, extra-marital sex but not gluttony, erotic stories but not mystery stories. We do all this for reasons different from those behind the laws against robbery and tax evasion.

It is policy that determines the black markets. Cigarettes and firearms are borderline cases. We can, as a matter of policy, make the sales of guns and cigarettes illegal. We can also, as a matter of policy, make contraceptives and abortion illegal. Times change, policies change, and what was banned yesterday can become legitimate today; what was freely available yesterday, can be banned

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tomorrow. Evidently there are changes under way in policy on birth control; there may be changes on abortion and homosexuality, and there may be legislation restricting the sale of firearms.

The pure black markets reflect some moral tastes, economic principles, paternalistic interests, and notions of personal freedom in a way that the rackets do not. And these tastes and principles change. We can revise our policy on birth control (and we are changing it) in a way that we could not change our policy on armed robbery. The usury laws may to some extent be a holdover from medieval economics; and some of the laws on prostitution, abortion, and contraception were products of the Victorian era and reflect the political power of various church groups. One cannot even deduce from the existence of abortion laws that a majority of the voters, even a majority of enlightened voters, oppose abortion; and the wise money would probably bet that the things that we shall be forbidding in fifty years will differ substantially from the things we forbid now.

What happens when a forbidden industry is subjected to legitimate competition? Legalized gambling is a good example. What has happened to Las Vegas is hardly reassuring. On the other hand, the legalization of liquor in the early 1930's swamped the criminal liquor industry with competition. Criminals are alleged to have moved into church bingo, but they have never got much of a hold on the stock-market. Evidently criminals cannot always survive competition, evidently sometimes they can.

The question is important in the field of narcotics. We could easily put insulin and antibiotics into the hands of organized crime by forbidding their sale; we could do the same with a dentist's novocaine. (We could, that is, if we could sufficiently enforce the prohibition. If we cannot enforce it, the black market would be too competitive for any organized monopoly to arise.) If narcotics were not illegal, there could be no black market and no monopoly profits; the interest in "pushing" it would not be much greater than the pharmaceutical interest in pills to reduce the symptoms of common colds. This argument cannot by itself settle the question of whether (and which) narcotics (or other evil commodities) ought to be banned, but it is an important consideration.

The greatest gambling enterprise in the United States has not been significantly touched by organized crime. That is the stock market. (There has been criminal activity in the stock market, but not monopoly by what we usually call "organized crime.") Nor has organized crime succeeded in controlling the foreign currency black markets around the world. The reason is that the market works too well. Federal control over the stock market, designed mainly to keep it honest and informative, and aimed at maximizing the competitive-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ness of the market and the information of the consumer, makes it a hard market to tamper with.

Ordinary gambling ought to be one of the hardest industries to monopolize. Almost anybody can compete, whether in taking bets or providing cards, dice, or racing information. "Wire services" could not stand the ordinary competition of radio and Western Union; bookmakers could hardly be intimidated if the police were not available to intimidate them. If ordinary brokerage firms were encouraged to take horse-racing accounts, and buy and sell bets by telephone for their customers, it is hard to see how racketeers could get any kind of grip on it. And when any restaurant, bar, country club or fraternity house can provide tables and sell fresh decks of cards, it is hard to see how gambling can be monopolized any more than the soft-drink or television business, or any other.

We can still think gambling is a sin, and try to eliminate it; but we should probably try not to use the argument that it would remain in the hands of criminals if we legalized it. Both reason and evidence seem to indicate the contrary.

The decisive question is whether the goal of somewhat reducing the consumption of narcotics, gambling, prostitution, abortion or anything else that is forced by law into the black market, is or is not outweighed by the costs to society of creating a criminal industry. The costs to society of creating these black markets are several.

First, it gives the criminal the same kind of protection that a tariff gives to a domestic monopoly. It guarantees the absence of competition from people who are unwilling to be criminal, and an advantage to those whose skill is in evading the law.

Second, it provides a special incentive to corrupt the police, because the police not only may be susceptible to being bought off but can even be used to eliminate competition.

Third, a large number of consumers who are probably not ordinary criminals – the conventioneers who visit prostitutes, the housewives who bet on horses, the women who seek abortions – are taught contempt, even enmity, for the law by being obliged to purchase particular commodities and services from criminals in an illegal transaction.

Fourth, dope addiction may so aggravate poverty for certain desperate people that they are induced to commit crimes, or can be urged to commit crimes, because the law arranges that the only (or main) source for what they desperately demand will be a criminal (high-priced) source.

Fifth, these big black markets may guarantee enough incentive and enough profit for organized crime so that large-scale criminal organization comes into being and maintains itself. It may be – this is an important question for research – that without these important

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

black markets, crime would be substantially decentralized, lacking the kind of organization that makes it enterprising, safe, and able to corrupt public officials. In economic-development terms, these black markets may provide the central core (or "infra-structure") of underworld business.

A good economic history of prohibition in the 1920's has never been attempted, so far as I know. By all accounts, though, prohibition was a mistake. It merely turned the liquor industry over to organized crime. In the end we gave up, probably because not everybody agreed drinking was bad (or, if it was bad, that it was anybody's political business), but also because the attempt was an evident failure and a costly one in its social by-products. It may have propelled underworld business in the United States into what economic developers call the "take-off" into self-sustained growth.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Catholics and their colleges (I)

CHRISTOPHER JENCKS
&
DAVID RIESMAN

The Catholic Church has organized most of its American operations on a geographic basis, dividing the nation into dioceses and parishes, and putting every activity in a given area under the local bishop or parish priest. But Catholic higher education has been an exception to this pattern. While many of the first Catholic colleges were established by energetic bishops to serve a particular diocese, less than two dozen now operate on this basis. The rest of America's 380-odd Catholic colleges are operated by autonomous teaching orders of religious (as priests and nuns are called in the Church), which are free to define their missions and

---

This article has been excerpted from a longer chapter which will appear in our forthcoming study of American higher education, The Academic Revolution. *Readers interested in the sources of the statistical and demographic data cited will find them there. We are indebted to the Carnegie Corporation for support of our work on higher education, and to the numerous colleagues who read earlier drafts of this article. Proper acknowledgment to these colleagues, by name, will be made in the book.* — Auth.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

clientele as they wish.[1] Approximately 75 Catholic orders today operate colleges in the United States. These orders have different national origins, systems of organization and government, traditions, and often very dissimilar leaders. All are ultimately responsible to Rome, but until relatively recently communication has been slow and often deliberately imperfect, so that local colleges have had great autonomy. All orders accept a common body of doctrine and ritual, but here too there has been room for highly diverse interpretations. Thus while differences among orders are not quite comparable to those among Protestant denominations, they are often much more significant than non-Catholics assume. These differences have certainly had many of the same effects on higher education as denominational differences among Protestants.

Catholic colleges vary not only in the locality they serve, but in the sex, ethnic origins, social class, and occupational ambitions of their students, and in their academic standards, cultural styles, ideological commitments, and curricular emphases. This diversity has frequently been accompanied by intense competition for students, donors, and respectability. The American Church has never tried to curb such competition by adopting a "Master Plan" for higher education. Nor, indeed, have individual teaching orders adopted such plans. The Jesuits, for example, run 28 colleges without any national scheme for allocating resources, setting priorities, curbing institutional imperialism, or ensuring that unpopular needs are met. And the Church's overall system of higher education manifests a degree of pluralism verging on anarchy, and a division of labor hardly less complex than in secular institutions.

I

The Control of Catholic Colleges

Outsiders who view Catholicism as some kind of conspiracy find it hard to credit the kind of heterogeneity and chaos we have just described. Even if they finally accept the idea that there is no national

[1]One interesting exception to this pattern was Catholic University, founded in Washington in 1889 by the American hierarchy to provide graduate training for priests and nuns from all the many teaching orders that were conducting colleges in America. Originally an exclusively graduate institution, it went through many of the same vicissitudes as the two other would-be graduate schools founded in the same era: Johns Hopkins and Clark. Like them, it reverted to the American norm and accepted undergraduates, eventually becoming a predominantly local institution at the undergraduate level. While it continues to train a substantial proportion of the religious taking graduate work in certain fields, it has suffered from involvement in the ideological warfare between Catholic liberals and conservatives. For this and other reasons, the more outward-looking Catholic religious and laymen usually prefer to do graduate work elsewhere.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or international control center for Catholic colleges, they tend to assume that on the local level the bishop and his staff must exercise a large measure of supervision and authority. While this assumption is not entirely without foundation, the bishop's role tends to be exaggerated. A local bishop must authorize the founding of a college in his diocese. Once it is in business, however, it is usually legally controlled by a board drawn from the teaching order which conducts it. The local bishop has certain kinds of spiritual authority over all the faithful in his diocese, including priests and nuns; but he cannot intervene directly in the affairs of a college. This does not, of course, prevent his exercising enormous indirect influence over nearby colleges if he has the time and inclination. Few teaching orders are willing to remain at swords' points with a local bishop for very long.[2]

One reason for cooperation is financial. Unlike some Protestant colleges, Catholic institutions almost never get direct subventions from the Church, so they are not subject to direct annual review and reprisal. Nonetheless, a teaching order must raise money from local Catholic businessmen, competing with Catholic hospitals, charities, schools, and the Church itself. An order which is at odds with the local bishop is unlikely to fare well in such competition. Then, too, Catholic colleges compete for able local students; and if a particular college is on the outs with the local priests or bishop, it has reason to fear that potential students may be steered to its more compliant competitors. (Or so Catholic educators believe. Andrew Greeley, one of the most knowledgeable observors of the Catholic scene, has argued to us that this is a myth, and we ourselves know no specific evidence that it is so.)

On the other hand, Catholic colleges in turn have considerable power over local bishops. They are, for example, the principal source of lay teachers for the parochial schools. We have been told of an uncooperative local bishop who was discreetly reminded that his parochial schools paid considerably lower salaries than public ones; that the Catholic college with which he was at odds had been making great efforts to cajole its alumnae into parochial school teaching; and that conflict between him and the college might leave his schools short-handed in the coming semester. Under these circumstances both bishops and the teaching orders almost always find it expedient to maintain at least the appearance of cooperation, and in most cases this cooperation is quite genuine.

[2]Perhaps the most interesting case of conflict between a Catholic college and its bishop is Los Angeles, the bailiwick of America's most reactionary Catholic prelate, Francis Cardinal McIntyre. In the midst of this diocese is Immaculate Heart, probably the most courageous and one of the two or three liveliest and most progressive Catholic women's colleges in the country.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The preservation of outward unity between the Church and its colleges depends in part on the fact that, diverse as Catholic colleges are, they are still almost entirely controlled by the religious. Catholic laymen have participated in advisory boards, but these have had no real power. Diocesan colleges have occasionally had appreciable numbers of laymen on their governing boards, but these also include the local bishop, and his views are usually decisive. Both Notre Dame and a number of Jesuit colleges such as St. Louis and Fordham have added laymen to their boards in the past few months. Two or three diocesan colleges have lay presidents, and the President of Webster has recently left her order. But these are exceptions, and laymen are still a hesitant minority almost everywhere. The Catholic college which comes closest to the "lay power" ethos of Protestant higher education is Webster. The Webster board, led by an extraordinary woman with enormous faith in the potential of the laity, even includes non-Catholics. While Webster is today unique in the American Catholic world, we suspect that other Catholic colleges will move in the same direction.

The laymen enter

The logic leading to greater lay control over Catholic education is remarkably similar to the logic which has led so many Protestant colleges in the same direction over the past century and a half. One of the reasons why Protestant colleges began adding laymen to their boards was that clergymen were frequently identified with one or another side of a sectarian squabble in which the college did not want to take sides. A layman was a "safe" choice, for his theological views were usually unknown and his bank account non-sectarian. Most Protestant colleges were under financial pressure to attract students from as wide a spectrum of Protestant belief and disbelief as possible, and a lay board played down the sectarian image of the college.

Theological disputes among Catholic clerics have seldom reached the same intensity as among 19th-century Protestants, and have never involved appreciable numbers of Catholic laymen. No Catholic college has had to worry about the effect on recruitment of appointing a "progressive" as against a "conservative" priest to its board. Vatican II and its aftermath may have altered this situation to some extent, but only for the most sophisticated Catholics. Certainly there is nothing like the degree of polarization between Catholic factions that there once was between, say, the Unitarian and Congregationalist factions which struggled for control of Harvard. Since Vatican II there have been signs of change in this, but so far there have been no splits comparable to those in Protestantism.

Within the teaching orders, too, there is growing self-doubt – a feeling that a university and a seminary are not identical, nor even

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

closely related to one another. This doubt expresses itself in clerical admiration for secular educational achievements, and in an often aggressive effort to recruit students and faculty who meet secular standards of academic competence. Such individuals may be "good Catholics," "bad Catholics," or, perhaps best of all from some clerics' viewpoint, non-Catholics. A college which wants to attract such individuals must prove to them that it is in sympathy with the going secular standards of academic excellence and with the professionally approved means of achieving these standards. While we ourselves are not sure (for reasons we develop later) that lay boards will necessarily accept secular academicism any more quickly than clerical boards will, most prospective faculty and graduate students to whom we have talked assume they will. A clerical board is, therefore, an important symbolic tie to the old order, while adding laymen is, and will continue to be, widely (if often naïvely) interpreted as a progressive move.

A second important reason why Protestant colleges added laymen to their boards was financial. Businessmen who joined the board were expected to make greater efforts to raise money from their friends than businessmen who were merely members of the alumni association. Conversely, the alumni and other laymen were expected to give more generously to a college controlled by "sound" business and professional leaders than to one run by presumptively fuzzy-minded and financially inept ministers.

Historically, these arguments for a lay board have had less force in Catholic colleges. For one thing, Catholic businesmen have until recently had relatively little money to give their colleges. The principal subsidy available to these colleges therefore had to come from the teaching orders themselves, which provided their services free. It was not only logical but inevitable that those who provided this subsidy, and made such enormous sacrifices in behalf of a college, should expect to control it. Today, however, the number of young men and women assuming vocations is not increasing at anything like the same rate as the number of Catholics entering college.[3] There are few major Catholic colleges where the religious now outnumber the lay faculty, and on many campuses the religious number less than 20 percent of the total. Yet numbers alone are not the main part of

[3]This lag is principally if not exclusively the result of rapid increases in the proportion of young people entering college. This increase has been even more rapid among Catholics than for the total population. Whether there has also been a decline in the proportion of young people taking up religious vocations is a matter of some dispute. Richard J. Clifford, S.J., and William B. Callahan, S.J., "Catholic Higher Education: The Next Twenty Years," *America*, September 19, 1964, pp. 288-291, report that in 1954 the ratio of priests to faithful was 1 to 660, that in 1964 it had declined to 1 to 785, and that in 1985 it could be expected to be 1 to 1000.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the story. While 70 percent of Catholic men's college faculty were laymen in 1964, 62 percent were laymen in 1934 and 56 percent in 1924—whereas in 1872 only 12 percent were laymen.[4] The great jump in the numbers of lay teachers came in the first quarter of the twentieth century and the last quarter of the nineteenth. This was also the period when many Catholic institutions moved from being primarily secondary schools to being exclusively colleges. Since then the real change has been in the *status* of laymen in the Catholic college. They are no longer seen as a necessary evil, are no longer recruited primarily from the alumni of the college. Instead, they are increasingly drawn from the same pool of MA's and PhD's as non-Catholic college faculty. As a result, the economy of Catholic colleges increasingly resembles that of their Protestant counterparts. This means that Catholic colleges will have to do far more than they have in the past to raise money from wealthy Catholics.

Many Catholics certainly believe that boards of control with lay minorities or majorities will find it easier to raise money than boards composed exclusively of clerics. But the fact remains that Catholic colleges have had relatively little success raising money from laymen. In 1964, no Catholic college or university ranked among the 30 best endowed in the country, and only three (Georgetown, Notre Dame, and St. Louis) ranked among the hundred best endowed. While this lack of lay support may reflect partly the dearth of wealthy Catholics willing to give their money away, and partly the competition of other Catholic enterprises, it may also be a result of the relative non-involvement of Catholic laymen in the affairs of their colleges. It could also be argued on the other side that some Catholic colleges, perhaps especially those for women, are most successful in raising money when they seem most cloistered and least businesslike, for in this role their very appearance of weakness is a lever for making prospective donors feel strong and consequently generous. Still, whatever the facts of the matter, many Catholics *believe* that lay involvement in policy-making would make fund-raising easier, and this belief plainly makes such involvement increasingly likely.

Finally, another major reason why the more enterprising Catholic teaching orders have been bringing laymen into the management of Catholic colleges has been a restless desire to free themselves at least partially from this responsibility and drain on human resources. Some orders now want flexibility to deploy themselves in whatever areas show greatest need, instead of being tied down to a particular college.

---

[4]John D. Donovan, *The Academic Man in the Catholic College* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1964), pp 23-24.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How much difference would it make?

While the addition of laymen to the boards of Catholic colleges may produce modest changes in these colleges' policies and climates, we doubt that these changes will be as significant or as uniformly progressive as Catholic liberals, both clerical and lay, usually assume. In many instances the leading figures in the Catholic teaching orders are more sympathetic to what one might call "the academic revolution" than are lay Catholics of the type a college might appoint to its board of trustees. Lay Catholic boards are, after all, no more likely to be composed of intellectuals than are non-Catholic boards. Most lay Catholic advisory boards are today made up of wealthy real estate tycoons, hopefully influential political figures, loyal football promoters, and the like. It seems improbable that the laymen chosen for a Catholic college's board of control will be very different. These men are in many cases quite literally more Catholic than the Pope. They have been frequently distressed by liturgical reform because they found it easier to ascribe magical powers to what they couldn't understand than to what they could, and many are equally distressed by proposals to eliminate outmoded academic traditions in which they have been taught to have faith.

The clerics who serve on Catholic college boards have, on the other hand, usually had some experience on college faculties. Today a growing minority have been trained in an academic discipline as well as in theology, sometimes at a secular graduate school. This certainly does not mean that their first loyalty is to the academic profession rather than to their Church or order, nor does it mean that they will necessarily be innovators. But it seems to us that Catholic clerics are at least as likely as the typical Catholic layman to support the claims of the academic professions on Catholic colleges. Indeed, it might even be argued that academic innovation in a Catholic institution is easier under clerical than lay auspices, since no layman has the authority to force changes in long established Catholic traditions.

Yet while this argument might be decisive in the short run, it may be dangerous over the long haul. It is, after all, rather like the argument which used to be made a few years back that Negro colleges would move forward faster under white than Negro presidents, or with white rather than Negro trustees, since enlightened whites could afford to be more liberal and could give legitimacy to rapid change in a way that Negroes could not. This was often enough true, and the substitution of Negroes in the top jobs at Negro colleges has certainly not been an unmixed blessing for academic freedom and progress. But relying on whites to reform the Negro colleges, while perhaps having immediate advantages for the colleges, compounded the psychological problems of racism rather than helping resolve them,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for it perpetuated Negro dependence on white initiative and deference to white authority. The same thing is probably true of the Catholic colleges, where one of the basic problems – perhaps *the* basic problem – is the Catholic layman's passivity in the face of the religious. If this is the case, Catholic colleges may have to go through a "lay power" phase in order to establish the intellectual parity of the laity with the clergy, and thus to open the way for true collaboration and integration a generation or two hence.

In this context perhaps the most important change likely to come from adding laymen to boards of control is the selection of more lay presidents at Catholic colleges. Several diocesan colleges, such as the University of Dallas and Sacred Heart University in Bridgeport, already have lay presidents. But so far as we know, every college conducted by a teaching order is headed by a priest or nun from that order.[5] Teaching orders have in the past tried having laymen run their colleges, and have found that it worked out rather badly. We gather that this was because real control continued to be in the hands of the religious, who filled all the places on the board. This meant that the religious on the faculty could circumvent the lay president's authority by appealing directly to fellow religious on the board. Under such circumstances the faculty would tend to regard a lay president as an errand boy with no real power. If a lay president came as a by-product of a partly or entirely lay board, however, his authority would be less open to question.

In any case, if Catholic colleges are to compete successfully for lay faculty, laymen will have to be given both symbolic and real power in the administration of the college. A lay board and a lay president will almost surely be essential both to improving the morale among lay faculty and to attracting gifted secular scholars for whom a clerically-controlled college is frequently out of the question. The only alternative we can see for an academically ambitious college would be to decentralize, giving faculty committees, lay department chairmen, and lay deans more autonomy, while sharply curtailing the powers of the board and president. This kind of democratization, while useful as a protection against the worst kinds of administrative despotism and incompetence, is probably inappropriate to an ambitious institution, for it allows mediocrity to protect and perpetuate itself in a multitude of ways. This is one reason why we are so skeptical about lay presidents, for they would almost certainly feel compelled to democratize their colleges to some extent. Democratization and lay power strike us as formulas which, while likely to guard against the worst in Catholic higher education and to produce some

[5]When the President of Webster was relieved of her religious vows, the Sisters of Loretto also relinquished control over the college.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

important benefits, are unlikely to bring really exciting new departures. Instead, they are likely to produce a competent but undistinguished imitation of secular higher education. This should not be taken to mean that clerical boards have other, more exciting visions. Few do. But where there *is* a distinctive sense of purpose, the best religious seem able to force the pace and direction of change in a way that no layman can.

If complete lay control is established over Catholic colleges in the near future, it may not come from the transformation of existing colleges but from the establishment of new ones. Lay Catholics have shown considerable interest in this possibility; some bishops are also said to be interested. A particularly promising variant of the idea has been the effort to establish a Catholic college in association with an existing secular university. This scheme has so far been obstructed by skeptical non-Catholic universities in some places, by the hierarchy in others, and by clerically-controlled Catholic colleges working through the hierarchy almost everywhere. But the association of a *clerically*-controlled Catholic college with a predominantly secular university is already going forward. Immaculate Heart in Los Angeles is moving to Claremont and will join the Associated Colleges there, paving the way for its girls to take courses under non-Catholic auspices and presumably to make more non-Catholic friends than before. An even more radical departure has been tried at the University of Toronto, where Catholic students can take courses in theology, philosophy, and literature at clerically-controlled St. Michael's College, but are encouraged to forage throughout the secular colleges of the University for instruction in other subjects, and indeed even for courses which parallel those offered by St. Michael's.

II

Professionalism: Clerical vs Lay Models

Like their non-Catholic counterparts, Catholic colleges are widely perceived as an entry into the upper-middle class, and especially into professional and managerial employment. All are therefore to some extent constrained in their choice of students, faculty, and program by the real or imagined requirements of future employers. Except for those students planning religious vocations, many if not most of whom are in seminaries rather than regular colleges, these requirements do not differ for Catholics and non-Catholics. The result is that Catholic colleges feel they have only limited freedom to deviate from national norms regarding what a college graduate should know and what he should be like.

There are, however, important variations among colleges in this respect. At those universities which seek to prepare their students for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

professional and managerial careers requiring graduate work, the academic revolution is often well launched. At the other end of the spectrum, some women's colleges which expect their alumnae to become wives, mothers, office workers, and school teachers are as insulated from the claims of the academic profession as any American college can be.

Nineteenth-century Catholic colleges were in many instances founded to recruit and train priests. But like their Protestant rivals, they soon branched out, admitting non-religious to their liberal arts program in order to make these of economic size, and then developing a liberal arts program primarily aimed at laymen. Few, however, prepared students directly for non-religious callings. Even those few institutions which established professional schools quite early, such as Georgetown, St. Louis, and Notre Dame, still placed their major emphasis on their undergraduate liberal arts program – a program which was in many cases even more rigorously classical than its Protestant and secular counterparts.

We have no statistical measures of the proportion of 19th-century Catholic college graduates who took up callings within the Catholic community, but our guess is that it was high. Those who did not become priests were likely to become doctors catering to Catholic patients, lawyers serving Catholic clients in (hopefully) Catholic political and social contexts, contractors working for Catholic clients, and so on. Some Catholic college graduates moved in wider orbits, but most seem to have felt that this would require breaking with the distinctive traditions which had set American Catholics and their colleges apart from the Protestant majority.

Those careers which required employment and promotion within a large organization often left even less room for compromise. Large secular universities might, for example, be uneasy lest a Catholic historian not share the current perspectives on the Middle Ages or the Reformation. Yet a Catholic historian with secular credentials and attitudes might be regarded warily by a Catholic college, and he could not until recently find much colleagueship in such a college or exert much influence outside his own classroom. Similarly, a Catholic who wanted to follow a business career either had to choose one of the few fields in which Catholic entrepreneurs had a foothold or else try to conform to the style and outlook of the Protestants who controlled most of the big corporations in the country. Even if he did adapt, he often encountered a job ceiling imposed simply because he was Catholic. Many Catholic college graduates were therefore reluctant even to try to "pass." This may be one reason they were underrepresented in academic and corporate jobs. Of the large employers seeking college graduates, government agencies were the only ones which seem to have been more attractive to Catholics than to non-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Catholics. (Catholics also seem to have settled in large numbers in regulated private bureaucracies such as insurance and the public utilities, which provided quasi-governmental job security and relatively impersonal standards of competence and promotion.)

Changing occupational ambitions

These patterns seem to have been widespread between the Civil War and World War II. In the generation since World War II, however, they seem to have altered quite sharply. When the National Opinion Research Center surveyed college seniors in 1961, the career choices of Catholics and non-Catholics had become almost indistinguishable.[6] Reversing the earlier inhibition, Catholics were somewhat more likely than non-Catholics to enter business. They were also somewhat less likely to enter elementary and secondary education.

Efforts to accommodate changing Catholic occupational ambitions have led to a large measure of secularization on many Catholic campuses. This is particularly evident at the graduate level, where Catholic universities must compete on the open market with non-Catholic ones, and must promise comparable professional skills and status. While there is some parental and parochial pressure to attend a Catholic college as an undergraduate, there is very little effective pressure to stay on in a Catholic milieu for graduate and professional training.[7] Much as disinterested faculty members at the poorer state universities may quietly warn their own students against staying on, many of the better Catholic college professors, both lay and clerical, urge their abler students to go on to secular graduate schools, where they will usually meet stronger competition and obtain a wider range of instruction. The students, too, often want to test themselves in a larger world, and prove that they can make it there. Many also want to have the option of teaching, or practicing law or medicine, outside the Catholic fold.

Even those who do not care about options (e.g., those already in orders) may prefer a secular graduate school, which is often cheaper, usually more reputable, and always ecumenical (an outlook

[6]Andrew Greeley's *Religion and Career* (N. Y.: Sheed and Ward, 1964), provides a vast amount of demographic information on Catholics, both at Catholic and secular colleges. We have drawn on his data throughout this article, and especially in the following pages.

[7]In 1963, Catholic institutions awarded 11 percent of all BA's, but only 8 percent of the MA's, 7 percent of the professional degrees, and 3 percent of the PhD's. (National Catholic Welfare Conference, *Summary of Catholic Education,* 1963, and U. S. Office of Education, *Digest of Educational Statistics,* 1965.) The NORC survey strongly suggests that this deficit was due to Catholic college BA's going to secular graduate schools, not to their failure to go on at all.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which, while not widespread among parents or high school seniors, is common among educators and prospective graduate students). Those who expect to stay within the Catholic community are less likely than in the past to feel that this will allow them to challenge or ignore the professional standards of the larger American society. With this perspective, college students are likely to decide between a Catholic and non-Catholic graduate school on the basis of the school's secular standing rather than its religious affiliation.

Catholic graduate schools

Catholic graduate schools of arts and sciences have only developed to significant size in a few of the leading institutions. No Catholic university ranks among the top twenty in PhD's awarded. Catholic University, Notre Dame, Fordham, and St. Louis are the only Catholic institutions among the top 50 producers of PhD's. Taken together, Catholic graduate departments turned out less than three percent of all PhD's during the early 1960's. This is a significant increase over the 1950's, and even more so over earlier decades. Nevertheless, it still meant that the great majority of Catholic doctoral candidates were turning to non-Catholic graduate schools, and that even those prospective scholars who earned BA's in Catholic colleges usually went elsewhere for graduate work.[8]

Underdeveloped as they may be, the Catholic graduate schools are growing extremely rapidly. This is happening because graduate programs are valuable in attracting able scholars to a faculty. Many Catholic progressives deplore this development, arguing that the Catholic colleges should concentrate on undergraduate education and send their BA's to secular universities for advanced professional training. But we know no Catholic college in a position to build a graduate school which is not doing so. In most cases, Catholic graduate departments' aspirations are virtually indistinguishable from their secular rivals, partly because of the need to compete in a secular world. Less and less lip service is paid to the notion of Catholic biology, Catholic economics, or Catholic history. There are separate Catholic learned societies in some disciplines, such as sociology and psychology, but almost nobody imagines that these are substitutes for the corresponding secular societies. The American Catholic Sociological Society, for example, brings together Catholics and non-Catholics

[8]The NORC survey of 1961 BA's suggests that about a quarter of all PhD candidates are now Catholics. About a tenth of the nation's PhD candidates probably come from Catholic colleges. Even if all PhD candidates in Catholic universities came from Catholic colleges, only a third of the Catholic college BA's headed for PhD's would be accounted for. The remaining two-thirds must be seeking PhD's in non-Catholic graduate departments.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

studying one or another aspect of Catholicism or of comparative religion, rather than trying to create a new breed of sociologist who would study the full range of social phenomena from a distinctive Catholic viewpoint. A good many religious attend the meetings of this Society because of their specific institutional concerns, but the more professional sociologists among them also attend the nearly simultaneous meetings of the American Sociological Association.[9] Catholic institutions compose so large a world that they deserve special study, by both Catholics and non-Catholics. But this is not the same thing as the unending search for a special Catholic angle of vision with which to approach the regular academic disciplines – disciplines which have been almost wholly organized and subdivided by secular scholars.

The development of Catholic graduate programs has been somewhat uneven. At the faculty level the Catholic colleges have in the past given more attention to qualitative than to quantitative disciplines. Catholic scholars have more often been philosophers, historians, literary critics, and political scientists than economists, sociologists, anthropologists, or natural scientists.[10] Despite the efforts of institutions like Notre Dame, development in the natural sciences has been slower than in the humanities. Yet Greeley's data suggest that these historic patterns may be changing very rapidly, so that by the 1980's the depth and distribution of academic effort among Catholic scholars (though not necessarily among Catholic scholars at Catholic institutions) may be about the same as among non-Catholics.

Graduate programs in the Arts and Sciences are not the only ones which have been secularized. The five Catholic medical schools (Georgetown in Washington, Loyola in Chicago, Marquette in Milwaukee, Seton Hall in New Jersey, and St. Louis) are also much like middle-level secular medical schools – though there is considerable variation among them. At Marquette, for example, there was only one Jesuit on the Medical Faculty when one of us visited the University a few years ago. Seton Hall's Medical School has recently been handed over to the State. This does not, of course, mean that Catholic medicine has been *socially* integrated with non-Catholic. Catholic hospitals are a major outlet for the energies of many nuns, and these hospitals from the network of medical sociability and referral for

[9]The decision of the *American Catholic Sociological Review* to rename itself *Sociological Analysis* underlines the fact that at least in this discipline the quest for a separate identity is nearly dead.

[10]Federal research grants, most of which are in quantitative fields, almost never go to Catholic institutions. In 1962, for example, no Catholic university ranked among the top 75 recipients. Of the four Catholic universities in the top 100, three had medical schools which probably accounted for the bulk of their grants.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

many Catholic doctors. Conversely, the exclusiveness and snobbery of the elite non-Catholic hospitals still makes it more difficult for Catholics than non-Catholics to move in, even if they attend non-Catholic medical schools. Our unsystematic sampling of Catholic undergraduates who want to be doctors suggests, however, that they are considerably more concerned with finding a place which will admit them and give them technically adequate training than with finding a place which is Catholic. They know that Catholic medicine differs from non-Catholic medicine in only a few minor particulars, such as its priorities in handling human reproduction. About 7 percent of all MD's come from nominally Catholic medical schools, whereas Greeley's data suggest that, as in Arts and Sciences, nearly 25 percent of all medical students are Catholics. This suggests that about 30 percent of would-be Catholic doctors are attending Catholic medical schools. Even the prospective medical students from Catholic colleges probably choose secular medical schools as often as Catholic ones.

Similarly, while there may in theory be a distinctively Catholic way to run a law school, this possibility has scarcely been tested. Men from Catholic colleges are slightly more likely to choose legal careers than men from other colleges; but they have traditionally aspired to the lower rather than to the upper reaches of the law – to a local practice, to a local civil service job, or to the FBI, rather than to a Wall Street or Washington firm. Most Catholic law schools have concentrated on the practical side of legal training – often on training trial lawyers. Some offer little more than a cram course for the state bar examination. At a few schools such as Notre Dame there are men interested in natural law and in legal philosophy, men who believe that Catholic thought has something distinctive to contribute to the legal order. But most Catholic law schools are just as "secular" and narrowly vocational as their non-Catholic counterparts, and their professors are for the most part considerably less interested in the origin and nature of the law than are men in such national law schools as Yale, Chicago, and Harvard.

Despite small differences in atmosphere, then, it can be said that the Catholic universities are generally very much like second- and third-level non-Catholic ones at the graduate level. They recruit students and faculty from much the same environment, compete with secular institutions for research funds and foundation support, and judge themselves successful or unsuccessful according to their standing in non-sectarian eyes. Most Catholic graduate programs are now eager to attract non-Catholics, both as students and faculty. Able non-Catholics have traditionally been reluctant to join Catholic faculties, fearing not only a loss in professional prestige and mobility but a loss of academic freedom and of voice in institutional policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But leading Catholic universities are actively trying to allay these fears, and with considerable success.

The terminal colleges

Universities in the above sense are, however, still the exception on the Catholic scene. There are less than a dozen such Catholic institutions, and they enroll no more than 20-25 percent of the students in Catholic institutions. The free-standing "university college" is almost non-existent in the Catholic sector. (The only Catholic male institutions we know which come close to our definition of a university college are Holy Cross and perhaps St. Johns College in Minnesota. Some of the better Catholic women's colleges might qualify, but the gap between their faculties and those of the leading Catholic universities is much greater than the gap between, say, Smith's faculty and Yale's.) It is therefore important to consider the effect of occupational pressures on the 200 or more terminal colleges which constitute the overwhelming majority of all Catholic institutions and which enroll most of the students.[11]

With a few conspicuous exceptions, Catholic colleges have resisted professionalization more at the undergraduate than at the graduate level. One illustration is engineering. While NORC data show that Catholics are as likely as non-Catholics to become engineers, the data also show that Catholics who want to become engineers mostly go to non-Catholic colleges. Only a handful of Catholic colleges have been willing to spend the money and make the inroads on their traditional undergraduate curriculum which engineering seems to require. While Catholic engineering programs are almost identical in tone and content to non-Catholic ones, their rarity tells something about both the psychology and the economics of Catholic undergraduate programs.

It used to be thought that there was some special affinity between Protestantism and the development of the natural sciences – just as there was, in Max Weber's thesis, between Protestantism and the spirit of modern capitalism. This impression was supported in America by studies which showed that the men who achieved scientific distinction during the 1930's and 1940's came in disproportionate numbers from such Protestant or ex-Protestant colleges as Oberlin, Carleton, Grinnell, Hope, Kalamazoo, and so on. Today, however, the NORC Survey shows Catholic colleges turning out as many

[11] In speaking of 200 institutions we are ignoring the seminaries, which train priests not only for parish work but also provide members of teaching orders with at least part of their training for academic careers. Important as these institutions are, we do not know enough to discuss them. We are also ignoring the Catholic junior colleges, again out of ignorance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would-be scientists as the average non-Catholic college – though no Catholic college seems to rival the most productive secular institutions in this regard.[12] Since very few religious have been trained to teach such students, the Catholic colleges have had to find large numbers of lay scientists to staff their burgeoning departments.

Catholic college BA's also choose school teaching as a career less frequently than Protestants. About 25 percent of Catholic college graduates plan to teach school, compared with 36 percent of Protestants. The differences are primarily the result of Catholic women's underchoosing elementary school teaching. Two-thirds of all students in Catholic colleges come from parochial schools, and probably half have spent their entire elementary and secondary careers in such schools. A girl who has never been in a public school may be understandably hesitant about taking a job in one, especially if her parochial school (and perhaps even her college) imbued her with a feeling that the public schools were no place for a good Catholic. If, on the other hand, she thinks about becoming a lay teacher in a parochial school, she must face poor pay, subordination to nuns who often have little respect for her, and a rigid job ceiling.

At least until very recently, Catholic educators have acted as if public education were a predominantly Protestant affair. They have not built education departments which would contribute intellectually to the shaping of public school policy, nor have they sought to train a cadre of Catholics who would become leaders in the public schools. In part this has been because Catholic educators believed that the best way to train a teacher was to provide him (or, more often, her) with a good liberal arts education. As a result, Catholic departments of education have tended to provide minimal programs, aimed at meeting local certification requirements but not much more. There has seldom been the kind of extensive involvement with the public school system that is found in the best secular teachers' colleges and in university colleges of education. (Webster College has been a conspicuous exception, developing an extraordinary teacher training program in cooperation with several Missouri public schools. Some other Catholic colleges are now moving in similar directions.)

If education remains a relatively underdeveloped field of Catholic undergraduate interest, business and government have proven more attractive. The NORC data show that public administration is relatively the most popular field among Catholic college graduates, with accounting and corporate administration not far behind. A third

[12]See Alexander Astin, "Productivity of Undergraduate Institutions," *Science*, April 13, 1962, p. 133. Dr. Astin has generously supplied us with the institutional data used in his article, which make clear that none of the Catholic institutions he studied attracted a really high proportion of future scholars.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of all 1961 BA's from Catholic colleges expected to work for big corporations, compared to a quarter of the graduates– Catholic and otherwise – of non-Catholic colleges. However, Catholic colleges developed their "commerce course" – now typically upgraded to the status of a "Business College" – more in response to student than to employer needs. Its function has been to teach a few minimal skills, or certify that these were already present, and to give the student something he could do moderately competently in the years between high school and employment. The Business College keeps the student off the street, awards him a BA, and in this way gives him some confidence for the future. (In most cases it also makes money.)

The fact that undergraduate business courses only loosely reflect the demands of the adult business world has inevitably limited the extent to which they serve as conduits for bringing business values onto the Catholic campus. (Which is not to say that there is necessarily any tension between the values which prevail on the Catholic campus and in, say, the accounting division of General Dynamics.) In some respects separate business programs, far from bringing business values to a campus, have had the opposite effect, vaccinating the bulk of a college against the claims of the corporate world for which a minority of its students was headed. Neither clerical nor lay liberal arts instructors are eager to teach undergraduate business students, any more than most of them want to teach prospective school teachers. By segregating these students into separate colleges with their own faculty, administrators have allowed the liberal arts faculty to ignore prospective businessmen without even knowing it, much less feeling guilty. Students of modest ability are often pushed into the Accounting or Business or Commerce course as a way of keeping them in college – and keeping their tuition coming – without trying the patience of the more influential or stellar faculty.

Professional influences

Taken together, the professions seem to have had much the same influence (and lack of influence) on Catholic as on non-Catholic higher education. The more academic and better organized professions have established enclaves of influence within the universities, at the graduate level if they could and at the undergraduate level if they had to. Yet both intellectual and institutional power in most Catholic colleges still centers in the departments grouped together under the rubric "liberal arts" or "arts and sciences." And Catholic faculty in these departments more and more resemble their colleagues at non-Catholic institutions. Their antennae are far better attuned to signals from these colleagues than to influences emanating from other organizations and professions, however wealthy and powerful. Such sensitivity varies, of course, among Catholic institu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions just as it does among non-Catholic ones. The Jesuits, for example, seem more concerned than, say, the Christian Brothers or the Benedictines with the number of Woodrow Wilsons and NSF Fellowships their students win, with the proportion going on to "top" graduate schools, and with the reception given faculty publications by colleagues elsewhere. Even within orders there is great variation, so that Boston College and Fordham, though both academically reputable, are quite different in style; and of course both are a long way from less academically distinguished places like Rockhurst in Kansas City or Spring Hill outside Mobile.

Yet even in those colleges where very few faculty write anything, and where very few students are entering professions which require specialized preparation, the academic revolution makes itself felt. Clarke College in Dubuque, for example, has traditionally emphasized "character building" and "preparation for life" rather than professional training, and has provided its girls with a "feminine" program which gave a large place to the arts. Yet it is proud when one of its girls goes on for a PhD, and at least some of its faculty would like to see the proportion increase. This does not mean that Clarke or other similar colleges will soon stop expecting the majority of their girls to become housewives, nor even that those who expect to teach school will be pushed hard to become scholars instead. Nor would we necessarily applaud such pressures. Nevertheless, the range of questions raised at such colleges is being broadened to include the natural and social sciences as well as the humanities, so that the possibility of escaping the "feminine" ghetto is at least open. This has accentuated pressures to employ lay faculty, since the already short supply of religious has in the past been mostly trained in the traditional subjects. (Unfortunately, there has been little countervailing effort to open up "feminine" possibilities like the arts at Catholic men's colleges.)

Lay faculty hired to teach the "new" subjects inevitably bring new values, as do the younger religious who are now more likely to have studied the natural and the social sciences. Many of these people, both religious and lay, have been trained in secular graduate schools. The laymen typically know little or nothing about religion except what they may have learned in undergraduate courses on philosophy and theology. They have comparatively little contact with the religious on their faculties, and what contact they do have seems to involve little intellectual interchange. And so they talk to one another, and assume their "colleagues" are not the religious but laymen teaching the same subject elsewhere. (Ironically, there may be more contact between the religious and non-Catholic faculty, for the latter sometimes have an intense interest in religious questions combined with a lack of deference to the religious.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

When Catholic instructors have studied under the same scholars as non-Catholics, when they attend the same national meetings, and when they read the same journals, they are not likely to teach a subject such as American history very differently from non-Catholics. They may have different convictions on a few points where their faith or personal experience is salient, such as the character of the nineteenth-century public school system or the implications of John Kennedy's election in 1960, but for the most part they pass on a tradition defined by men whose religion, be it Catholic or otherwise, has had no apparent effect on their scholarship.

The "Catholic" style

Perhaps the special influence of the Church and of the religious will be preserved in the distinctively "Catholic" subjects, notably philosophy and theology. Courses in these subjects have traditionally been taught almost exclusively by priests and nuns, and have been required of all Catholic undergraduates. Students have traditionally responded with a mixture of bored indifference and hostile resentment. This reaction was not, so far as we can tell now, sparked primarily by the dogmatic structure of the courses, nor even by the fact that they were required, but by the fact that they were highly abstract and seemingly irrelevant to the social and vocational concerns of an earlier generation of Catholic college students. Such students were not worried by conflicts between their secular and religious beliefs; they were quite content to compartmentalize potentially contradictory ideas. The few instructors who asked them to integrate their ideas were either troubling, wearisome, or both.

Such students and such complaints are still widespread, but a growing minority is critical for different reasons. This new minority is interested in difficult philosophical problems, troubled by spiritual and moral conflicts, and eager to discuss the problems which trouble it with elders whom it can respect. Its complaint is that most of those who teach the philosophy and theology courses still act as if they were dealing with students who wanted a pat catechism to memorize, regurgitate, and forget. Being uncertain and uncommitted, the new breed of Catholic students often resents what it takes (perhaps sometimes naïvely) to be the certainty and commitment of the religious. The last few years have seen considerable ferment in some theology departments, especially among the young religious now coming out of the seminaries. Gifted laymen are also becoming more interested in Catholic thought, and some colleges have used them to supplement religious instructors, particularly in philosophy courses. Assumption College in Worcester has engaged a Congregational minister as part of its theology and philosophy department, and Fordham has also added several non-Catholic clergymen and a rabbi.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Many of the best students and a few of their young teachers now want to explore all the intellectual alternatives, and this has brought changes in syllabi as well as in personnel. Traditional reading lists have been expanded to include controversial modern Catholics, such as Fathers Teilhard de Chardin, Hans Kung, and Karl Rahner. More important, perhaps, many also include non-Catholics, of whom the most popular is Harvey Cox.

We can see in all such developments the general process Harold Lasswell has called "restriction through partial incorporation." Just as the Tory ruling classes in Britain brought able working-class and middle-class people into their own ranks, so too (and with even greater success) the Church has traditionally prolonged its life by partial incorporation of the non-Catholic world. Catholic conservatives have always seen this process as an assault on the "purity" of their doctrine and have asked where it would all end. The answer is that, so long as the Church endures, it will not end at all.

As a result, it sometimes seems as if what is "Catholic" must be found in interstitial matters of style and vocabulary. When we read the student newspapers at Catholic colleges and universities, for example, and compare them with the student press at secular institutions, what seems "Catholic" is often a particular set of terms ("prudence," "natural law," "right reason," "just authority"). These were, of course, ordinary lay terms in an earlier era, but their survival into the present seems to be a peculiarly Catholic phenomenon, akin to the survival of medieval dress for the religious.

While lay professionals now largely shape the Catholic college curriculum, making it increasingly difficult to distinguish this curriculum from that of the non-Catholic college, the same cannot be so easily said of the extracurriculum. Church colleges generally control their students' non-academic lives more than secular colleges do, and Catholic colleges are no exception. Student government, which is pretty much a fraud at all but the most "advanced" secular colleges, does not even exist on paper at many Catholic institutions. Student journalism is for the most part closely supervised, although this is changing rapidly on the more liberal campuses. For better or worse, fraternities and sororities have often been forbidden and almost always discouraged. Indeed, the administration usually limits the independence and autonomy of the student culture on almost every front.

At times, though, these limitations are more apparent than real, for while many colleges have very strict rules, some make no effort to enforce them all. When Andrew Greeley toured Catholic colleges recently he was told occasionally that such rules were to prevent scandal. (If a student was caught publicly doing something, the college could say he was breaking a rule, even though it made no effort

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to catch him.) Such spinsterish anxiety and hypocrisy sometimes derive from the religious order, sometimes from the lay community. In either case, the more outspoken religious and lay reformers are passionately opposed to such strategems, and are demanding that the church and its institutional appendages develop a very uninstitutional candor, clarity, and courage.

Yet it is not clear how much difference this makes. Perhaps the major impact of paternalistic policies is to discourage certain kinds of Catholics from applying to a particular college, and to provide easy targets for the incipient snipers among those who come. Conversely, the possibilities opened up by a non-paternal approach are seldom seized by many, especially if the students are recruited mainly from local parochial schools. Most Catholic college students are evidently so habituated to the idea that adults in general, and the religious in particular, reward docility and conformity that they cannot believe professors or administrators are ever really sympathetic to curiosity and rebellion. Even if they finally grasp this unsettling fact, they may feel betrayed and be unable to respond. (And of course parents, if they discover it, may feel even more betrayed.)

Judging by straw polls on student political preferences during the Goldwater campaign, by the relative rarity of civil rights and peace activities on Catholic campuses, and by our own conversations with individual undergraduates, we have the impression that students at Catholic colleges are more conservative than those at comparable non-Catholic colleges. This is not, however, a simple matter. On economic and social matters Catholics seem more liberal than the American norm, but more docile, too. In foreign policy they seem more militant than other urban students, but no more than those in the South or Mountain states. Catholic college attitudes are also undergoing fairly rapid change. When one of us analyzed interviews done with college seniors in 1955, the Notre Dame graduates showed an anti-Communist fervor similar to that of Protestant fundamentalists. At the time, the right-wing Law School Dean, Clarence Manion, was probably a fairly representative if slightly exaggerated spokesman for Notre Dame and probably for most of Catholic higher education. Today Notre Dame has linked itself to social revolutionary movements in Latin America, and many of its students and faculty are critical of the war in Vietnam – though the majority almost certainly are not. If this trend were to continue, the time might come when, far from being "super-American," the Catholic clergy might find itself criticizing American life from an increasingly "un-American" perspective. By adhering to a morality which in principle transcends nationalism, and by establishing a spiritual identity with millions of religious foreigners which is theoretically greater than their identity with millions of idolatrously nationalistic Americans, the Catholic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

religious are among the stronger potential opponents of American ethnocentrism. Thus far their collective voice has been feeble, involving, for example, the condemnation of unjust wars in general but not in particular. But the seeds of a more radical alienation from modern nationalism have always been there, and they keep sprouting in unpredictable places. In this context it may be fortunate that the religious still preserve a substantial measure of influence over the extracurricular activities of Catholic college students – far greater, we have found, than their influence over the curriculum.

It is difficult to determine to what extent attending a Catholic college leads to either religious observance or orthodoxy, and to what extent it merely follows from it. There is considerable evidence, both logical and empirical, that Catholics who choose Catholic colleges are predisposed to keep the faith, and that some of those who choose secular colleges are indifferent or hostile to the Church. On the other hand, constant exposure to priests and nuns almost certainly encourages apathetic students to make the slight extra effort required to meet their religious payroll. Then, too, some of the religious lead lives whose serenity and grace seem to influence students, especially girls. Being unmarried, the religious are more readily available on residential campuses "after hours," and some of the more energetic and charismatic make good use of this fact. On many Catholic campuses one finds one or two priests or nuns who serve as catalysts for bringing together spiritually and morally troubled students for discussion and occasional action. Even the Jesuits, who strike outsiders as extremely worldly, have a contemplative and speculative side which may flourish in the informal life of a residential Catholic college. While such teachers reach very few students, the same is true on non-Catholic campuses. Certainly if one compares the typical Catholic college not to Swarthmore or Berkeley but to the typical Protestant or ex-Protestant college, it is remarkable how often the Catholic institutions manage to produce at least a small minority of concerned and questing students, relatively immune to the bland all-Americanism and myopic pragmatism which characterize the collegiate majority on almost every campus, Catholic or otherwise.

Looking to the future, we are constantly tempted to write off the influence of the religious on both academic and non-academic student life, and to assume that all Catholic colleges will eventually serve the same secular professional interests as non-Catholic institutions. But while such a prediction may capture a large part of the truth, it may not be the whole of it. The professions, after all, need not all be secular. The Protestant colleges were secularized because the Protestant clergy lost out in competition with other professional interests, but the Catholic clergy may prove more resilient. The situation in Catholic higher education today, while in some ways similar to that in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Protestant higher education a century ago, is by no means identical – if only because Catholic priests and nuns are better equipped than the Protestant clergy ever was to maintain some sort of distinctive influence over their colleges.

Yet while Catholic priests and nuns may continue to play a large role in Catholic higher education, the academic revolution is still likely to follow its familiar course. Many enterprising priests and nuns are already doing everything in their power to promote secularization of the same kind that lay professionals generally want. Indeed, for reasons indicated in the previous section, they may sometimes be able to promote secular academicism even more effectively than laymen. This being the case, one must ask what the special role of the religious in a Catholic college will be. If they do not maintain a monopoly on administration, and if their monopoly on theology and philosophy is to be broken, what unique role is left for them? Some would say none, and urge either that the religious get out of higher education entirely or else that they acquire secular training, accept secular academic standards, and teach secular subjects as best they can, bringing to bear whatever special wisdom their religious studies and discipline may give them. But in that case why should the religious work on Catholic rather than on secular campuses? This raises a larger question, namely what should be distinctive about a Catholic college? In the short run such a question does not require an answer: the colleges are there, the students come, and that creates a need to which many religious respond. But in the long run there must be some sort of answer which satisfies the participants, and we have not heard one which seemed persuasive to the most rigorous. That is why we think the triumph of lay professionalism is likely in the long if not the short run.

[Part Two of this article on the Catholic colleges will appear in the next issue of *The Public Interest.*]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Notes on the post-industrial society (II)

DANIEL BELL

These "notes" are guiding a work in progress entitled *The Post-Industrial Society*. They appear as "notes" to emphasize the tentative nature of the formulations. The "post-industrial" society, as it was outlined in the first part of this essay, was defined as one in which the economy had moved from being predominantly engaged in the production of goods to being preoccupied with services, research, education and amenities; in which the professional-technical class had become the major occupational group; and—most importantly—in which innovation in the society, as reflected in the changing relationship of science to technology, and economics to the polity, was increasingly dependent on advances in *theoretical* knowledge. For this reason, the intellectual institutions of the society, because they are concerned with the codification of theoretical knowledge, will increasingly, in the last third of the century, become the primary institutions of the society. The post-industrial society, it was argued, presupposes the rise of a new class who, on the political level, serve as advisors, experts or technocrats. The relation between the technocrat and the politician, serving as the broker for various interest groups, will become one of the problematic issues of the post-industrial society.

There are many other features of the post-industrial society as well. It will become, increasingly, a "communal society" in which, as the needs of the public sector and of public services become more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

severe, government decisions, both on the Federal and local level, will replace the market as the arbiter of various social and economic choices. And, as a communal and future-oriented society, it will inevitably have to engage in more planning. The consequences of these changes is the subject of the "notes" that follow.

- **Social choices and individual values**

The irony is that the more planning there is in a society, the more there are open group conflicts. Planning sets up a specific locus of decision, which becomes a visible point at which pressures can be applied. Communal coordination – the effort to create a social choice out of a discordance of individual personal preferences – necessarily *sharpens* value conflicts.

Where a single policy (such as defense) constitutes, in the language of economic theory, a "single-peaked preference curve" – one on whose importance and priority the society, by and large, is agreed – there may be little conflict. But what about situations, such as social or welfare policy, where there may be less agreement: how then does one decide? Do we want compensatory education for Negroes at the expense, say, of places for other students when the number of positions is limited? Do we want to keep a redwood forest or provide a going industry to a local community? Will we accept the increased noise of jets in communities near the airports, or force the reduction of weight and payloads – with a consequent increased cost to the industry and the traveler? Should a new highway go through old pleasant sections of a community, or do we route them around such sections with a higher cost to all? These, and thousands more, are issues which cannot be settled on the basis of technical criteria; inevitably they involve value and political choices.

In the "Great Society" more and more goods necessarily have to be purchased communally. The planning of cities and the rationalization of transit, the maintenance of open spaces and the extension of recreational areas, the elimination of air pollution and the cleaning up of the rivers, the underwriting of education and the organization of adequate medical care, all these are now necessarily the concern of "public institutions." Individuals have their own scale of values, which allow them to assess relative satisfactions against costs, and to make their purchases accordingly. But public life lacks such ready measures. We cannot ask for and individually buy in the market place our share of unpolluted air. Regulating the availability of higher education by the market alone would deny many families the possibility of such learning, and also deny the society some of the social benefits which a more educated, and therefore more productive, citizenry might create. But we have no effective social calculus which gives us a true sense of the entire costs and benefits of our public initiatives.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moreover, *we are never likely to get any such perfected calculus.* For in recent years, while economists and mathematicians have been able to supply a "rational proof" of the individual utility preference model, they have become skeptical of the possibility of constructing a group welfare function model. When one turns from individual decision making to that of groups, when one considers the problem of how best to amalgamate the discordant preference patterns of the members of a society so as to arrive at a compromise preference pattern for society as a whole, we seem to be at a theoretical impasse. In the first major effort to formulate the problem, Kenneth Arrow demonstrated, in his *Social Choice and Individual Values,* written in 1951, that the five requirements of "fairness" for social-welfare functions are inconsistent (i.e., no welfare function exists which satisfies all of them). Even the principle of majority rule which satisfies three, and possibly four, of the conditions is subject to the logical contradiction, first formulated by Condorcet, of the paradox of the cyclical majority.

The proof can be demonstrated simply. Supposing there are three voters, A, B, and C, whose preferences on issues x, y and z are ordered in the following pattern:

	Voters		
	A	B	C
Preferences			
First	x	z	y
Second	y	x	z
Third	z	y	x

Clearly, x is preferred to y by a majority (voters A and B); y is preferred to z by a majority (voters A and C); from the principle of transitivity (i.e., if an individual prefers x to y, and y to z, we assume he would also prefer x to z) we should predict that x is also preferred to z, and that x, therefore, is the choice of the majority of the voters; but in fact, z is preferred to x by voters B and C, so that no simple majority preference can be formulated on these three issues.*

There have been numerous attempts both to modify the original conditions which Arrow put forth as necessary to organize a group welfare-function and to resolve the voting paradox. But so far, at

*The most comprehensive effort to deal with the problem is that of Duncan Black, *The Theory of Committees and Elections.* (Cambridge University Press, 1958). Further discussion can be found in Buchanan and Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (University of Michigan, 1962). Some earlier discussions are in Dahl and Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (New York: Harper and Row, 1953), and Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

least to the extent that I can follow the technical literature, no satisfactory "solutions" have been forthcoming.*

This problem – of seeking to produce a single social ordering of alternative social choices which would correspond to individual orderings – is academic, in the best sense of the word. In the "real" world, the problem of social priorities, of what social utilities are to be maximized, of what communal enterprises are to be furthered, will be settled in the political arena by "political criteria"– i.e. the relative weights and pressures of different interest groups, balanced against some vague sense of the national need and the public interest. But it is precisely at this point that the problem becomes most irksome. For increasingly, one of the "issues" of a Great Society – which can be defined as a society that seeks to become conscious of its goals – is this relationship between "rationality" and "politics." The Great Society aims to rise above "mere" politics toward some kind of rational political behavior – but rigorous theoretical analysis leads us back to "mere" politics!

• The new prince

One other item of democratic theory would seem to be in trouble, too, empirically as well as theoretically. This is the theory of interest groups in a pluralistic society.

The theory of representative government reflected a picture of society as a "balance of forces." The legislature, in this conception, was supposed to contain representatives of the various social divisions and class interests in the country, for, as Mill noted in appealing for the right of the working-class to be represented in Parliament, "in the absence of its natural defenders, the interest of the excluded is always in danger of being overlooked." Mill, in fact, was so intent on the idea of the representation of minorities, that he gave enthusiastic endorsement to the proposal of Thomas Hare for proportional representation, "a scheme which has the almost unparalled merit of carrying out a great principle of government in a manner approaching to ideal perfection as regards the special object in view . . ."

This normative theory was refined by what might be called the "realist" school of political thought, from Arthur F. Bentley on. (Bentley's original formulations in 1908 were ignored for many years, but

*Arrow, in an appendix to a new edition of his book (Cowles Foundation, Yale University, 1963) has sought to counter some discoveries of errors in his proofs by reformulating the conditions to show that the inconsistencies in the conditions still remain, and that no logical foundations for a complete social-welfare-function are possible. The most recent effort to prove the possibility of "collective rationality" is that of James Coleman, "The Possibility of a Social Welfare Function" (*American Economic Review*, December, 1966).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were restated three decades later by V. O. Key, David Truman, and Earl Latham.) If a "group theory" was lacking in economics, it certainly made its appearance, in full flower, in American political thought in the last few decades. As V. O. Key put it most succinctly:

> At bottom, group interests are the animating forces in the political process. . . . Whatever the bases of group interest may be, the study of politics must rest on an analysis of the objectives and composition of the interest groups within a society. . . . The chief vehicles for the expression of group interest are political parties and pressure groups. Through these formal mechanisms groups of people with like interests make themselves felt in the balancing of political forces.*

And, in this conception, the role of the politician was to be a broker:

> The problem of the politician or the statesman in a democracy is to maintain a working balance between the demands of competing interests and values. . . . Within limits . . . special interests in a democracy are free to express their demands and their disagreements. . . . The politician in a democracy . . . must be able to hold together enough of these special interests to retain power; he must yield here, stand firm there, delay at the next point, and again act vigorously in a confusing complex of competing forces and interests. . . . The politician . . . must play the part of arbitrator and mediator, subject to the criticism of all. To avoid or mitigate conflict, he compromises.

Whatever the truth of this "model" as a description of the "nineteenth century inheritance,"** (or even as a superficial description of Lyndon Johnson), it is astonishingly out of date for an understanding of politics in the second half of the 20th century, for it fails to take into account the three most decisive characteristics, or shaping elements, of national policy today: the influence of foreign policy, the "future-orientation" of society, and the increasing role of "technical" decision-making.

1) Foreign policy is not formulated primarily in reaction to the needs and pressures of domestic pressure groups (though once decisions are taken, some modifications may be made in response to their demands, e.g., to build airplanes in the Southwest rather than in the Northwest). Foreign policy is shaped in accordance with great

*V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942), pp. 23-24.

**The "group theory of politics," it should be noted, has been challenged on theoretical grounds by Mancur Olson, Jr., who, applying an "economic analysis" to the nature of aggregate choice, argues that interest groups do not best represent the interests of their members. See Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and The Theory of Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

power and ideological interests, and as responses to perceived threats from other great powers or ideological forces. But its consequence, under conditions of a cold war, is to force a "mobilized posture" on the society as a whole, to create some sense of national unity, and to centralize decision-making and enormous resources in the hands of a national administration. (Of the $15 billion spent by the Federal government for research and development, ninety percent goes into three areas: defense, space, and atomic energy.) The social and economic map of the U.S. has been redrawn more in the past twenty years by the influence of defense and defense spending than by any other single factor.

2) The commitment to economic growth, and the new dimensions of social change – its more rapid shock effects on larger and larger sections of the society and the consequent need to anticipate social change and to a considerable extent to direct it – have brought with them a renewed emphasis on planning, on the need to become more conscious of national goals and of the "alternative futures" which a society with a steady increase in productivity (a constant 3 percent growth rate of productivity will double national output in 24 years) can provide.

3) The combination of these two elements brings into play the increasing role of technical decision-making. The shaping of conscious policy, be it in foreign policy, defense, or economics, calls to the fore the men with the skills necessary to outline the constraints ahead, to work out in detail the management and policy procedures, and to assess the consequences of choices. The revolutions in military technology (the introduction of nuclear power, the replacement of manned aircraft by missiles) were initiated by scientists. The development of systems analysis and cost-effectiveness techniques, which have revolutionized both the strategy process as well as the management structure of the Pentagon, was brought about by mathematicians and economists. The management of the national economy, with its close watch on the effects of government spending, requires the services of men skilled in the economic arts, and such crucial policy questions as when to have tax cuts or tax increases, how much to have, and what the wage-price guideposts should be, increasingly become technical decisions.*

*As one quondam bureaucrat has earnestly argued, "the development of public policy and of the methods of its administration owe less in the long run to processes of conflict among political parties and social or economic pressure groups than to the more objective processes of research and discussion among professional groups." Don K. Price, *Government and Science* – a statement written little more than ten years after V. O. Key, and reflecting the differences, perhaps, of the pre-war and post-war experiences of political analysts.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But the most important political consequence of all this is the passing of effective power, in almost all political systems, from the legislative and parliamentary bodies to the executive, and the re-emergence of what Bertrand de Jouvenal has called, in his elegant fashion, *The Principate.* How could it be otherwise when, in the nature of modern politics, foreign policy is no longer "diplomacy" but an unceasing round of strategic maneuver in which crucial decisions have to be taken speedily, and when, because of the new patterns of social change, the very need to plan policies, rather than lay down laws, gives the initiative to the Executive?

In the United States we have seen, in the past twenty-five years, the enormous transformation of the Presidency into the Executive Office of the President with the addition of new staff functions – such as the Bureau of the Budget, the Council of Economic Advisors, and the Office of the Science Adviser – directly within that office. For the long run, it is not the growth of the personal powers and prestige of the President that is important, but the *institutionalization* of such crucial control and directing functions.

Although these essential changes – the new role of the Executive, the conflict between technocratic rationality and political bargaining, and the orientation to the future – have been variously described, political theory has, so far, failed to absorb them into a new conceptual structure.

- **Number, density, interaction**

While our eyes have been focused on the visible political changes, some underlying structural changes, of the kind that Paul Valéry alluded to, have in crescive fashion been transforming our society. Thus, the effects of the increase in number, interaction, and density of population are enormous. Here, I shall take the communication pattern as an instance.

a) *The loss of insulating space.* If one looks at American history, what strikes one immediately is the tremendous amount of violence, particularly labor violence, which took place over a period of 65 years (from 1877, beginning with the railroad strikes, and ending with the outbreak of war at the end of 1941). From any rough set of indicators that one chooses – the number of times troops were called out, the number of riots, the number of individuals killed, the amount of sabotage, the number of man-days of work lost, the amounts of money spent by corporations in fighting trade unions – it is highly likely that there was probably more violence here than in any country in Europe. Yet the U.S. did escape the political holocausts that wracked European society, and some basic accommodation between business and labor was reached.

One can identify many factors which account for this difference

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

between American and European society, but surely one of the most important ones, particularly before World War I, was what one can call the factor of "insulated space." One of the distinguishing features of political violence in Europe is that most of it took place close to, or at, a political center. What would have happend to the French Revolution, for example, if the Constituent Assembly had met at Dijon, rather than at Versailles, twenty miles from Paris and subject to the pressures of the Paris crowds? Clearly all such *if* questions are unanswerable, but their formulation allows one to see the possibility of alternatives. In the United States, our early violence took place largely at the "perimeters" of the society (in isolated coal mining communities, in the Far West and Rocky Mountain areas) and the "shock effects" had small radial range.

The introduction of modern mass communication allows us, in many cases forces us, to respond directly and immediately to social issues. There is little question that the presence of the television cameras in Selma, Alabama, depicting the use of crude violence (snarling police dogs, electrified cattle prods) against the Negro marchers aroused an immediate national response which was reflected in the presence of thousands of persons who poured into Selma, the following week, from all over the country. Without television, it is likely that the shock effect, even if transmitted through news photos and newsreels, would have been dissipated (and, before the rise of the mass media, would have never had a national impact).

One can see this by a crude comparison of two incidents. In the winter of 1893-94, the growing economic distress and mass unemployment brought the formation of scattered groups of jobless into "armies" who declared for a "march on Washington" to demand relief. The best known of these was "Coxey's Army," led by the populist "general" Jacob S. Coxey. Although detachments of the armies started out from various parts of the country, and Coxey led his contingent from Massillon, Ohio, only 400 persons reached the national capital, and the "armies" were easily dispersed.

In the summer of 1963, Negro civil rights leaders called for a March on Washington to bring pressure upon the administration for the passage of a civil rights bill, and by plane, bus, rail and car, 250,000 persons descended onto the capital in an extraordinary demonstration of political purpose. Differences of issue apart, it is clear that one incident is a product of a regional society, the other of a mass society.

In effect, our society has become more "permeable" and open to plebiscitarian pressures. One may applaud the fact that the nature of the mass media increases the likelihood of a spectacular rise in "participatory" democracy, but these instances are also more likely to be on emotional issues, so that the loss of "insulating space"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

itself may permit the setting off of chain reactions which may be disruptive of civil politics and reasoned debate.

b) *Communication overload.* Whatever else may be said about the 20th century, it has produced the greatest bombardment of aural and visual materials that man has ever experienced in his history. To the linotype, camera, typewriter, telephone and telegraph, the 20th century has added radio (and radio telephone), teletype, television, microwaves, communication satellites, computers, xerography and the like. Transistors and miniaturization not only facilitate an incredible packaging of communication senders, receivers, and recorders in the small space of a space ship, they also allow automobile telephony, walkie-talkies, portable radios and television sets, and finally, on the agenda, person-to-person communication by "wrist-watch" radio anywhere in the country (and soon the world?). Radar and LORAN have taken over most of the air-sea guidance of transport, while an incredibly deployed watching system like SAGE (already, in part, obsolete) permits a national command-control system, using real-time computers, to patrol the continental defense from the distant early warning lines.

George Miller, the Harvard psychologist, once demonstrated, in a marvelous article, "The Magical Number Seven Plus or Minus Two," the finite limits to the number of different "bits" (or signals) that a human channel could encompass at one time.* But the problem is not the single instant, it is the total number of sensations that an individual is subject to. Some random sampling of the communication media illustrates, in a cursory way, the growth of the networks of interaction. In 1899, there were one million telephones in the United States, or 13.3 per 100,000 population; in 1963, there were 84,440,000 telephones or 442.5 per 100,000 population. (Over 350 million local calls are made daily in the U.S.) In 1899, 6,576,000 pieces of mail were moved in the U.S.; in 1963, 67,853,000,000 pieces of mail were sent (more than half of them first-class). In 1924, 1,250,000 families had radio sets, and 530 stations were on the air; in 1964, more than 90 percent of families had radio sets and 5,607 stations (AM and FM) were on the air. In 1949, 940,000 families had television sets, and 17 stations were sending pictures; in 1964, more than 90 percent of all families had television sets, and 564 television stations were broadcasting regularly.

The extension of the range of communication has brought the entire world into instant reach of any listener. Consider only the multiple geography lessons that each of us has had to learn in the last 25 years, from a knowledge of the strategic value of the Chagos

*See George A. Miller, *The Psychology of Communication: Seven essays.* (New York: Basic Books, 1966).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Archipelago as an equatorial staging area halfway between Aden and Singapore, to the distinction between the Congo Republic (Leopoldville), formerly Belgian, and the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), formerly French. And consider, too, the number of different political figures and the bewildering number of political parties that we have to learn about to keep abreast of the news.

For the society and the political process, there are enormous problems which arise from this communications overload. At a time when, in our psychological values, we place a greater emphasis on individuation, where is the possibility of privacy, of a "psycho-social moratorium" (a term used by Erik Erikson to describe the need of sensitive adolescents to escape the pressures of schools, career choice, and the like), and a relief from the stresses created by these incessant "messages" out of the blue? Certainly, for the year 2000 this may be one of the most urgent of all social problems.

And for the political process, consider only one image: the number of problems, terrifying in number, which automatically flow today to Washington as a political center, and the multifarious issues which the President, therefore, has to confront, and often decide upon, in "real time." Can such a system continue, without breakdown?

- **Rates of diffusion**

The communications revolution, while accelerating many things, has most dramatically accelerated the rate of diffusion of social demands.

The point about diffusion is the critical one for any consideration of social change – and prediction about the future. For it is not the spectacular innovations (crucial as they may be as turning points) which are the important elements in changing the social map of a country, but the rate of diffusion of products and privileges. For diffusion is not automatic. In the case of products, it rests upon certain entreprenurial talents, and the ability to break through the cake of custom or the barriers of entrenched interests. In the case of privileges, it rests upon the ability of disadvantaged groups to mobilize political pressures. And both of these are operative only within the framework of the value system of a society.

One of the reasons why the predictions of Tocqueville, made more than 130 years ago, are still so cogent, is that he had hit upon the great "master key" to American society – the desire for equality. What has been the property or privilege of the few is demanded, legitimately, by the many. The enormous change, for example, in the character of higher education, which affects us all, is not due to any sweeping technological innovations or even the post-World War II baby boom, but to the extension of higher education from the few to the many. In 1935, for example, 12.2 percent of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(9.2 million) 18-21 age group attended college, while in 1964, more than 40 percent of the (11.2 million) 18-21 age group was in college.

Out of this same impulse, there is a constant set of rising expectations about what the society can produce. It has been estimated, for example, that about twenty percent of our people live in poverty. But this is a definition of poverty by 1964 standards. If we applied, say, 1947 standards, only about fifteen percent of the people would be considered poor today. It is the nature of the American experience to "upgrade" constantly the notion of what constitutes a decent minimum, and correspondingly to upgrade the definition of poverty. As Herman Miller, the assistant to the director of the Census, points out in his book, *Rich Man, Poor Man,* according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, a "modest but adequate living standard" in New York City in 1947 required a family income (in 1961 dollars) of $4000 a year. This criterion rose in 1961 to $5,200 – a twenty-eight percent increase. At this rate, by 1975, the new decent minimum for a family will be (always in 1961 dollars) $7,000. As Mr. Miller concludes: our standards will be lifted a little higher, our belts will be opened another notch, and there will still be a large block of families living under new and higher substandard conditions.

In seeking for clues to social change, therefore, the important task is to be able to identify which aspects of privilege or advantage today will be demanded by the many tomorrow. (More travel, travel to more distant places, winter vacations, summer houses?) And it is the diffusion of these privileges to an increasing number that provides a key to the kinds of social and political demands we shall witness in the coming years.

But changes in number also mean a change in scale. Increases in size change the nature of organizations, give rise to multiple hierarchies, introduce new problems of coordination, and pose new questions of order and planning. Students at Berkeley, for example, complain of depersonalization because of the size of the University – yet decentralization (or the creation of more universities) is not a complete answer because of the scarcity of professional talent relative to the demand. The spread of medical care has prompted the introduction of more technological devices (e.g., multiphase diagnostic screens) which, many complain, "mechanize" the doctor-patient relationship. Yet this is a concommitant of a mass society. (The other answer, increase the number of doctors, is easy rhetorically, yet difficult both because of the problems of recruiting more doctors and the long time-lag in the training period.)

The question of the size and scope of all social units – the appropriate size of governmental units, the optimal size of various organizations, the decentralization of function and the creation of a "human scale" in a mass society – is the most crucial sociological

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

problem that arises out of the influence of number, density and interaciton, and the consequences of diffusion and change of scale.

- **The public and the private**

The conventional model of the economy concentrates on the private, profit-seeking center. Yet what is public and what is private, and what is profit and what is not-for-profit, is no longer an easy distinction these days. The aerospace companies are private, yet the Federal government purchases 74 percent of their entire output. All profits above a negotiated sum are returned to the government; the government, rather than the competitive market, determines the firms' profitability, and even their survival. The New York Port Authority and the Triborough Bridge Authority are non-profit public corporations, yet they make enormous profits, which are reinvested in new enterprises far beyond the original charter of these corporations. In practical effect, they differ little from private utilities who pay off a fixed sum of their indebtedness as interest charges and use profits for reinvestment. The Battelle Institute is a not-for-profit research foundation; the Arthur D. Little Company is profit seeking; yet the activities of the two are quite similar. (Battelle did the experimental and development work on xerography and now reaps large royalties; Arthur D. Little does a considerable amount of public service work at no fee.) Mutual insurance companies and mutual savings banks are not-for-profit, yet their dividends, interest rates, salaries, and practices are virtually identical with capital stock insurance companies and savings banks. The University of California at Berkeley is a state university, yet receives large amounts in corporate gifts and other private giving. Columbia University is a private school, yet more than half of its annual $100 million budget comes from Federal contracts and grants. The medical and health service field, the largest "growth industry" in the country, is a commingling of private, profit, non-profit, and government activities.

If one looks at the not-for-profit sector as a whole, taking into account the wide range of government, educational, and health services, the striking fact is that about one-fourth of G.N.P. and "not less than one-third and possibly almost two-fifths of all employment is accounted for by the activities of that sector.* In the 1950-1960 decade, in fact, nine out of every ten *new* jobs added to the economy was generated in the not-for-profit sector – i.e., by the vastly enlarged role of the Federal government in connection with the cold war, the expanded activities of state and local governments in providing community services, and the growths of the education and health and welfare fields.

*These and subsequent figures are taken from Ginzberg, Hiestand and Reubens, *The Pluralistic Economy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The growth of the not-for-profit sector brings into focus, as employers of significant amounts of manpower, a whole array of organizations whose structure and form differ to a considerable extent from the usual model of "bureaucracy." These are universities, research laboratories, hospitals, community welfare organizations and the like. The "received" doctrine, as drawn from Max Weber, and accepted by most students of stratification theory, posit a beaucracy as having a division of labor based on functional specialization, a well-defined hierarchy of authority, impersonal, 'bureaucratic' rules of behavior, and the like. This is the "ideal type" model which is often best exemplified in business corporate structure. Yet the variety of new kinds of organizations that are emerging (particularly ones with a high component of technical and research personnel) indicate that the older models, patterned on pyramidal structures, may no longer be applicable, and that in the coming decades the "traditional" bureaucratic form will have given way to organizational modes more adaptive to the needs for initiative, free time, joint consultation and the like. The emergence of new structural forms of non-bureaucratic organization is one more item on the long agenda of new problems for the post-industrial society.

- **A system of social accounts**

The development of national economic accounting provides us with an instructive picture of the workings of a modern economy. There are, at present, for example, four types of accounting systems which allow us to measure different kinds of economic phenomena and transactions: (a) National Income and Product Accounts sum up the total value of goods and services transacted in the economy and the allocation of net income among households, government, business, and foreign units; (b) National Moneyflow Accounts trace the flow of funds between financial and non-financial units, including households and government; (c) National Interindustry Accounts set forth the value of purchases and sales of goods and services between variously "disaggregated" units of business, government, household and foreign sectors; (d) National Wealth Accounting, in effect a national assets inventory, evaluates the reproducible assets and resources of the nation.

Yet these and other economic concepts, particularly the now familiar Gross National Product, are limited in their use, and sometimes – more by popular opinion than by professional economists – give us a distorted picture of the social economy. GNP measures the sum total of goods and services transacted within the *market* economy. It is immediately apparent that services performed within a household – by a wife, for example – are not "valued." (The British economist A. C. Pigou, a pioneer of welfare economics, once

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

remarked that if a widowed vicar paid his housekeeper a weekly wage, this was an addition to the national income; if he married her, it became a subtraction.) The point at stake is that "income" in rural areas (where a substantial amount of food may be produced at home) is often "under-valued" as against urban income – a fact neglected not only in some discussions about poverty in the U.S., but in the international comparisons between the U.S. and some well-to-do-agrarian countries, (e.g., Denmark, New Zealand) who, on the scale of GNP, rank lower than their real income would put them.

Moreover, if national income is understated by considering GNP alone, the sense of progress can be exaggerated by the "additive" nature of GNP accounting. Thus, when a factory is built, the new construction and the new payroll are an addition to the GNP. If, at the same time, the factory pollutes a stream and builds a filtration plant to divert the wastes, these expenditures, too, become an addition to the GNP.* True, more money has indeed been spent in the economy; but the gross addition simply masks an "offset cost," not a genuine contribution to economic progress. The definition of what is an addition and what is an offset clearly is a difficult task, but one insufficiently recognized in the popular discussion of national economic accounting, and in the widespread acceptance of GNP as a "welfare" or "growth" measuring device.

One can have a meaningful sense of progress only by knowing its costs, direct and indirect. A difficulty in national economic accounting today is that of assigning the costs generated by one group which often are borne by others (e.g., the costs to the community of strip mining, gouging out a countryside).** But the problem is not one that can be handled on an *ad hoc* basis. We need a broader cost matrix.

---

*In a similar vein, Victor Fuchs of the National Bureau of Economic Research, in writing of the expansion of the service sector of the economy, remarks: "There has been a presumption [among economists] that the more highly developed the economy the more useful the [real GNP as a] measure becomes. . . . But the trend may now be in the other direction, because at very high levels of GNP per capita, a large fraction of productive effort is devoted to the services (where real output is very difficult to measure) and to other activities (that are not measured at all)." Among the activities that are not measured today, in fact, are many government services, since these cannot be valued at market prices.

**A "far-out," but still telling, example is that of New York City, which in order to reduce the "costs" of snow removal no longer hires additional private trucks to cart away the snow but has its sanitation department push the snow into the middle of the busy streets where passing taxis, buses and cars grind it into slush that is then hosed down the sewers. The city reduced its costs, but the amount of slush which splattered on the trousers, coats, and dresses of the passersby increased the cleaning and dyeing bills in the city by a substantial amount. From the point of view of the city and the cleaning industry there was a distinct gain; but this surely was an "irrational" way of distributing the extra costs involved.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In effect, what we need is a System of Social Accounts which would broaden our concept of costs and benefits, and put economic accounting into a broader framework. The eventual purpose would be to create a "balance sheet" that would be useful in clarifying policy choices.

What would a system of social accounts allow us to do? The word "accounts," as it stands now, is perhaps a misnomer. Sociologists have been able to establish few completely consistent sets of relationships (such as the relationship, say, between unemployment and delinquency). Even where sophisticated social analysis can establish relationships, it is difficult to establish these in measurable terms. But we can begin by seeking to establish a conceptual framework.

A System of Social Accounts would begin with a series of social indicators that would give us a broader and more balanced reckoning of the meaning of economic progress as we know it. This effort to set up a System of Social Accounts would move us toward four goals:

(a) the measurement of the social costs and net returns of innovations,

(b) the measurement of social ills (e.g., crime, family disruption),

(c) the creation of "performance budgets" in areas of defined social needs (e.g., housing, education),

(d) indicators of economic opportunity and social mobility.

The following elaboration of the four problems referred to above is meant to be merely illustrative.

(a) *Social Costs and Net Return:* Technological advances create new investment opportunities. These investments are expected to be paid for by the enhanced earnings they produce. But clearly there are losses as well. The major loss is the unemployment created by technological change, particularly in those instances where the advanced age of the worker of the particular skill that is displaced makes it difficult for him to find new employment. Or, a new plant in an area may create new employment opportunities, yet its by-products — water pollution and air pollution — may create additional costs for the community. Long ago, Professor A. C. Pigou demonstrated, in his *The Economics of Welfare,* that there is frequently a divergence between the private cost borne by an entrepreneur and the social costs. Into the cost account of the private entrepreneur goes only those items for which he has to pay, while such items as maintenance of the unemployed, provisions for the victims of industrial accidents or occupational diseases, costs of access roads, etc. are borne, in the old phrase of J. M. Clark, as "social overhead costs."

The question of which costs should be borne by the firm and which by the community is clearly a matter of public policy. Increas-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ingly, for example, firms responsible for polluting the waters of a river are asked to bear the costs of filtration. The Ruhr, flowing through West Germany's most dense industrial region, is at present less polluted than it was twenty years ago. Swimming and boating are commonplace. This happy circumstance is the result of a cooperative arrangement between 259 municipalities and 2,200 industries along the river who have developed a system of effluent fees calculated to encourage the construction of waste disposal systems. In this case the entire cost of pollution is assigned to the source. On the other hand, certain costs of severence pay or maintenance of an older labor force on a firm's payroll may be so huge as to inhibit the introduction of useful technological devices, and such costs might more efficiently be borne by the community than by the firm itself. But these questions of public policy can only be decided when we have a clearer picture of the actual social costs and returns of particular innovations.*

(b) *The Measurement of Social Ills:* Every society pays a huge price for crime, juvenile delinquency, and disruption of the family. The costs of child care and mental health are also high. There are no simple causes, such as unemployment, of such social ills. Yet such ills and social tensions do, in a measurable way, have significant effects on the economy (from loss of able-bodied workers because of mental illness, to direct losses of property because of thefts and riots). Although data on crime, on health, dependent children and the like are collected by U.S. Government agencies, there is rarely any effort to link these problems to underlying conditions; nor is there a full measure of the cost of these ills. Systematic analysis of such data might suggest possible courses of remedial action.

(c) *Performance Budgets:* The American committment is not only to raise the standard of living, but to improve the quality of life. But we have few "yardsticks" to tell us how we are doing. A system of social accounts would contain "performance budgets" in various areas to serve as such yardsticks. A national "housing budget," for example, would indicate where we stand in regard to the goal of a "decent home for every American family." It would also enable us to locate, by city and region, the areas of greatest needs and so provide the basis for effective public policy. A series of community health

*Andrew Shonfield, in his book *Modern Capitalism*, points out that the construction of a new subway line in London was held up for over a decade on the premise that it couldn't pay its way – until someone demonstrated that the secondary benefits resulting for the people *not* using the line (in speeding taxi and private vehicular flow and the like) would result in a true return on investment which was 10 percent over the capital cost of the project. Andrew Shonfield, *Modern Capitalism* (Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 227-229.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

indices would tell us how well we are meeting the needs of our people in regard to adequate medical care.

(d) *Indicators of Economic Opportunity and Social Mobility:* More than twenty-five years ago, in *An American Dilemma,* Gunnar Myrdal wrote: "We should . . . have liked to present in our study a general index, year by year or at least decade by decade, as a quantitative expression of the movement of the entire system we are studying: the status of the Negro in America. . . . But the work of constructing and analyzing a general index of Negro status in America amounts to a major investigation in itself, and we must leave the matter as a proposal for later research."

Two decades later, we still have no "general index" of the status of the Negro in America. In a strict methodological sense, no "comprehensive indexes" are perhaps possible; but we *can* assemble specific indicators. Thus, where once it seemed impossible to conceive of a "value" figure for "human assets," the creation of recent years of a "lifetime-earning power index" gives us a measure to reflect the improvements in income which come with increased education, improvement in health, and reduction of discrimination. And economists have a term, "opportunity costs," which allows us to calculate not only direct costs but also the gains foregone from the use of those resources elsewhere.

This approach derives from a proposition: American society would be in a better position to appraise its achievements, its needs, and its shortcomings by being able to specify broad national goals and national priorities. This proposition itself rests on the underlying assumption that we remain a democratic polity capable of peaceful bargaining and trade-off between groups, as well as being able to shape a political rationality which subordinates technique to consensual ends.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Times: An Exchange

I HAVE rarely seen a commentary on the American press that was more wrongheaded and ill-informed than Irving Kristol's article about The New York *Times* in the Winter 1967 issue of *The Public Interest.*

One is astounded that a man so prone to error would have the temerity to lecture the press on its shortcomings.

Practically every assumption that Mr. Kristol makes is erroneous. Consider a few examples:

(1) Assumption: "If The *Times* wants to interpret events in China, it could (a) employ a full-time China expert to do so – but it has none on its staff. . . ."

Actuality: Seymour Topping, foreign news editor of The New York *Times,* entered the College of Chinese Studies in Peking in 1946 and at the same time started work there as a correspondent. He remained in China until the Communists took over in 1949. Since then he has spent several years in Hong Kong and territories around China.

Tillman Durdin went to Shanghai in 1939 and was a correspondent there for 14 years altogether. Most of his subsequent career has been devoted to Chinese affairs.

Several other *Times* writers and editors have served in China – on the mainland, in Hong Kong and in Taiwan. Two of them were born in China.

(2) Assumption: "(The *Times*) rarely hires anyone with a graduate degree in anything but journalism, and it *never* hires a professor."

Actuality: Before joining The New York *Times,* John Canaday, Walter Kerr and Harry Schwartz, just to name a few, were all college teachers. Countless members of The *Times* staff lecture occasionally or regularly at colleges and universities. Many have graduate degrees.

The *Times* subsidizes employees who wish to pursue their studies. The secretary who is taking down these very words is working towards a degree in European history.

(3) Assumption: "The *Times* then takes this young man (a college graduate) and slowly squeezes him through the eye of all its needles – police reporter, Brooklyn Borough Hall reporter, etc., etc., – until he is eventually regarded as worthy of more weighty assignments."

Actuality: No reporter on The New York *Times* has been put through that process for almost four years.

(4) Assumption: "Now, let us say that someone wanted to edit

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a book of ten essays, to be used by the college student of American government and politics, covering such Washington institutions as the Pentagon, the Supreme Court, Congress, the administrative agencies, etc. Would one think instinctively of asking The New York *Times* man to contribute? Would one even know his name?"

Actuality: One would certainly know of Arthur Krock, James Reston, Tom Wicker, Max Frankel, Edwin L. Dale, Jr., and Anthony Lewis, who is now in London. Mr. Lewis, when he covered the Supreme Court for The New York *Times,* not only wrote essays, but he also lectured to bar associations, judicial conferences and law schools, and wrote an excellent book on one of the landmark decisions of the Supreme Court, "Gideon's Trumpet."

(5) Assumption: "Whether or not a journalist reads books, or is interested in ideas, is of little importance in the eyes of his colleagues."

Actuality: The New York *Times* has a library of 40,000 volumes, and various members of the staff have impressive libraries of their own, including many specialized collections.

(6) Assumption: "The foreign correspondent who knows the language of the country he is stationed in is still the exception to the general rule."

Actuality: The correspondents of The New York *Times* in the following cities speak the language of the countries in which they are stationed: Berlin, Bonn, Buenos Aires, Geneva, Lisbon, Madrid, Mexico City, Moscow, Paris, Rome, Rio de Janeiro.

Several other correspondents speak the second language of the countries to which they are assigned. Some speak as many as five foreign languages.

The *Times* pays all or a part of the tuition of those who want to learn languages for professional purposes.

(7) Assumption: "... The *Times* does not have a professional economist on its staff.... In all fairness I must quickly add that the *Times* does have two excellent economic journalists, Edwin L. Dale, Jr., on the news staff, Murray Rossant on the editorial."

Actuality: Before coming to The New York *Times,* Erich Heinemann was an economist at the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York. He was trained at Harvard and the Graduate School of Business Administration at Columbia. He is only one of five members of the business and financial staff who have had academic training in economics. Three of them have graduate degrees.

(8) Assumption: "The journalist who exposes the fact that a city official steered a profitable urban renewal contract toward a friend, a relative, or a former business associate is sure to receive the appropriate honors and applause due 'a good reporter.' That this same journalist has never had anything intelligent to say about the urban renewal plan itself — that, indeed, he really understands almost nothing about this incredibly complicated subject — is deemed to be of little consequence....Meanwhile, the expert who has written a good book or paper on this urban renewal project remains unheard of in the journalistic universe."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Actuality: Mr. Kristol doesn't seem to have heard of Ada Louise Huxtable.

(9) Assumption: "... It is fairly clear that The *Times* does not like to see letters published which suggest that its original stories were incomplete and often ill-informed ... (Letters to the Editor) is a department not for the use of officials, or scholars, or experts, or even for the subjects of the stories themselves, but for The *Times*' own version of the man-in-the-street."

Actuality: Not only does The *Times* publish many letters challenging its stories, but it also has a long-established policy of correcting any substantial error called to its attention by a knowledgeable and responsible reader.

On the Sunday after Mr. Kristol's article appeared, the following persons signed the letters in the letters column of The New York *Times:* Paul Buck, sometime Provost of Harvard University; Richard A. Pline, Director, Onboard Metropolitan Small Busines Center, Inc., New Bedford, Mass.; H. M. De Thierry, Professor of Languages, Marymount Manhattan College; Walter Millis, staff director of the Fund for Republic Inc.; Carl L. Loeb, Jr., New York stockbroker; Edward C. Devereux, Jr., professor at Cornell University; Erling B. Stockmann, a retired industrial engineer from Port Washington.

(10) Assumption: "The *Times* now even has a lawyer to write about legal news, a precedent-shattering innovation."

Actuality: The precedent was shattered eleven years ago, when Anthony Lewis went to Harvard on a Nieman Fellowship to study law in preparation for his assignment to the Supreme Court. The *Times* now has two lawyers, not one, writing about legal news.

CLIFTON DANIEL
Managing Editor
The New York Times

A Rejoinder

I SHOULD like to congratulate Mr. Daniel on his good fortune in having a secretary who spends her evening taking courses in European history. But I do hope this estimable young lady understands that she need not keep plugging away, year after studious year, on *my* account. She should feel absolutely free to drop out whenever she pleases, and I promise not to hold it against The *Times*.

Seriously, though, I am disappointed by Mr. Daniel's reaction to my article. That article tried to make some general points about the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fundamental intellectual weakness of American journalism today and, inevitably, I took the New York *Times* as my point of departure. Mr. Daniel does not so much as refer to these general points; the very word, "journalism," does not appear in his letter, except when he quotes me; and I must take this bland refusal as being symptomatic of the weakness I was alluding to.

Mr. Daniel, instead, has written an entirely *ad hominem* defense of The *Times*. And this puts me in an embarrassing position. How, precisely, should I properly reply? Ought I do draw up a list of two dozen Timesmen whom Mr. Daniel carefully does not mention and belligerently inquire: "What about *these*?" (That I could compile such a list, Mr. Daniel cannot possibly doubt.) Or am I supposed now to denigrate the names Mr. Daniel does mention? Neither prospect appeals to me. After all, I am not The *Times*' vice president in charge of personnel, and do not aspire to be. Nor have I ever doubted – indeed, I was careful to make a positive statement to this effect – that there are good men on The *Times*. What I was interested in exploring were the assumptions of American journalism that made The *Times* the kind of flawed journalistic *institution* it is. And because this was my purpose, I went out of my way to limit the "naming of names" to a minimum.

Nevertheless, I suppose I do have to address myself to Mr. Daniel's specifics, lest I be accused of "chickening out." So here, reluctantly, goes:

1) Seymour Topping and Tillman Durdin (and Henry Lieberman, too) have certainly been capable reporters on the Far East, and The *Times* has every right to be gratified with their presence on its staff. But they do not ordinarily "interpret" events in China for The *Times*. And I must inform Mr. Daniel that they are not regarded by the academic or political communities as "China experts" – nor, I should think, do they regard themselves as such.

2) The last time The *Times* hired a professor – i.e., hired him from a university, not from another newspaper or magazine – was about a decade ago. And I somehow find it most revealing that Mr. Daniel cannot even bring himself to use the term "professor," but insists on "college teacher." I detect a (doubtless unconscious) bent toward anti-intellectualism in this very choice of words.

3) I stand corrected: my description of The *Times*' employment practices was apparently out of date. But was my general point – about The *Times*' reluctance to have a young man devote himself to journalism in the particular field he studied – also erroneous? Mr. Daniel does not say.

4) Mr. Daniel is being disingenuous. Neither Arthur Krock nor James Reston is in the Washington news bureau, nor do they "cover" any of the institutions I mentioned. Edwin Dale covers national economic news, not government or politics. On the other hand, Anthony Lewis unquestionably promised to be a truly excellent student of the Supreme Court – so why is he now in The *Times*' London bureau?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

5) Mr. Daniel accurately quotes my statement, and then gives a reply that is no reply at all. The *Times* could obviously afford to have a library of 100,000 copies, if it wanted to. The questions remain: Who reads? And who cares who reads?

6) My passing reference to foreign correspondents not ordinarily knowing the language of the country they are stationed in was not addressed to The *Times* but to American journalism in general.

7) Mr. Daniel's choice of words is curiously evasive: note that he never actually says that any of his business and financial staff have graduate degrees *in economics*. But I don't want to quibble about academic certificates. All I can do is express wonderment that, if The *Times*' financial and business pages have such expertness at hand, it isn't used to better effect. I still stand by my assertion: if The *Times*' financial section were to vanish tomorrow, no one in Wall Street would particularly notice the event.

8) Ada Louise Huxtable is an eminent architectural critic. She is not – and I am sure she would not pretend to be – an expert on urban problems in general, or urban renewal in particular.

9) What about the letters that *don't* get published, Sunday or weekday?

10) Going to Harvard for six months doesn't make a lawyer. In any case, Mr. Daniel really ought to stop using poor Anthony Lewis' name in vain. He was sent to London, remember?

IRVING KRISTOL

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CURRENT READING

"One Man, One Vote — So What?"

The argument for the reapportionment of state legislatures has generally been to the effect that it would, by ending rural over-representation, create a more progressive government and ensure the urban population a fairer treatment of their needs and problems. In the March, 1967, issue of *Transaction*, two political scientists, David Brady and Douglas Edmonds, turn a skeptical eye on this proposition, in an article entitled "One Man, One Vote – So What?" Among the findings of their study:

¶The malapportioned states today seem to differ very little from the more equally-apportioned ones in such things as teachers' salaries, per capita expenditure on education, percentage of state expenditure directed toward education, unemployment compensation benefits, per capita expenditures on welfare, and per capita expenditures on health.

¶What all of these things do seem to correlate positively with is (a) per capita income in the state, (b) percentage of the state population living in cities, and (c) percentage of the state population that has a high-school education.

¶In *both* malapportioned and equally-apportioned states, the large cities tend to receive a smaller share of state revenues than they pay in taxes, *and the kind of apportionment seems to make no noticeable difference in degree.* (One possible explanation of this odd fact: though big-city dwellers feel more "deprived," and certainly face a host of extraordinary problems, they also usually have a higher per capita income than non-urban citizens: state expenditures seemingly will always tend to compensate for this inequality.)

¶Apportionment appears to be of little consequence in determining whether or not a state will have a right-to-work law or an income tax.

¶Contrary to popular belief, the legislatures of malapportioned states, at least in the North, show no special tendency toward rural-Republican domination. Indeed, the malapportioned states give a more decisive majority to the Democrats, in both houses of the legislature, than do the equally-apportioned ones.

None of this means, of course, that all the arguments against malapportionment are without merit. What it does mean is that some of the more familiar arguments are in this unhappy condition, and that most of the great expectations hanging upon reapportionment are going to be dashed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Dropping-out and dropping-back-in

A sign of growing resistance to the "meritocracy" that appears to be developing in the U. S. is sometimes thought to be discernible in the increasing numbers of students who, for various and often unspecified reasons, drop out of the academic regimen. In *The College Dropout and the Utilization of Talent,* edited by Lawrence A. Pervin, Ph.D., Louis E. Reik, M.D., and Willard Dalrymple, M.D., and published by Princeton University Press, a number of psychologists, educators, and social scientists consider the problem from the psychological, educational, and social points of view. First, a few facts; but even before these, necessarily, a definition:

• In this book, the term "college dropout" refers to any student who leaves college for any period of time, regardless of reason, and does not receive his degree with the class in which he began. It thus includes transfer students, and makes no distinction between the cases of students who drop colleges, and colleges who drop students.

• *Using this definition, those who drop out of college outnumber those who do not.* Only about 40 percent of the nation's college students graduate with their original classes.

• Although there is enormous variation between colleges (the figures for finishing on schedule run from 12% to 82%), the national rate has remained relatively constant since World War II.

• A detailed study of the situation at Princeton, however, shows that although the percentage of students dropping out has not changed, *the reasons* for dropping out *have* changed significantly in recent decades: the great shift is in the decrease of those leaving for academic reasons and an increase in those leaving for personal reasons; also, more students than previously are seriously considering withdrawing.

• High academic grades have little relationship to subsequent distinction in science and the arts, but there is a significant correlation between getting a degree and succeeding occupationally.

To deal with the problem of student failure to finish college as planned, some of the authors contributing to this study focus on changing the environment: Donald Ford and Hugh Urban, Counselors at Pennsylvania State University, report on a successful, matter-of-fact counseling program they have developed there. But it is interesting to note that, in 1961, Penn State changed from an 18-week semester to a ten-week term, from a 50-minute to a 75-minute class period, with the result that students concentrated on only three or four courses at a time and their vacations fell between terms. The change was accompanied by an even further decrease of those dropped for poor scholarship than that achieved by the counseling program.

Despite some "finding" of the obvious, and some professional psychiatric claptrap, the book may have the useful effect of causing us to reexamine the assumption that there is something "wrong" when a person with the ability to do so does not go straight through, without

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a break, from kindergarten to graduation from college. A taste of the intellectual excitement of college often leads to a desire or need to look around, to explore, to read freely, and an interruption of the academic program may be highly salutary. Furthermore, those students with sufficient sensitivity to suffer in choosing between emotional and intellectual experience, when the former is intense enough to disturb the latter, need not always be handled as "problems." Students returning – chastened or elated, as the case may be – to college have a good record of success; and educators, parents, social planners, and the students themselves may learn to take such irregularities in stride: *At Princeton, in 1960, 97% of those who dropped out returned to college, 88% of these obtained a B.A. eventually, and those who have interrupted their college education are as successful in obtaining an advanced degree, if they decide to continue their education, as those who have not.* Findings at the University of Illinois and the City University of N. Y. indicate similar possibilities for successful return.

K'o-hsueh Ming-tz'u Hui-pien

Surely the most awesomely esoteric (though doubtless necessary) research task of the decade is represented by the *List of Chinese Dictionaries in All Languages* just issued by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the U. S. State Department. In all, there are 412 entries, from *acoustics* to *zoology.* In fact, there are 22 different dictionaries in zoology alone, from an English-Chinese Acarological Dictionary (Peking, 1965), to the Russian-Chinese Terminology of Zoohistology, compiled by the Academia Sinica (Peking, 1965).

The most comprehensive dictionary, at least from a cursory glance, is the *K'o-hsueh Ming-tz'u Hui-pien* (Glossary of Scientific and Technical Terms), Vols. I-VII, Taipei, Cheng-chung Shu-chu, 1958. This includes an English-Chinese glossary in twenty-two fields such as Atomic Energy, Pedology, and Sociology, a Latin-Chinese dictionary in Human Anatomy and Pharmacology, and a Latin-German-English-Chinese section in Pathology and Psychopathology.

Browsing through the volume, one is pleased to find a Chinese dictionary on Glass, by Lin Shu-i (Peking, 1959), three on Telecommunications, and even one on Refrigeration – in Chinese, English and Russian – by the Academia Sinica (Peking, 1964, 495 pages!). There are also nineteen Chinese-Chinese dictionaries, variations presumably of Fowler and Follett, which provide glossaries of daily vocabulary, new idiom, and Romanized Chinese phrases.

A section of great utility, clearly, is the Military, which lists twelve different dictionaries by the U. S. Army, the Russians, the Indians, Peking, and Taipei. One trusts that the terms in the different dictionaries match; it would be a useful computer project to find out if they do. One such start, apparently, is the *Ying-O-Han Huo-chien Chi-shu Tz'u-tien* (English-Russian-Chinese Rocketry Dictionary) (Peking, 1962). This could be helpful when ballistic and anti-ballistic missiles meet.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But the most tantalizing, if not the most inscrutable, entry is the *Ch'i-pi, Chung-wen Tz'u-tien* (Initial Stroke Chinese Dictionary), which, according to the annotation, "Gives telegraphic code numbers for characters arranged by initial stroke. Single characters with definitions. No compounds." (Hong Kong, I-shu, T'u-shu, Kung-szu, 1963, 914 pages). What a dream book for the crypto-analyst that must be! As good as that old Rand classic, *A Hundred Thousand Digits With a Million Random Numbers.*

All in all, a must book for your reference shelf.

Intellectuals for the City

Most writers on the metropolis decry it because of a romantic-pastoral bias for the green town and the garden city – e.g., Lewis Mumford; or because they regard it as noisome, dirty, responsive largely to financial interests and failing to provide individuals with sufficient "human space" – e.g., Paul Goodman. (For a searching history of these attitudes, going back to Jefferson, see Morton and Lucia White, *The Intellectual versus The City.*)

Martin Meyerson and Edward Banfield are exceptions. In their book, *Boston: The Job Ahead* (Harvard University Press), they say: "Far from being a catastrophe, the American metropolis is a great achievement – one of the greatest achievements of all times – if judged from its success in giving scores of millions of people what they want." The credentials of the two men are impressive. Meyerson, now the President of the State University of New York at Buffalo, was formerly Dean of the College of Environmental Design at Berkeley, the director of the Harvard-M.I.T. Joint Center on Urban Studies, and a planner of the Michael Reese redevelopment area in Chicago. Banfield, professor of government at Harvard, is the author of a half-dozen outstanding studies of urban politics. The book is a collection of essays, originally commissioned as a public service by the New England Merchants National Bank, and published from 1962-1965 as a series of advertisements which, because of the national attention they attracted, led to their republication in book form. Although the essays deal principally with Boston, the discussion on the suburbs, on the downtown district, traffic and transit, housing, schools, etc., is generally applicable to most American metropolises. Like Raymond Vernon, also of Harvard (in his book *The Myth and Reality of Our Urban Problems*), Meyerson and Banfield reject the elitist, aesthetic-oriented approach to city design. They believe, as does Vernon, that most citizens are unresponsive to programs of urban renewal because these reflect the values of an intellectual or planning elite. As democrats (or populists?), the authors write: "If what these millions choose – single-family houses and private cars, for example, results in costs such as traffic congestion, or increases in air pollution, these costs should not overshadow the achievements."

Meyerson and Banfield try to see the city as a "system," yet they also believe that the market is still the best way to achieve results in accordance with what most people want. They write:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> ¶The approach that we recommend and that we have tried to exemplify is one which views the metropolis as a complicated system of interrelated elements. The state of one element in the system is largely, and sometimes wholly determined by that of the others. . . .
>
> ¶Another way of characterizing our general approach is to say that it is an economizing one. We mean by this that we start from the assumption that nothing is free – that getting something one wants always involves giving up something else one wants – and then go on to look for the best terms that can be made. One who adopts this approach does not simply look for a way of achieving some given end, say the reduction of the traffic congestion. Instead he looks for that way, among the many possible ways, which will achieve the end with the least possible sacrifice of other ends (e.g., the least inconvenience and expense to motorists, safety hazards, administrative cost, and so on). He is therefore always engaged in an effort to measure and compare the costs and benefits (non-monetary as well as monetary, of course) of doing things one way with those of doing them other ways.
>
> ¶This preoccupation with finding the most economical (which is to say, most satisfying) way of doing things leads us to favor the widest possible use of the market and the price mechanism for publicly provided as well as privately provided goods and services. Where the problem of policy is to give the individual what he prefers (as distinguished from what someone thinks he ought to have), there is much to be said for arranging the situation so that people can bid against each other for what they want. We are aware, of course, that inequities in the distribution of income limit the advantages of the market as a rationing device.

The difficulty with this argument is that a systems approach and the market approach are, at least at present, largely irreconcilable. Take the question of transportation. At the moment, each item in the transportation system – rails, air, private auto, bus, ship – exists independently within the market. If the Pennsylvania Railroad, for example, wanted to build a high-speed system between New York and Washington, on the model of the famed Tokyo-Osaka run, which would bring the two cities within a two-hour distance from each other (from town center to town center), the capital costs involved would probably make the price of a ticket substantially higher than that of the air shuttle. Yet the airlines do not have to pay for the costs of the roads from the center of town to the airports, nor for the costs of the congestion. We have no decision system, in effect, which reckons out "social costs" and apportions these among those who generate such costs. Nor do we usually take "social costs" into account in making crucial decisions. When we do – when the millions of people are given a clearer picture of the *actual* cost alternatives to their choices – at that point the market mechanism might come into better use.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED